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Preface
This dissertation consists of two self-contained articles extending the work on belief-driven
stock price fluctuations by Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) and Adam, Marcet, and
Beutel (2017). In these papers, the authors develop a theory of stock price behavior that
can resolve a number of empirical puzzles, most prominently that observed stock prices
are “excessively” volatile if related to the volatility of dividends (LeRoy and Porter, 1981;
Shiller, 1981) and that stock price dynamics seem to display boom-bust cycles that are
hard to justify by shifts in fundamental values. This theory is attractive, because it
makes – relative to competing ones – only minimal adjustments to a standard Lucas-type
consumption-based asset pricing model (Lucas, 1978) along a dimension that has both
intuitive appeal and can be supported by empirical evidence.
Specifically, Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) and Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017)
relax the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) in favor of a subjective belief specifi-
cation according to which investors make statistical inference about future stock price
behavior based on past observed stock price behavior. Stocks are a very long-duration
asset1 and the dividend yield is typically only a small fraction of stock returns, whereas
capital gains play a more important role.2 These facts imply that for most investors
the expected resale price at the end of the intended holding period is much more impor-
tant for judging the merits of a stock market investment ex ante than is the expected
stream of dividend cash flows to be received during the holding period.3 Under rational
expectations, all investors know how the stock price is determined in market equilibrium
as a function of fundamentals (e.g. dividends). Consequently, forecasting future prices
amounts to forecasting future fundamentals. While future resale prices are still impor-
tant for investors, investors do not need to be concerned about them independently of
considerations about future fundamentals, because they know that the price equals the –
1The quarterly price-dividend ratio in the United States has on average been around 140 over the
post-war sample.
2The (nominal) dividend yield of the S&P 500 over the U.S. postwar sample has on average been 84
basis points, whereas (nominal) capital gains have on average amounted to 200 basis points.
3This is opposed to the situation for many fixed-income assets with finite maturity. For those, some
investors intent to hold the asset until maturity. Given this strategy, expectations about intermediate
secondary market prices are entirely irrelevant (although expectations may still be relevant to decide on
such a strategy).
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appropriately discounted – present value of future dividends on all future trading dates.
However, despite their name, rational expectations generally do not follow from ratio-
nality. Instead, rational expectations can be the outcome of a deductive reasoning process
of a rational individual only under very strong assumptions on what investors know about
the market process and other investors’ behavior (see Adam and Marcet, 2011). In prac-
tice, it is unlikely that investors are endowed with a sufficient amount of knowledge to
predict with certainty how fundamentals are mapped into market outcomes.4 The REH
rests thus on very restrictive assumptions and relaxing it has immediate intuitive ap-
peal: stock investments may in practice be perceived as risky, precisely because investors
are uncertain about future market prices, independently of and beyond the uncertainty
about future dividends (or other fundamentals). Furthermore, if investors try to use
observed market prices to draw inference about future market prices and subsequently
make trading decisions based on this inference, price-belief dynamics become partially
self-referential and may occasionally be delinked from movements in fundamentals. This
is the explanation for high stock price volatility and the emergence of boom-bust cycles
put forward by Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) and Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017).
This rationale is also supported by empirical evidence. First, the models presented in
these papers match a set of key asset pricing facts under reasonable calibrations. This is a
requirement to accept these models as quantitatively credible explanations of stock price
behavior. Second, and more importantly, Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) present direct
evidence on investor expectations based on a number of surveys.5 In all those surveys,
investors tend to expect high returns, when prices are already high relative to dividends,
and low returns, when prices are low. In contrast, actual stock returns display the opposite
pattern. This inconsistency of survey responses with actual returns is statistically strong
enough to lead Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) to reject the REH, but at the same
time it is qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the alternative subjective belief
specification these authors propose and utilize in their asset pricing model.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation studies the effects of a financial transaction tax in an
extension of the Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) model. As this framework features
stock price fluctuations that lead in their most extreme form to large and persistent
boom-bust cycles, one may be concerned that these fluctuations are inefficient and thus
socially undesirable. A policy instrument that discourages investor speculation based on
price beliefs could then raise welfare. In European policy debates following the financial
crisis, a financial transaction tax has featured prominently with precisely the intention
to discourage speculation and improve price efficiency. The chapter analyzes whether
such a tax is a suitable and desirable tool to achieve this outcome in the context of the
Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) model. In particular, it asks the question whether a
4The competing theories found in the asset pricing literature suggest that at least academic economists
seem to lack such knowledge.
5Similar evidence is also presented by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014).
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transaction tax can prevent boom-bust cycles in stock prices. The chapter is the outcome
of a joint project with Klaus Adam, Johannes Beutel and Albert Marcet, an earlier version
of which was based on my master thesis, Merkel (2014). It has been published as Adam,
Beutel, Marcet, and Merkel (2016). It also appeared as a chapter of Johannes Beutel’s
dissertation (Beutel, 2017, Chapter 2).
To make a financial transaction tax an interesting policy in the framework of analysis,
we extend the Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) model by introducing investor belief
heterogeneity that leads to equilibrium trade. Such trade is important for prices to have
any allocative implications, whereas in the absence of it, price fluctuations cannot have
welfare effects. We motivate belief heterogeneity by a more fine-grained analysis of in-
vestor survey data and show that the extended model is quantitatively consistent with
the joint behavior of stock prices, price expectations and trading volume. In this ex-
tended model, price fluctuations lead to redistribution from experienced to inexperienced
investors, which the policy maker might consider undesirable.6 We next introduce a finan-
cial transaction tax into the framework and show that such a tax does indeed discourage
speculative trading. However, this comes at the cost of reduced market liquidity. There-
fore, prices have to react strongly, whenever the market has to absorb small variations in
stock supply. If such supply variations are present,7 strong price reactions might in turn
trigger strong belief-revisions. Occasionally, these belief revisions are strong enough to
trigger a self-reinforcing price-belief feedback loop resulting in the very boom-bust cycles,
the imposition of the tax seeks to prevent. As we show in our quantitative analysis, this
indirect liquidity effect dominates the direct discouragement effect, thereby increasing
the probability of boom-bust cycles. Based on this analysis, a financial transaction tax
seems to be an undesirable instrument for improving the efficiency of stock prices.
Chapter 2 extends the framework of Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) and Adam,
Marcet, and Beutel (2017) along an entirely different dimension. Their models are based
on an endowment economy in which by assumption price fluctuations cannot have any
(aggregate) allocation effects. Chapter 2 embeds these stock price theories into a pro-
duction economy based on a real business cycle model. It is shown that the resulting
model matches a standard set of moments describing key aspects of the behavior of stock
prices, business cycles and their interaction. The framework thus provides a unified and
quantitatively credible explanation for the joint behavior of stock prices and business
cycles. The chapter is based on a paper written jointly with Klaus Adam, Adam and
Merkel (2018).
Modeling the joint behavior of stock prices and business cycles has proven to be quan-
titatively challenging. This is the case because business cycles are relatively smooth, in
6Because the model does not feature any aggregate effects of belief-driven stock price fluctuations
(for such a framework, see Chapter 2), any redistribution of the aggregate consumption quantity across
agents is Pareto-efficient. Whether such redistribution is perceived as undesirable depends thus on the
precise welfare objective.
7In our model this comes from the presence of a tiny amount of noise trades.
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particular so is consumption, whereas stock prices are very volatile. Generating volatile
prices in the presence of smooth consumption and output fluctuations is difficult in a
rational expectations model, even if output and consumption are endowment processes.
It becomes even more difficult, if endogenous production decisions provide agents with
additional tools to smooth consumption and self-insure against risks.8 To nevertheless
generate good quantitative predictions about the joint behavior of stock prices and busi-
ness cycles, the existing literature has almost exclusively relied on non-separable prefer-
ences and labor market frictions. As we argue in detail in Chapter 2, these assumptions
may be undesirable. Our theory, in contrast, does not rely on such assumptions. In-
stead, it utilizes the subjective belief specification of Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017)
that has proven successful in an endowment economy. In our framework, belief-driven
stock price fluctuations lead to cyclical variations in investment demand; booms in stock
prices are associated with booms in investment and hours worked. Consequently, in this
model belief-driven price fluctuations have aggregate effects and it becomes possible to
assess the welfare effects of such fluctuations. We find that, on average, hours worked are
higher and consumption lower than in the absence of belief distortions, because invest-
ment choices do not fully reflect productivity developments. Instead, they are partially
driven by (false) optimism and pessimism. However, the welfare gains of eliminating
belief-driven price cycles turn out to be modest, comparable in magnitude to the gains
of eliminating the business cycle.
8E.g. if agents are sufficiently averse to non-smooth consumption profiles, asset prices have to react a
lot to make agents accept the non-smooth profile in an endowment economy. But if agents can in addition
control their labor supply, they may well choose to eliminate consumption fluctuations by adjusting their
work hours in a production economy.
Chapter 1
Can a Financial Transaction Tax
Prevent Stock Price Booms?∗
1.1 Introduction
Following the financial crisis, there has been a widespread desire among policymakers to
introduce financial transaction taxes (FTTs). The European Commission, for example,
proposed the introduction of FTTs in September 2011. Subsequently, France introduced
in 2012 a 0.1% tax on stock market and related transactions and has recently increased
the tax rate to 0.2%. Italy introduced a 0.1% tax on stock market transactions in 2013.1
One of the stated policy objectives of the European Commission is that FTTs should
‘discourage financial transactions which do not contribute to the efficiency of financial
markets’. The present paper seeks to analyze to what extent FTTs actually increase
the efficiency of stock market transactions and stock market prices. In particular, it
investigates whether FTTs can prevent boom and bust like dynamics in stock prices;
over recent decades such price dynamics have become pervasive in a number of important
stock markets and have contributed to the redistribution of wealth between different kinds
of investors.2 The effect that FTTs have on boom-bust like dynamics in stock markets
should thus be of prime importance to policymakers.
To analyze this issue, we use a modeling framework that can generate stock price
fluctuations roughly of the size observed in the data, including occasional large upswings
and reversals in stock market prices. The model also quantitatively replicates important
∗This chapter was published as Adam, Beutel, Marcet, and Merkel (2016). The version presented
here is identical to the published one up to typesetting and the correction of minor errors.
1FTTs are already a widely used tax instrument in housing markets. Spain, for example, levies an 8%
transaction tax on real estate transactions and Germany levies a 5% tax, both additionally levy capital
gains taxes.
2See Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) for evidence on how the tech stock boom and bust around the
year 2000 redistributed wealth between hedge fund and other investors.
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data moments characterizing the behavior of trading volume, as well as its comovement
with stock prices and investor expectations. Credibly replicating the behavior of trading
volume appears key for an analysis that seeks to understand the effects of taxing trading
activity and is a distinguishing feature of the present analysis.3
Besides being quantitatively plausible, our modeling framework gives FTTs the best
possible chance to generate positive welfare effects: first, we consider a framework where
subjective belief components cause asset prices not to be fully efficient, so that there
is - at least in principle - room for increasing the efficiency of financial market prices;
second, within the presented framework, the gains from trade exist only in subjective
terms, i.e., due to belief differences, so that taxing trading activity may appear desirable
on a priori grounds, see Simsek (2013); third, we abstract from a number of adverse
consequences likely to be associated with the introduction of FTTs, such as costly evasive
behavior, which may involve redirecting orders to other exchanges, the adverse liquidity
effects resulting from financial market fragmentation, or the costly creation of alternative
financial instruments that are not subject to the tax.
Our main finding is that even within this very conducive setting, the introduction of
FTTs fails to ‘discourage transactions which do not contribute to the efficiency of financial
markets’. Indeed, we find that the introduction of FTTs increases the likelihood that the
stock market embarks on a significant boom and bust cycle in valuation, and thereby
increases the overall amount of wealth redistribution. The reasons for this finding are
subtle, as we explain below, but show that FTTs may actually not be a suitable policy
instrument for increasing the efficiency of stock markets.
The modeling framework used in the present paper builds upon prior work by Adam,
Beutel, and Marcet (2015), which replicates stock price behavior within a representative
agent framework with time-separable preferences. The present analysis adds (1) by in-
troducing investor heterogeneity and thereby equilibrium trade, (2) by showing that the
resulting trading patterns are empirically plausible, and (3) by studying the pricing and
welfare effects of introducing FTTs.
While the equilibrium pricing patterns of the representative agent model in Adam,
Beutel, and Marcet (2015) prove rather robust to introducing agent heterogeneity, i.e.,
stock prices continue to be very volatile and to display occasional boom-bust cycles,
the addition of agent heterogeneity helps in generating auto-correlated trading volume,
trading volume that correlates positively with absolute price changes, and trading volume
that correlates positively with investor disagreement, in line with what is found in the
data.
The presented model is one where boom-bust dynamics arise from subjective price
beliefs, but in a setting where investors take fully optimal investment decisions given their
beliefs, following Adam and Marcet (2011). The introduction of subjective stock price
beliefs is motivated by empirical evidence presented in Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015),
3See Section 1.2 for a discussion of the related literature.
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who show that the joint dynamics of realized capital gains and capital gain expectations,
as observed from survey data, are strongly inconsistent with the rational expectations
hypothesis. This implies – amongst other things – that rational asset price bubbles, e.g.,
those derived in classic work by Froot and Obstfeld (1991), are inconsistent with the joint
dynamics of actual and expected capital gains in the data.
Following Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015), we consider investors who hold subjective
stock price beliefs of a kind such that Bayesian updating causes investors to extrapolate
(to different degrees) past capital gains into the future. The degree of extrapolation is
thereby calibrated to the one that we document to be present in survey data. In particular,
we show that less experienced stock market investors extrapolate more compared to
investors with longer investment experience.
Extrapolative behavior, which gives rise to investor optimism and pessimism, po-
tentially supports a strong argument in favor of introducing FTTs. Specifically, in our
setting, price booms emerge because investors become optimistic once they see past prices
going up, causing them to bid up today’s prices, thereby creating additional optimism
in the next period and further price increases. FTTs can prevent investors from trad-
ing on their optimistic beliefs, i.e., prevent them from bidding up prices once optimism
has increased, thereby preventing the positive feedback loop between price increases and
increased optimism just described.
While intuitively plausible, this argument ignores an important additional conse-
quence of FTTs. By preventing agents from trading, even arbitrarily small exogenous
shocks to stock supply can have a disproportionately large effect on realized prices. Specif-
ically, linear transaction taxes imply that investors, whose stockholdings are close to their
subjectively optimal level, do not want to trade, unless there is a significant change in the
stock price.4 As a result, FTTs can increase price volatility in normal times. With real-
ized prices feeding into investors’ beliefs, due to extrapolative behavior, this ultimately
increases the likelihood that the stock market embarks on a large self-fueling boom and
subsequent bust. The predicted effect of a 4% FTT is an increase by one third of the
number of stock price boom episodes relative to the case without taxes.
Our quantitative analysis shows that FTTs manage to decrease the size and duration
of stock price booms, including the volatility of prices during boom times. At the same
time, FTTs increase price volatility during normal times.5 The latter together with
increased likelihood of (volatile) boom and bust episodes causes FTTs to increase overall
stock price volatility.
Motivated by the observation that it is undesirable to levy FTTs in normal times,
4This is so because the gains from trade are of second order close to the optimum, while the cost of
the tax are of first order.
5Normal times are times that are not classified as boom times. Boom times begin when the quarterly
price dividend ratio exceeds a certain level and end when the PD ratio falls below a certain lower level.
In our numerical application, we set the first threshold to 250 and latter to 200. Results turn out to be
rather robust to the precise threshold values.
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as they increase price volatility and thereby the likelihood of boom-bust cycles, we also
consider the effects of state contingent taxes that are only levied once prices exceed a
certain threshold. We show that such taxes give rise to non-continuous stock demand
functions and thereby to problems of equilibrium multiplicity and non-existence. State-
contingent transaction taxes appear problematic on these grounds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses some of the
related literature. Section 1.3 provides basic facts about the joint behavior of stock prices,
trading volume and investor expectations that we seek to quantitatively match within
our asset pricing framework. Section 1.4 introduces the asset pricing model. Section 1.5
shows that the model performs poorly in terms of replicating price and trading dynamics
when investors hold rational price expectations. Section 1.6 evaluates the quantitative
performance of the model with subjective price beliefs and in the absence of a transactions
tax. In Section 1.7 we show how stock price boom and bust dynamics redistribute wealth
between different investor types. Section 1.8 presents the implications of introducing
linear FTTs and Section 1.9 considers the effects of state-contingent taxes. A conclusion
briefly summarizes. Technical material and information about the employed data sources
is summarized in Appendix A.
1.2 Related Literature
The present paper is closely connected to an extensive literature on financial transaction
taxes going at least back to the well-known proposal by Tobin (1978). We provide here a
selective overview of the literature, making reference to work that is most closely related
to the present paper.
In a comprehensive theoretical study, Da´vila (2013) determines optimal linear trans-
action taxes for a setting where investors hold heterogeneous beliefs. He shows that the
optimal transaction tax of a social planner who maximizes social welfare under her own
(possibly different) probability beliefs, depends on the cross-sectional covariance between
investors’ beliefs and equilibrium portfolio sensitivities.
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) analyze how asset price bubbles and trading volume
are affected by transactions taxes in a setting with risk-neutral investors who face a short-
sale constraint and who hold different beliefs because they assign different information
content to publicly available signals. In their setting, transaction taxes strongly affect
trading volume but may have only a limited effect on the size of asset price bubbles.
The present paper adds to these contributions by considering the effects of FTTs
within a quantitatively credible setting that replicates important data moments describ-
ing the joint behavior of stock prices, trading volume and investor expectations. Further-
more, by incorporating learning from market prices, investors’ belief distortions depend
in important ways on market outcomes. This gives rise to feedback effects that are absent
in models in which agents consider market prices to offer only redundant information.
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In related work, Buss, Dumas, Uppal, and Vilkov (2013) consider the effects of FTTs
and other policy instruments on stock market volatility in a production economy in which
some stock market participants overinterpret the information content of public signals,
as in Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009). The present paper considers an endowment
economy but evaluates model performance also with regard to the ability to match trading
activity. Similar to our findings, Buss, Dumas, Uppal, and Vilkov (2013) show how
financial transaction taxes increase the volatility of stock market returns.
With financial transaction taxes being almost equivalent to trading costs, the present
paper also relates to the transaction costs literature. As in Constantinides (1986), trans-
action costs generate within the present setup partially flat demand curves, see also
subsequent work byAiyagari and Gertler (1991) and Heaton and Lucas (1996). Different
from Constantinides (1986), the asset price effects of transaction costs fail to be of second
order within the present setting because we consider agents that use price realizations to
update beliefs about the price process. Guasoni and Muhle-Karbe (2013) and Vayanos
and Wang (2013) provide recent surveys of the transaction cost literature.
Empirical evidence on the volatility effects of financial transaction taxes is provided in
Umlauf (1993), Jones and Seguin (1997) and Hau (2006). These studies tend to find that
market volatility increases with the introducing of a tax, see also McCulloch and Pacillo
(2011) for a recent overview of the empirical literature. Coelho (2014) and Colliard and
Hoffmann (2015) analyze the recent experiences with the introduction of FTTs in France
and Italy, documenting how FTTs increase price volatility and reduce market depth.
The market microstructure literature also studies financial transaction taxes, focusing
on the differential impact that such taxes have on the participation of noise traders, which
create exogenous market volatility or mispricing, versus the participation of informed
traders who evaluate prices according to fundamentals, see for example Jeanne and Rose
(2002) or Hau (1998). The general conclusion of this theoretical literature is that if
financial transaction taxes cause noise traders to participate less in the market, then
market volatility can fall as a result.
1.3 Stock Prices, Price Expectations and Trading
Volume: Empirical Evidence
This section documents key facts about the joint behavior of U.S. stock prices, investors’
price expectations and stock market trading volume that we seek to quantitatively repli-
cate with our asset pricing model. The next section presents empirical evidence about
stock price behavior, the behavior of dividends and the behavior of average stock price
expectations. Section 1.3.2 complements this with key facts about the behavior of trading
volume and its relation with price behavior and the behavior of price expectations. It
shows – amongst other things – that trading volume correlates positively with disagree-
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ment across investors about future prices. Finally, Section 1.3.3 shows that disagreement
between investors can be systematically related to investors’ stock market experience.
1.3.1 Stock Prices, Dividends and Average Price Expectations
Table 1.1 presents key facts about the behavior of quarterly U.S. stock prices, dividends
and stock return expectations as available from survey data.6 The facts presented in
Table 1.1 are the main data moments guiding the analysis in Adam, Beutel, and Marcet
(2015) and we summarize them here for convenience.7
Table 1.1 shows that the average quarterly price dividend ratio (E[PD]) is around
140 and has a standard deviation (std(PD)) of approximately half its average value.8
Stock prices are thus very volatile. The quarterly auto-correlation of the price dividend
(PD) ratio (corr(PDt, PDt−1)) is 0.98, showing that deviations of the PD ratio from its
sample mean are very persistent over time. As a result, quarterly real stock returns are
very volatile, with a standard deviation (std(rs)) of around 8% per quarter. Real stock
returns are thus much more volatile than real dividend growth, which has a standard
deviation (std(Dt/Dt−1)) of just 1.92%. The mean real stock return (E[rs]) is 1.89% per
quarter and much higher than the average growth rate of real dividends (E[Dt/Dt−1 − 1]),
which equals 0.48% per quarter.
Table 1.1 also documents that the average investor’s expected real returns in the
UBS survey correlates strongly and positively with the PD ratio (corr(PDt, EtRt+1)):
the correlation equals 0.79.9 Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015) show that this fact is
robust against using other survey data sources and against alternative ways to distill
expectations from the survey data. They also show that this fact is inconsistent with
investors holding rational price expectations, which is why we include the correlation
between the PD ratio and expected returns in the set of data moments that we seek to
match.
1.3.2 Trading Volume, Stock Prices and Disagreement
This section presents empirical facts about trading activity and its comovement with
prices and price expectations. It shows that trading volume is highly persistent, that
trading volume is largely uncorrelated with stock market valuation, instead correlates
6The data sources used in this and the subsequent sections are described in Appendix A.1.
7We include here all asset pricing facts considered in Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015), except for
those involving the bond market, as the present model does not feature a bond market.
8The quarterly PD ratio is defined as the price over quarterly dividend payments, see Appendix A.1
for further details.
9The number reported in Table 1.1 uses the mean of the expected returns of the own portfolio return
expectations of all investors in the UBS survey. The survey data are avaialable from 1998:Q2 to 2007:Q2
and have been transformed into real values using the median of expected inflation reported in the survey
of professional forecasters.
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Table 1.1
Quarterly stock prices, dividends and survey expecta-
tions
Considered U.S. data, 1949:Q1-2012:Q1
moments
Stock prices
E[PD] 139.7
std(PD) 65.3
corr(PDt, PDt−1) 0.98
std(rs) 8.01%
E[rs] 1.89%
Survey expectations
corr(PDt, EtRt+1) 0.79
Dividends
E[Dt/Dt−1 − 1] 0.48%
std(Dt/Dt−1) 1.92%
positively with absolute price changes. Furthermore, it documents - to our knowledge for
the first time - that aggregate trading volume and disagreement about future aggregate
stock market returns, as measured by survey data, are positively correlated.
The finance literature studies a range of empirical measures to capture trading activity,
see Lo and Wang (2009) for an overview. To account for trading in individual shares, Lo
and Wang (2009) argue that ‘shares traded divided by shares outstanding is a natural
measure of trading activity when viewed in the context of standard portfolio theory and
equilibrium asset-pricing models’ (p.243). Clearly, for individual shares, this measure
is identical to using the dollar volume of shares traded divided by the dollar volume of
shares outstanding. Since this latter measure aggregates more naturally across different
stocks and since we are interested in the aggregate stock market, we use the dollar volume
of shares traded over the dollar volume of share outstanding as our preferred measure of
trading volume.
We aggregate daily trading volume into a quarterly series by summing up the daily
trading volumes over the quarter, following Lo and Wang (2009). While being standard,
this procedure is likely going to lead to an overstatement of the model relevant trading
volume, as many of the daily trades recorded in the data may be reversed with oppos-
ing trades within the same quarter. Indeed, with the advent of high frequency trading
strategies, many of the recorded trades are likely to be undone within seconds, if not
milliseconds. Dealing properly with this issue in the data is difficult, as it would require
information about individual portfolios of all investors. We seek to account - at least
partially - for the increasing share of high-frequency trades over time, therefore use de-
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Figure 1.1. Quarterly trading volume (% of outstanding shares, undetrended)
trended data on trading volume. Since detrending can affect the cyclical properties of the
trading volume series, we report below only facts that turn out to be robust to a range
of plausible detrending methods.
Figure 1.1 depicts the (undetrended) quarterly trading volume of the U.S. stock mar-
ket, where data is available from January 1973. Trading volume displays a clear upward
trend over time. In the early 1970’s trade during a quarter amounted to around 5% of the
market value of outstanding shares; at the end of the sample period this number reaches
close to 50%; the data also shows temporary spikes in trading volume around the 1987,
2000 and 2008 stock market busts.
Table 1.2 presents a number of facts about detrended trading volume. As a baseline,
we use simple linear detrending, but the table also displays outcomes for other commonly
used detrending methods. In particular, it considers linear-quadratic detrending, the
outcomes obtained from HP-filtering with a smoothing parameter of 1600, as well as so-
called moving average (MA) detrending, which normalizes trading volume by the average
trading volume recorded in the preceding four quarters.
Table 1.2 shows that trading volume displays considerable autocorrelation across quar-
ters. The autocorrelation is statistically significant at the 1% level for all detrending
methods.10 For higher frequencies, this is a well-known fact that has been documented
in the finance literature, we show it here for the quarterly frequency at which we will
evaluate our asset pricing model.
Table 1.2 also shows that there exists no statistically significant correlation between
10We test the null hypothesis H0 : corr(·, ·) = 0 in this and subsequent tables using robust standard
errors, following Roy and Cle´roux (1993), which are implemented with a Newey-West estimator with 4
leads and lags.
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Table 1.2
Trading Volume and Price Behavior
Correlations Detrending Method
Baseline (linear) Linear-quadratic HP filter MA
corr(TVt, TVt−1) 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.66*** 0.43***
corr(TVt, PDt) -0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.06
corr(TVt, |Pt/Pt−1 − 1|) 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.23***
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively.
trading volume and the level of the PD ratio.11 This illustrates that claims about the
existence of a high positive correlation between the level of stock prices and trading
volume, see for example Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and the references cited therein,
disappear once one removes the trend displayed by trading volume.12
The previous finding does not imply that trading volume and prices are unrelated.
Indeed, as Table 1.2 documents, trading volume correlates positively and in a statistically
highly significant way with normalized absolute price changes. This finding holds again
for all detrending methods. It is in line with patterns documented by Karpoff (1987) and
shows that periods of high volume are associated with large relative price changes.
The facts presented in Table 1.2 are fairly standard in the light of the existing finance
literature studying trading volume. We complement these facts below with additional
empirical evidence on the relationship between trading volume and belief disagreement.
Models in which investors disagree about the future prospects from investment have a
long tradition in the finance literature, see Hong and Stein (2007) for a survey. We
document in Table 1.3 below that there exists a fairly robust positive correlation between
aggregate trading volume and the amount of cross-sectional disagreement about future
aggregate stock market returns.
Table 1.3 reports the correlation between trading volume and the cross-sectional stan-
dard deviations of real survey return expectations (corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1))), as obtained
from various survey data sources.13 The point estimate of the correlation is always pos-
itive and often statistically significant when using linear or linear-quadratic detrending
or the HP filter. The evidence is less strong when detrending trading volume using the
moving average approach, but is otherwise rather robust. Furthermore, to document that
11Table 1.2 uses the undetrended PD ratio. Detrending the PD ratio leads to very similar conclusions.
For example, using instead the linearly detrended or HP filtered PD ratio, the point estimates for the
correlations with turnover range between -0.27 and 0.02, depending on the way turnover is detrended.
12Our findings also hold true if one uses data only up to the year 2006, which shows that results are
not driven by the recent financial crisis.
13Since the Shiller survey asks for expected capital gains, the reported correlations for this survey
pertain to the cross-sectional dispersion of capital gain expectations.
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Table 1.3
Correlation between trading volume and disagreement
Survey sources Detrending Method
Baseline Linear- HP filter MA
(linear) quadratic
UBS-Gallup survey (1-year horizon)
corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.41* 0.41** 0.43* 0.17
corr(TVt, IQR(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.36 0.50* 0.65** 0.41**
Shiller survey (3-months horizon)
corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.37* 0.40* 0.43** -0.06
corr(TVt, IQR(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.52** 0.54** 0.63*** 0.19
Shiller survey (6-months horizon)
corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.60*** 0.60* 0.58*** 0.03
corr(TVt, IQR(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.43* 0.46* 0.47** 0.09
Shiller survey (1-year horizon)
corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.51** 0.52** 0.51*** 0.18
corr(TVt, IQR(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.49** 0.55** 0.56*** 0.23
CFO survey (1-year horizon)
corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.70** 0.65** 0.64*** -0.02
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively.
results are not driven by outliers in the surveys, Table 1.3 also reports the correlation be-
tween detrended trading volume and the inter-quartile range (IQR) of the cross-section of
survey expectations (corr(TVt, IQR(E˜
i
tRt+1))).
14 Results turn out to be robust towards
using this alternative dispersion measure.
Overall, the evidence in Table 1.3 shows that trading volume and disagreement are
positively correlated in the data.
1.3.3 Disagreement and Stock Market Experience
Given the evidence presented in the previous section, which shows that investor disagree-
ment is systematically related to trading volume, this section explores potential sources
of investor disagreement more closely. In particular, it shows that disagreement can be
partly related to investor experience: the price expectations of investors with less stock
market experience are more heavily influenced by recent stock market performance than
14For the CFO survey, we do not observe individual survey responses or the interquartile range, thus
cannot perform this robustness check.
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Figure 1.2. Price growth expectations by experience group (UBS survey, real, in quarterly
growth rates)
those with more experience.
Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015) show that the empirical time series behavior of the
average price growth expectation in the UBS survey data (Et[Pt+1/Pt]) can be captured
very well by an extrapolative updating equation of the form
Et[Pt+1/Pt] = Et−1[Pt/Pt−1] + g
(
Pt
Pt−1
− Et−1[Pt/Pt−1]
)
, (1.1)
which stipulates that the average investor extrapolates observed capital gains into the
future. We document below that investors with different numbers of years of experience
extrapolate to different degrees.
Figure 1.2 depicts the evolution of quarterly real price growth expectations held by
investors with different years of stock market experience, as available from the UBS
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survey.15’16 It shows that in the year 1999 and until the beginning of the year 2000,
when prior stock market returns have been very high due to the preceding tech stock
boom, it is the less experienced investors that tend to be most optimistic about future
capital gains. Indeed, investors with 0-5 years of experience expect an average real capital
gain of around 3.5% per quarter, i.e., a real gain of about 14% per year, while the most
experienced group expects considerably lower capital gains (albeit still very high ones
by historical standards). Following the subsequent stock market bust, belief dispersion
across investor groups significantly narrows and reaches a low point during the stock
market trough in the year 2003. Clearly, this happens because less experienced investors
updated expectations more strongly during the market bust. Following the stock market
recovery after the year 2003, belief dispersion widened again, with the least experienced
investor group then holding once more the highest return expectations, while the two
most experienced groups hold the lowest expectations.
Figure 1.2 suggests, in line with evidence presented in Malmendier and Nagel (2011),
that the capital gain expectations of less experienced investors react more strongly to
realized capital gains. We formally check this hypothesis by estimating the updating
parameter g in equation (1.1) for each experience group separately, using the same ap-
proach as employed in Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015). Table 1.4 reports the estimation
outcome and shows that the updating parameter is monotonically decreasing with expe-
rience, with the updating parameter of the most inexperienced group of investors being
approximately 75% higher than that of the most experienced investor group. The es-
timated updating gains are all statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%
level.17 Appendix A.4 shows that the gains are significantly different from each other for
sufficiently distant experience groups and that the gain of the most experienced investor
group is different from those of all other groups at the 1% level.
15We choose experience groups with equidistant group boundaries (except for the highest group) and
in a way that groups are approximately of similar size. The reported results are robust to using different
numbers of groups or different group boundaries, provided one does not consider too many groups, which
causes results to become more noisy.
16The figure reports the ’own portfolio’ return expectations from the UBS survey, as these are available
for a longer time period. Results do not depend on this choice, though. We transform nominal return
expectations into real expectations using the median inflation forecast from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters. To be consistent with our asset pricing model, which models capital gain expectations, we
transform real return expectations into a measure of real price growth expectations using the identity
Rt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
+ Dt+1Pt =
Pt+1
Pt
+ βDDtPt where β
D denotes the expected gross quarterly real growth rate
of dividends that we set equal to its sample average, i.e, βD = 1.0048, see Table 1.1. Results are very
similar when using alternative plausible values for βD. Also, since the UBS survey does not have a panel
structure, the figure is based on a pseudo panel and reports at each point in time the median expectation
of the considered experience group.
17Standard errors in Table 1.4 and the p-values reported in Appendix A.4 are computed in a standard
way, exploiting the fact that the procedure used for estimating the gain is a nonlinear least squares
estimation.
CHAPTER 1. CAN A FTT PREVENT STOCK PRICE BOOMS? 18
Table 1.4
Estimated updating parameters
Experience (yrs) 0-5 6-11 12-17 18-23 > 23
Estimated gi 0.0316*** 0.0286*** 0.0264*** 0.0230*** 0.0180***
(std. deviation) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0090)
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively.
1.4 The Asset Pricing Model
This section presents the asset pricing model that we use to replicate the empirical facts
documented in the previous section. We consider a model with a unit mass of atomistic
investors who trade on a competitive stock market, where trade may be subject to a
linear transactions tax. At the beginning of each period, stocks pay a stochastic dividend
Dt per unit and investors earn an exogenous wage income Wt. Income from both sources
takes the form of perishable consumption goods.
There are I ≥ 1 types of investors in the economy and a mass µi > 0 of each type
i ∈ {0, . . . , I}, where ∑Ii=1 µi = 1. Types differ with respect to the beliefs they entertain
about the behavior of future stock prices and with regard to their accumulated stock-
holdings. For the special case without a financial transactions tax and when there is a
single investor type, the setup reduces to the one studied in Adam, Beutel, and Marcet
(2015).
The Investment Problem. The representative investor of type i ∈ {1, ..., I} solves
max
{Cit≥0,Sit}∞t=0
EP
i
0
∞∑
t=0
δt
(Cit)
1−γ
1− γ (1.2)
s.t.: SitPt + C
i
t = S
i
t−1 (Pt +Dt) +Wt − τ
∣∣(Sit − Sit−1)Pt∣∣+ T it
Si−1 given,
where Ci denotes consumption, γ > 1 the coefficient of relative risk aversion, Si the
agent’s stockholdings, P ≥ 0 the (ex-dividend) price of the stock, τ ≥ 0 a linear financial
transactions tax, which is levied on the agents’ trading volume
∣∣(Sit − Sit−1)Pt∣∣ and T i ≥ 0
lump sum tax rebates.
Investors’ choices are contingent on the history of variables that are exogenous to
their decision problem, i.e., time t choices depend on {Pj, Dj,Wj, Tj}tj=0 and the initial
condition Si−1. P i denotes a subjective probability measure, which assigns probabilities
to all possible infinite histories {Pt, Dt,Wt, Tt}∞t=0. The agent’s subjective probabilities
may or may not coincide with the objective probabilities, i.e., agents may not know the
true probabilities characterizing the behavior of the variables {Pt, Dt,Wt, Tt}∞t=0, which
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are beyond their control, but agents are ‘internally rational’ in the sense of Adam and
Marcet (2011), i.e., behave optimally given their beliefs about external variables.
We consider linear transaction taxes because they are most easily implemented in prac-
tice. In addition, non-linear transaction taxes would create incentives to either partition
trades into smaller increments or bundle trades of several investors into larger packages,
so as to economize on transaction costs. The resulting tax rate would effectively be linear
again. To simplify the analysis, we also assume that transaction taxes paid by investors
of type i are rebated in the same period in a lump sum fashion, i.e.,
T it = τ
∣∣(Sit − Sit−1)Pt∣∣ , (1.3)
where Sit and S
i
t−1 on the r.h.s. of the previous equation denote the choices of the
representative investor of type i.18 We thereby eliminate the income effects associated
with raising transaction taxes.19 Appendix A.5 considers an alternative setup without
tax rebates (T it ≡ 0 for all t, i). It shows that the main quantitative findings are robust
to assuming that taxes are not rebated to investors.
The exogenous wage and dividend processes take the form considered previously in
Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015), with dividends evolving according to
lnDt = ln β
D + lnDt−1 + ln εDt , (1.4)
where βD ≥ 1 denotes the mean growth rate of dividends and, ln εDt an i.i.d. growth
innovation described further below. The wage income process Wt is chosen such that
the resulting aggregate consumption process Ct = Wt +Dt is empirically appealing.
20 In
particular, we assume
lnWt = ln ρ+ lnDt + ln ε
W
t , (1.5)
where (
ln εDt
ln εWt
)
∼ iiN
(
−1
2
(
σ2D
σ2W
)
,
(
σ2D σDW
σDW σ
2
W
))
(1.6)
which implies EεDt = Eε
W
t = 1.
Substituting the constraint into the objective function and dividing the objective
function by D1−γ0 , the investor’s problem can be written as
max
{Sit}∞t=0
EP
i
0
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
Dt
D0
)1−γ (Sit−1 ( PtDt + 1)+ Wt+T itDt − τ ∣∣∣ (Sit−Sit−1)PtDt ∣∣∣− Sit PtDt)1−γ
1− γ
s.t. : Si−1 given (1.7)
18Agents’ fully understand that what matters for tax rebates is the trading decision of the representative
investor of type i and not their own decision.
19Alternative assumptions, e.g., a rebate that is identical across investors at each point in time, would
make rebates dependent on the whole distribution of trades in equilibrium and thus on the distribution
of investors’ beliefs. This would add many additional state variables into investors’ decision problem.
20For further details, we refer the reader to Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015), Section 4.
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Due to the linear transaction cost specification, the preceding optimization problem fails
to be differentiable. We explain in Section 1.4.1 how we deal with this difficulty.
Subjective Beliefs. To complete the description of the investment problem we now
specify investors’ subjective probability measure P i. We first assume that agents know
the processes (1.4) and (1.5), i.e., hold rational dividend and wage expectations.21 In a
second step, we seek to specify subjective price beliefs in a way that allows us to capture
the extrapolative nature of price expectations, as implied by survey data. In particular,
following Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015), we set up a belief system for prices that
leads to expectation dynamics of the kind described by equation (1.1), which captures
the empirical behavior of survey expectations. To this end, we endow agents with a belief
system that allows for persistent deviations of the growth rate of prices from the growth
rate of dividends. Specifically, we assume that agent i’s perceived law of motion of prices
is given by
lnPt+1 − lnPt = ln βit+1 + ln ε1,it+2 + ln ε2,it+1, (1.8)
where ε1,it+2, ε
2,i
t+1 denote (not directly observable) transitory shocks to price growth and
βit+1 a persistent price growth component that slowly drifts over time according to
ln βit+1 = ln β
i
t + ln ν
i
t+1, (1.9)
and where the persistent component of price growth ln βit+1 is also unobserved. The setup
just described can capture periods with sustained increases in the price dividend ratio
(βit+1 > β
D), as well as periods with sustained decreases (βit+1 < β
D). The perceived inno-
vations ln ε1,it+2, ln ε
2,i
t+1 and ln v
i
t+1 are assumed to be jointly normally distributed according
to  ln ε1,it+2ln ε2,it+1
ln νit+1
 ∼ iiN

 −
σ2ε,1
2
−σ2ε,2
2
− (σiv)2
2
 ,
 σ2ε,1 0 00 σ2ε,2 0
0 0 σiν
2

 , (1.10)
where the variances σ2ε,1, σ
2
ε,2 of the transitory components are identical for all agents.
We allow the perceived variance of the innovation to the persistent component (σiν
2) to
differ across investors, so as to be able to capture the different responsiveness of survey
expectations to realized price growth rates, as documented in Section 1.3.3.
The previous setup defines an optimal filtering problem for agents, in which they need
to decompose observed price growth (lnPt+1 − lnPt) into its persistent and transitory
components (ln βit+1 and ln ε
1,i
t+2 + ln ε
2,i
t+1, respectively). In the special case, that the
21This is motivated by the fact that within the present setting with time-separable preferences, (rea-
sonable amounts of) extrapolation of wage and dividend beliefs would add very little to price volatility.
This holds true for models with rational price expectations, as discussed in Section 2 in Adam, Beutel,
and Marcet (2015), but also for models with subjective price beliefs, see for example Section V.A in
Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015).
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two transitory shock components are both unobserved and can thus be combined to
ln εit = ln ε
1,i
t+1 + ln ε
2,i
t with variance σ
2
ε = σ
2
ε,1 + σ
2
ε,2, Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015)
show, that under the assumption of a normal prior with variance equal to its Kalman
filter steady state value, price growth beliefs can be summarized by a single state variable
mit that evolves according to
lnmit = lnm
i
t−1 −
(σiv)
2
2
+ gi
(
lnPt − lnPt−1 + (σ
i
ε)
2 + (σiv)
2
2
− lnmit−1
)
(1.11)
gi =
(σi)2
σ2ε + (σ
i)2
, (1.12)
where
(σi)2 ≡
−(σiν)2 +
√
((σiν)
2)2 + 4(σiν)
2σ2ε
2
is the Kalman filter steady state variance. The state variable lnmit describes the mean
of ln βit conditional on the information available at time t, i.e., ln β
i
t is conditionally
N(lnmit, (σ
i)2)-distributed, which implies
EP
i
t
[
Pt+1
Pt
]
= mite
(σi)2/2.
This previous result, together with equation (1.11) shows that optimal belief updating
delivers - up to a log-exponential transformation - the updating equation (1.1) considered
in the empirical section. Moreover, equation (1.12) shows that the optimal updating
parameter gi is a positive function of the variance (σiν)
2, which allows us to replicate the
empirically observed heterogeneity in the belief updating equations.
To avoid simultaneity between prices and price beliefs, which may give rise to multiple
market clearing price and price belief pairs, we shall rely on a slightly modified information
structure, where agents observe ln ε1,it as part of their time t information set. Adam,
Beutel, and Marcet (2015) show how such a modified information structure gives rise to
an updating equation of the form
lnmit = lnm
i
t−1 + g
i
(
lnPt−1 − lnPt−2 − lnmit−1
)− g ln ε1,it , (1.13)
which has lagged price growth enter.22
To complete the description of the belief system, we need to specify investors’ beliefs
about the behavior of the lump sum tax rebate T it . We shall assume that agents under-
stand that the tax rebates do not depend on their own decision, instead on the choices
22Price growth expectations are then given by EP
i
t [Pt+1/Pt] = m
i
t.
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of the representative investor of the same type i. Moreover, we assume that agents know
the tax rebate function (1.3).23
Market Clearing. The stock market clearing condition is given by
I∑
i=1
Sitµi = 1 + ut,
where the left-hand side denotes total stock demand by investors of all types and the right-
hand side total stock supply. We incorporate a small exogenous stochastic component
ut into stock supply, which we assume to be white noise, uniformly distributed and to
have support [−u, u] for some u > 0 sufficiently close to zero. Stock supply shocks ut
may thereby capture the issuance of new stocks or stock repurchases by firms.24 We add
these shocks because linear financial transaction taxes lead to piecewise price-insensitive
demand curves, which can give rise to equilibrium price indeterminacy in the absence of
supply shocks. In our numerical applications, we make sure that u is sufficiently small
such that it has no noticeable effects on the outcomes that emerge in the absence of a
financial transaction tax. For the case with transaction taxes, the supply shock effectively
only selects the equilibrium price whenever price-insenstitive demand curve may create
the potential for price indeterminacy.
1.4.1 Solution Approach
This section explains how one can solve for the optimal solution of the non-differentiable
problem (1.7). The approach we pursue consists of defining an alternative optimization
problem with a differentiable transaction cost specification, so that a standard solution
approach based on first order conditions can be applied. The alternative problem has the
property that all choices that are feasible in the original problem are also feasible in the
alternative problem. Therefore, if the optimal solution to the differentiable problem is a
feasible choice in (1.7), then it must also solve (1.7).
The alternative problem we consider is
max
{Sit}∞t=0
EP
i
0
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
Dt
D0
)1−γ (Sit−1 ( PtDt + 1)+ Wt+T itDt − τ it (Sit−Sit−1)PtDt − Sit PtDt)1−γ
1− γ
s.t. : Si−1 given (1.14)
23This assumption considerably simplifies the analysis: since in equilibrium individual actions coincide
with those of the representative investor of the same type, we do not need to incorporate any addi-
tional state variables that characterize the future evolution of lump sum taxes, when writing a recursive
representation of the agents’ decision problem.
24Alternatively, they may capture changes to asset float, as discussed in Ofek and Richardson (2003)
and Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006). In any case, these shocks capture (exogenous) stock demand
or supply that is not coming from the consumers described around equation (1.2).
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where τ it ∈ [−τ, τ ] denotes a state-contingent but fully linear transaction tax/subsidy and
where T it is given by (1.3). Problem (1.14) is differentiable and can be solved in a standard
way using first-order conditions. Moreover, since τ it ∈ [−τ, τ ], all stockholding plans that
are feasible in the original problem (1.7) continue to be feasible in the alternative problem
(1.14).
Suppose that the state-contingent transactions cost function τ it and the associated op-
timal stockholding plan
{
Si,optt
}∞
t=0
solving (1.14) jointly satisfy for all t ≥ 0 the following
property
τ it = τ at contingencies where S
i,opt
t > S
i,opt
t−1
τ it = −τ at contingencies where Si,optt < Si,optt−1
τ it ∈ [−τ, τ ] at contingencies where Si,optt = Si,optt−1 ,
(1.15)
then
{
Si,optt
}∞
t=0
is also feasible in the original problem (1.7) and thus the solution to
(1.7). The task of solving the original non-differentiable problem (1.7) is thus equivalent
to finding a state contingent tax function τ it such that condition (1.15) holds for the
optimal solution of the alternative differentiable problem (1.14).
For a given {τ it}∞t=0 the solution to (1.14) is characterized by the first order condition(
Ct
Dt
)−γ
(1 + τ it )
Pt
Dt
= δEPt
(
Ct+1
Dt+1
)−γ (
Dt+1
Dt
)1−γ (
Pt+1
Dt+1
(1 + τ it+1) + 1
)
(1.16)
As noted above, investor i’s subjective beliefs can be summarized by the recursively
evolving state variable mit. Provided the state contingency of the tax function can be
expressed in the form τ it = τ
i(Sit−1,
Pt
Dt
, Wt
Dt
,mit), where the arguments in the function
should be interpreted as the choices and beliefs of the representative agent of type i,
the optimal stock holding policy then also has a recursive representation of the form
St = S
i(Sit−1,
Pt
Dt
, Wt
Dt
,mit), by the same arguments as put forward in Adam, Beutel, and
Marcet (2015).25,26
Our numerical solution routines, which are described in Appendix A.2 simultaneously
solve for the functions τ i(·) and Si(·) that jointly satisfy equations (1.15) and (1.16).
Numerically solving for the optimal solution is computationally costly. Despite extensive
reliance on parallelization, the numerical computation of the solution and the evaluation
of the Euler errors takes around 30 hours of computing time.
25The fact that the transaction costs are linear and that under the stated assumptions the tax rebate
T i is a function of the same state variables is key for this result.
26The fact that τ it depends on S
i
t−1 is just a convenient way to summarize dependence of the tax
function on past values of Pt, Dt and Wt. It does not mean that the agent thinks that τ
i
t depends on
its own choices, in fact, as should be clear from the first order condition (1.16), the agent takes τ it as
exogenously given.
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1.5 Outcomes under Objective Price Beliefs
Before presenting the model outcome under subjective price beliefs, this section briefly
discusses the model predictions for the case where agents hold rational price expectations.
With objective price beliefs and with investors holding identical initial stock endowments,
differences between investor types disappear. The model then reduces to a representa-
tive agent rational expectations model with time-separable preferences. As shown in
Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015), the pricing implications of the model then display a
well-known set of shortcomings. The standard deviation of the price dividend ratio, for
instance, is one order of magnitude below that observed in the data and displays virtu-
ally no persistence over time. The model thus fails to replicate the large and protracted
run-ups and reversals that can be observed for the PD ratio in U.S. data. The model
also fails to replicate the positive correlation between the PD ratio and expected returns,
as evidenced in survey data. Finally, with rational price expectations, the model does
not give rise to trade in equilibrium, thus cannot be related to the documented facts on
trading activity. As we show in the next section, model performance strongly improves,
once one incorporates the kind of extrapolative behavior documented in survey data.
1.6 Quantitative Model Performance
This section evaluates the quantitative performance of our asset pricing model in the
absence of FTTs with subjective price beliefs given by equations (1.8) and (1.9). Per-
formance is evaluated in terms of the ability to match the stylized facts presented in
Section 1.3. The effects of introducing FTTs will be studied in Section 1.8.
We parameterize our model using the model parameters employed in Adam, Beutel,
and Marcet (2015), which are summarized in Table 1.5. Table 1.5 also lists the value
for the support of stock supply shocks, which is a new parameter and set such that the
amount of trade caused by these shocks amounts to less than 0.3% of the average trading
volume in a setting without FTTs. Since trading volume is only weakly affected for the
considered range of FTTs, the same holds approximately true for the case with FTTs.
Furthermore, we verify that in the absence of FTTs, stock supply shocks affect the model
moments in almost non-noticable ways.
Motivated by the evidence in Table 1.4, we consider a model with 5 agent types, each
of which has mass 1/5, and assign to them the point estimates of the updating gains from
Table 1.4.27
Table 1.6 compares the model generated moments in the absence of FTTs to those
in the data.28 The model moments for our baseline calibration are reported in the third
27Recall that we chose the experience groups in Table 1.4 so as to have approximately the same number
of investors in each group.
28All simulation results are based on 100.000 quarters of simulated data, where the first 10.000 quarters
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Table 1.5
Model calibration
Parameter Value Calibration target
βD 1.0048 average quarterly real dividend growth
σD 0.0192 std. deviation quarterly real dividend growth
ρ 22 average consumption-dividend ratio
σDW −3.74 · 10−4 jointly chosen s.t. corrt(Ct/Ct−1, Dt/Dt−1) = 0.2
σW 0.0197 and stdt(Ct/Ct−1) = 17stdt(Dt/Dt−1)
σε 0.0816 std. deviation of quarterly real stock price growth
δ 0.995 average PD ratio
γ 2 – none –
u 1 · 10−5 – none –
column, while the fourth column reports the associated t-ratios for each considered data
moment.29 Overall, our asset pricing model does a good job in replicating the pure
stock price moments, i.e., the first five moments reported in the table. It matches par-
ticularly well the mean and autocorrelation of the PD ratio, as well as the mean of
quarterly real stock returns. It produces, however, too much volatility for the PD ratio
and for returns. The model also does a good job in capturing the observed high positive
correlation between the PD ratio and average return expectations in the survey data
(corr(PDt, EtRt+1)).
Regarding the newly added moments, the model generates a high positive autocor-
relation in trading volume (corr(TVt, TVt−1)), albeit the model correlation is too high
relative to the one found in the data. The model also manages to quantitatively capture
the positive correlation between trading volume and (normalized) absolute price changes
(corr(TVt, |Pt/Pt−1 − 1|)). When looking at the correlation between trading volume and
the PD ratio (corr(TVt, PDt)), the model produces a fairly weak positive correlation,
but one that is stronger than in the data. The model also generates a positive cor-
relation between trading volume and cross sectional dispersion of return expectations
(corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1))), but again overstates this correlation relative to the data.
30 The
latter should not be surprising, given that in our simple model belief dispersion is the
are considered as a burn-in and discarded when calculating model moments. Also, to make results from
different simulations more comparable, we use fixed sequences for the exogenous driving processes (wages,
dividends, stock supply shocks).
29The t-ratio is based on an estimate of the standard deviation of the data moment as a measure of
uncertainty. Since the data moments in Table 1.6 are not truly data moments, but functions of such
moments, we estimate the standard deviation using the so-called delta method, as described in Cox
(1998) or in the online appendix to Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016).
30The data moment reported in Table 1.6 is the one pertaining to the UBS survey, which has also been
used to compute corr(PDt, EtRt+1) in the data.
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Table 1.6
Quantitative match of the asset pricing model
Considered moments U.S. data Baseline model t-ratio Reduced gain t-ratio
(no tax) (no tax)
E[PD] 139.77 135.77 0.16 117.16 0.91
std(PD) 65.17 122.13 -3.84 92.96 -1.88
corr(PDt, PDt−1) 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.98 -0.13
std(rs) (%) 8.00 11.63 -9.05 8.27 -0.68
E[rs] (%) 1.89 2.11 -0.47 1.84 0.11
corr(PDt, EtRt+1) 0.79 0.84 -0.78 0.84 -0.73
corr(TVt, TVt−1) 0.89 0.97 -4.29 0.97 -4.14
corr(TVt, PDt) -0.07 0.37 -5.79 0.47 -7.09
corr(TVt, |Pt/Pt−1 − 1|) 0.34 0.25 1.12 0.28 0.78
corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.41 0.95 -3.67 0.92 -3.50
only reason why agents want to trade.
Since the baseline model produces an ‘anti-puzzle’ in the form of too much stock price
volatility relative to the data, we also consider a model version in which we dampen
the extrapolative component in belief updating. This is motivated by the fact that the
updating gains in Table 1.4 are themselves estimated with uncertainty. Specifically, we
reduce the point estimates from Table 1.4 by 2.5 times the estimated standard deviation
of the point estimate31, leaving all other parameters unchanged. The resulting model
moments are reported in the second to last column in Table 1.6 below, with the last
column reporting the associated t-ratios. Price and return volatility are now in line with
data, while all other moments remain largely unaffected.
Overall, we find that the model does a good job in quantitatively replicating the joint
behavior of stock price, trading volume and price expectations.
1.7 Asset Price Booms and their Implications
This section illustrates that stock prices in the model occasionally embark on a self-
sustaining asset price boom and bust cycle. Unlike in the representative agent model of
Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015), such cycles have large welfare implications for different
agent types.
To illustrate the potential of the model to generate boom-bust cycles and to compute
the welfare implications of such cycles, we conduct a simple controlled experiment using
31We use for each gain parameter the gain specific standard deviation reported in the last row of
Table 1.4.
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Figure 1.3. Response of the PD ratio to dividend growth shocks: initial periods
the baseline model from the previous section: we fix agents’ initial stockholdings and
initial beliefs at their ergodic sample means; we then shock the economy with n positive
dividend growth shocks of a two standard deviation size. Such or larger positive dividend
shocks occur with a probability of about 2.5% per quarter. We shut down all other
shocks, including dividend growth shocks after period n. We begin the experiment with
n = 1 and successively increase n until we obtain a stock price boom and bust cycle
from period n+ 1 onwards. Figure 1.3 depicts - for different values of n - the equilibrium
outcomes for the PD ratio during the initial periods. While the PD ratio reacts very
little to the positive news when n = 1 (stock prices, however, do react to the positive
dividend news), the increase in price optimism starts to increase slightly the PD ratio
for n = 2 and n = 3. For n = 4 one suddenly obtains a very large stock price boom
and a subsequent price bust, see Figure 1.4.32 The economic forces driving the boom
and bust dynamics are explained in detail in Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2015). Here,
we only note that the boom results from the fact that agents - having observed price
increases - become optimistic about future price growth and eventually bid up stock
prices by sufficient amounts, so that price increases and increasing optimism mutually
reinforce each other. This effect is set in motion whenever a sufficient number of positive
32Increasing n further would lead to very similar boom-bust dynamics as for the case with n = 4.
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Figure 1.4. Response of the PD ratio: three versus four dividend growth shocks
fundamental shocks, e.g., dividend growth shocks, occurs. The boom comes to an end,
when agents’ increased wealth leads them to eventually increase consumption demand,
so that stock demand ceases to increase further with increased optimism. Prices then
stagnate, which means that they fail to fulfill the high growth expectations of agents.
Agents then revise growth beliefs downwards and set in motion a price bust. The bust
causes a temporary undershooting of the PD ratio below its ergodic mean, but prices
eventually return close to their ergodic mean absent further shocks, see Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.5 depicts the PD ratio (top panel) together with agents’ equilibrium trad-
ing decisions (middle panel) and return expectations (bottom panel) for the boom-bust
episode triggered by four positive dividend growth shocks. To increase readability of the
graph, we only report the trading patterns and return expectations of agents with the
highest and lowest updating gain parameters.33 In the UBS survey, high gains were esti-
mated for agents with few years of stock market experience, while the most experienced
group displayed a low updating gain. For this reason we refer to agents with a high (low)
gain as inexperienced (experienced) agents.
Figure 1.5 shows that in the initial phase of the stock price boom, inexperienced
33Agents types with intermediate updating gain values take intermediate decisions that are in between
those shown in the figure.
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Figure 1.5. PD ratio, trading and return expectations over a boom-bust cylce (baseline
model, no tax)
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Table 1.7
Welfare cost of a stock price boom-bust episode
Gain 0.0316 0.0286 0.0264 0.0230 0.0180
Permanent cons. variation (%) -7.01 -3.51 -1.27 1.73 5.24
agents do rather well. They start buying stocks early on and well before prices approach
their peak value. Experienced investors sell assets during the boom phase, i.e., much too
early. Yet, once the PD ratio is high, inexperienced investors are much more optimistic
about future returns than experienced investors, see the bottom panel. As a result,
inexperienced investors continue buying stocks from low gain types at high prices (relative
to dividends). Also, inexperienced investors continue buying during much of the price
bust phase and only sell in significant amounts once the PD ratio started undershooting
its long-run mean. Thus, even though inexperienced investors are doing well initially,
this fails to be the case over the entire boom-bust cycle.
To gauge the welfare effects of a boom-bust episode, we compare the outcome in
Figure 1.5 to a situation in which the same shocks occur, but where agents hold their
beliefs constant at the initial value, i.e., do not respond to the price movements triggered
by the dividend growth shocks, so that there is no asset price boom. We can then
compute the permanent proportional consumption variation that would make (ex-post
realized) utility in the setting with constant beliefs and without an asset price boom
identical to the (ex-post realized) utility in the setting with the asset price boom shown
in Figure 1.5. Outcomes are reported in Table 1.7, which shows that asset price booms
are extremely costly for inexperienced agents and extremely beneficial for experienced
investors: the welfare equivalent consumption variations of a boom-bust episode amount
to a permanent change in consumption of several percentage points.
1.8 The Effects of Financial Transaction Taxes
We now consider the implications of introducing linear financial transaction taxes, focus-
ing on the implication of FTTs for the behavior of asset pricing moments, the patterns
of boom-bust dynamics and trading volume.
Table 1.8 reports how the asset pricing moments from the baseline model in Table 1.6
are affected by various tax rates. The main effect of financial transaction taxes consists
of increasing asset price volatility, as measured by the standard deviation of quarterly
stock returns (std(rs)) and the standard deviation of the PD ratio (std(PD)).34 Ex-
cept for the reduced correlation between trading volume and prices (corr(TVt, PDt),
34For very high tax rates (10%) the volatility of the PD ratio starts to fall, while return volatility
continues to increase. We discuss this issue further below.
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Table 1.8
Effects of introducing financial transaction taxes
Considered moments No tax 1% tax 2% tax 4% tax 10% tax
E[PD] 135.77 137.21 139.74 142.47 146.27
std(PD) 122.13 123.18 125.42 127.10 125.24
corr(PDt, PDt−1) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
std(rs) (%) 11.63 11.85 12.14 12.55 14.04
E[rs] (%) 2.11 2.14 2.18 2.24 2.49
corr(PDt, EtRt+1) 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.89
corr(TVt, TVt−1) 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94
corr(TVt, PDt) 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.17
corr(TVt, |Pt/Pt−1 − 1|) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.05
corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.87
# of booms per 100 yrs∗ 1.82 1.95 2.12 2.40 3.06
average boom length (quarters)∗ 32.42 31.87 31.41 30.44 27.21
average boom peak (PD)∗ 491.03 485.82 480.31 469.95 443.86
E[TV ] relative to no tax (%) 100.00 99.64 101.49 102.52 117.85
*A boom starts in the first period in which the quarterly PD ratio exceeds a value of 250 and
ends once it falls below 200.
corr(TVt, |Pt/Pt−1 − 1|)), the remaining asset pricing moments from Table 1.6 prove to
be rather robust towards the introduction of FTTs.
The last four rows in Table 1.8 report a number of additional statistics about asset
price boom-bust episodes and trading volume. These statistics allow to asses in greater
detail why asset price volatility increases with the introduction of FTTs. The fourth to
last row in Table 1.8, for example, reports the number of asset price boom episodes per
100 years of simulated data, where we define the beginning of a boom as the first time
in which the quarterly PD ratio exceeds a level of 250 and the end of a boom as the
first time it falls below 200 thereafter.35 The results in the table show that the number
of stock price booms is monotonically increasing in the FTTs, with boom-bust episodes
becoming about a third more likely relative to the case without transaction taxes when
the tax rate reaches 4%.
The third and second to last rows in Table 1.8 display, respectively, information about
the length of the boom episodes and the average peak value of the PD reached during
these episodes. It shows that booms tend to become shorter lived and somewhat less
pronounced as the tax rate rises, but these effects are not very strong for tax rates up to
35The reported numbers are very robust to choosing different thresholds because boom-bust episodes
are periods in which prices display a clearly distinct behavior.
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Table 1.9
Welfare implications of FTTs (welfare equiv. perma-
nent cons. variations, in %)
Gain 0.0316 0.0286 0.0264 0.0230 0.0180
1% tax -0.34 -0.14 -0.02 0.06 0.25
2% tax -0.84 -0.36 -0.06 0.16 0.62
4% tax -1.56 -0.64 -0.07 0.28 1.18
10% tax -2.76 -1.00 0.10 0.39 2.15
4%. As a result, the effect of an increased number of booms dominates and the standard
deviation of the PD ratio increases with the tax rate. For a 10% tax rate, the decrease
in the peak level of the PD during booms and the reduced length of stock price booms
start to dominate, causing the standard deviation of the PD ratio to decreases, even if
the standard deviation of returns still increases.
Somewhat surprisingly, the average trading volume (relative to the case without
FTTs) tends to increase with the level of FTTs. This occurs because there is more
trade during booms times, as belief disagreements are then larger, and because booms
become more likely with the introduction of FTTs.
Table 1.9 reports the welfare implications associated with introducing different tax
rates. Starting from the ergodic mean for stock holdings and beliefs in the no-tax economy,
the table reports the welfare equivalent permanent consumption variation that would
make different agent types in the economy with taxes as well-off in expected terms as in
the economy without taxes.36 Table 1.9 clearly shows that agents that extrapolate more,
i.e., inexperienced investors in our survey sample, tend to lose, while more experienced
investors tend to win in expected terms.37 For all agent types, except the median type,
whose utility is largely unaffected by the tax rate, the gains and losses monotonically
increase with the tax rate. Wealth redistribution between investors thus increases with
the tax rate.
Table 1.10 provides additional insights by reporting asset price moments conditional
on being in a boom period, as defined above, and conditional on being in ‘normal times’,
i.e., periods that are not identified as boom periods. Clearly, the PD ratio is considerably
higher during boom times and so is the standard deviation of the PD ratio. Mean
quarterly stock returns during boom periods are considerably higher than in normal times,
36We use objective probabilities to compute agents’ expected utility.
37The welfare effects in Table 1.9 are smaller than those reported in Table 1.7. The latter reports
the effects of a single stock price boom episode relative to the counterfactual outcome without a boom.
Since booms are (in expected terms) not likely to occur within the immediate future, when starting the
simulation at the ergodic mean, the welfare effects in Table 1.9 are not as large as those reported in
Table 1.7.
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Table 1.10
Conditional Asset Price Moments
No tax 1% tax 2% tax 4% tax 10% tax
Boom times∗
E[PD] 424.63 419.79 415.04 406.56 384.06
std(PD) 44.93 44.13 44.27 42.89 42.01
corr(PDt, PDt−1) 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.53
std(rs) (%) 23.06 22.86 22.52 21.76 19.34
E[rs] (%) 3.68 3.74 3.67 3.55 3.15
E[TV ] rel. to no tax (%) 100.00 96.13 93.12 88.27 80.13
Normal times+
E[PD] 85.87 85.33 84.63 83.59 83.72
std(PD) 15.37 15.89 16.68 18.14 23.62
corr(PDt, PDt−1) 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.86
std(rs) (%) 8.15 8.36 8.65 9.31% 12.26
E[rs] (%) 1.84 1.84 1.88 1.95 2.32
E[TV ] rel. to no tax (%) 100.00 99.60 101.43 102.69 129.90
* A boom starts in the first period in which the quarterly PD ratio exceeds a value of 250
and ends once it falls below 200.
* Normal times are all those periods not classified as boom periods.
but stock returns also display a considerably larger standard deviation. Furthermore,
while the introduction of FTTs reduces the volatility of the PD ratio and returns during
boom periods, FTTs increase both of these standard deviations during normal times. As
we show below, it is precisely the increase in volatility during normal times coupled with
extrapolative behavior which causes stock price booms to become more likely.
Table 1.10 shows that trading volume decreases with the size of the FTT during
boom periods, but - somewhat paradoxically - increases during normal times. Upon
closer inspection, we find that for tax rates up to 4% the increase in trading volume
during normal times is purely driven by post-boom trading activity. As can be seen from
Figure 1.5, trading activity stays high long after the PD ratio returned to values below
200. Once one removes these post-boom periods from the normal times, trading volume
is actually decreasing with the FTTs in normal times.38
To illustrate further how FTTs increase the likelihood of boom-bust cycles, we now
perform a similar experiment as carried out in Section 1.7 for the case without a tax.
38The situation is different for very high tax rates (10%). Trading activity then increases also during
normal times, even when excluding post-boom periods. This occurs because the large increase in price
volatility leads to an amount of belief disagreement and thus trade in normal times, which more than
compensates the trade-reducing effect of the tax.
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Figure 1.6. FTTs and the likelihood of stock price booms
Specifically, we consider the model with a FTT of 4% and fix initial stockholdings and
initial beliefs at their ergodic sample means. We then shock the economy with n ≥ 0
positive dividend growth shocks of two standard deviations. Yet, this time we continue
to let the small exogenous stock supply shocks operate at all times. These shocks are
themselves not enough to generate stock price booms, but can do so in combination with
dividend shocks.
Figure 1.6 depicts the probability that the economy embarks on a stock price boom as
a function of the number of dividend growth shocks, integrating over possible realizations
of the stock supply shocks.39 For the case without a FTT, booms start to emerge once
n increases above 4.40 The situation differs for the case with a 4% FTT, where fewer
fundamental shocks are required to start a boom episode. For n ≤ 1, the economy never
embarks on a stock price boom, but for n = 2 stock price booms emerge in more than
60% of the cases and for n ≥ 3 virtually always. This shows that booms become more
39As before, we define a boom as a situation where the PD ratio subsequently increases above 250 at
some point. We consider up to 12 quarters after the last dividend shock. Results prove very robust to
choosing different thresholds and period limits. Probabilities are computed from averaging the outcome
of 500 stochastic realizations.
40Since we now let stock supply shocks also operate in the case without a tax, this shows that the
findings of Figure 1.4 are robust to the introduction of the stock supply shock.
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Figure 1.7. Stock demand function (4% tax)
likely in a situation with FTTs, as fewer fundamental shocks are required to set it in
motion.
Figure 1.7 illustrates the driving force giving rise to this outcome. The figure depicts
the stock demand function for a 4% FTT.41 It shows that around the level of prior
stockholding (assumed to be equal to one), stock demand (shown on the vertical axis) is
not sensitive to the stock price (shown on the horizontal axis). This price insensitivity
of stock demand covers a considerable price range and is actually increasing with the
tax rate.42 Therefore, in the presence of FTTs, even very small exogenous variations
in stock supply can lead to large movements in realized prices, explaining why prices
become more volatile during ‘normal times’. Since agents use realized price growth to
update price expectations, FTTs increase the likelihood that stock prices embark on a
belief-driven stock price boom.
41The figure assumes τ = 4% and the following values for the state variables: Wt/Dt = ρ, mt = β
D,
and S−1 = 1.
42Appendix A.3 explains how one can accurately determine the inaction regions.
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1.9 State-Contingent Financial Transaction Taxes
Motivated by the results in the previous section, this section considers the effects of
introducing state-contingent transaction taxes that are only levied once the PD ratio
exceeds a certain (sufficiently high) threshold value PD. The idea behind such a state-
contingent tax is that it avoids the increase in price volatility during ‘normal times’,
thereby avoiding that the stock market embarks with higher likelihood on a boom-bust
cycle, while potentially limiting the duration and extent of stock price booms once they
have taken hold.
Specifically, consider a setting with linear transaction taxes τ > 0, which are levied
only if PDt ≥ PD, and zero taxes otherwise. We set the threshold value PD equal to
250, which is the value used to identify the beginning of a stock price boom episodes in
previous sections. After solving for the optimal stock demand functions43, it turns out
that state-contingent taxes lead to problems of non-existence of equilibrium prices, as
well as to the possibility of equilibrium multiplicities.
The non-existence problem is illustrated in Figure 1.8, which depicts the excess stock
demand (on the vertical axis) as a function of the price dividend ratio (horizontal axis).
The figure depicts these functions for all agent types, as well as the aggregate excess
demand function.44
Figure 1.8 shows that once the PD ratio exceeds its critical value PD, agents want
to buy or sell less stocks, i.e., the excess demand functions discontinuously jump to a
value closer to the no trade line (the zero line). As a result, the aggregate excess demand
function also has a jump at PD = PD and for the case depicted in Figure 1.8, this leads
to non-existence of an equilibrium price: the excess demand function is strictly positive
for PD < PD but strictly negative for PD ≥ PD.
Obviously, the jump in the aggregate excess stock demand function does not neces-
sarily have to be of the kind shown in Figure 1.8. We also encountered cases in which
there was an upward jump at the critical value PD. This can happen whenever agents
who seek to sell stocks respond more to the tax once it is levied than agents who want
43The solution strategy outlined in Section 1.4.1 for the case with a non-state contingent tax can then
still be applied because the tax function τ i(Sit−1,
Pt
Dt
, WtDt ,m
i
t) derived in Section 1.4.1 can already depend
on the PD ratio. Instead of satisfying equations (1.15) and (1.16), the tax function and the stock holding
policy must now jointly satisfy the first order condition (1.16) and
τ it = τ at contingencies where S
i,opt
t > S
i,opt
t−1 and PD ≥ PD
τ it = −τ at contingencies where Si,optt < Si,optt−1 and PD ≥ PD
τ it ∈ [−τ, τ ] at contingencies where Si,optt = Si,optt−1 and PD ≥ PD
τ it = 0 otherwise,
so as to be feasible in the original problem with a non-differentiable tax function (above the PD threshold).
44To illustrate the effects in the most transparent way, we use the setting with a 10% transaction tax,
but the effects are qualitatively the same for lower tax rates.
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Figure 1.8. Non-existence of equilibrium with state-contingent FTTs
Figure 1.9. Multiple equilibrium prices with state-contingent transaction taxes
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to purchase stocks. Figure 1.9 depicts an example, where the aggregate excess demand
jumps upwards at PD = PD. As the figure illustrates, this can give rise to multiple
market clearing equilibrium prices. Since realized prices feed into agents’ price beliefs,
price multiplicities have the potential to significantly increase price volatility.
While the non-existence problem could possibly be overcome by introducing taxes
that are a continuous function of the PD ratio, the multiplicity issue is harder to address.
One would have to design state-contingent taxes in such a way that aggregate excess
stock demand functions are never upward sloping in the vicinity of the zero point. It is
unclear which tax design would be able to achieve this outcome.
1.10 Conclusions
We present a quantitatively credible asset pricing model in which stock prices display
occasional boom and bust cycles in valuation, which redistribute large amounts of wealth
between different investor types. We show how the introduction of financial transactions
taxes increases price volatility during ‘normal times’ and thereby the likelihood that the
stock market embarks on a belief-driven boom and bust cycle. State-contingent transac-
tion taxes, which seek to avoid the increase in price volatility during normal times, gen-
erate problems via equilibrium multiplicities and non-existence. Taken together, these
findings cast serious doubts on whether financial transaction taxes can fruitfully con-
tribute towards increasing the efficiency of stock market prices and transactions.
A key insight highlighted by the present framework is that the presence of extrapo-
lation by investors makes it an important requirement that market interventions do not
increase stock price volatility during normal times, so as to avoid creating additional
boom-bust episodes. Throughout the analysis, we have taken the degree of extrapolation
as given. Conceivably, market interventions can also have a direct effect on the degree to
which investors extrapolate past capital gains. To the extent that FTTs reduce extrap-
olation, FTTs can generate additional benefits that are not captured within the present
analysis and may overturn our results. Obviously, if FTTs give rise to more extrapola-
tion, they generate additional costs and strengthen the point made in the present paper.
Empirically investigating the effects of FTTs on the degree of investor extrapolation thus
appears to be an interesting avenue for future research.
Chapter 2
Stock Price Cycles and Business
Cycles∗
2.1 Introduction
We present a simple economic model that quantitatively replicates the joint behavior
of business cycles and stock price cycles. The model matches standard data moments
characterizing business cycle behavior, standard moments capturing stock price behavior,
as well as data moments that link stock prices with business cycle variables. The model
also gives rise to cycles in stock price valuation of the kind observed in the data.
Stock price cycles have – in comparison to business cycles – received relatively little
attention in the literature. Somewhat surprisingly, this is the case even though stock
price cycles are easily discernible in the data. Figure 2.1 depicts the S&P500 stock index
from 1985 to 2014.1 Over the considered thirty-year period, stock prices displayed three
significant run-ups and two large reversals, with the price reversal amounting to a close to
50% price drop when compared to the previous peak. Similar run-ups and reversals can
be observed in the stock markets of other advanced economies. We refer to this repeated
boom-bust pattern in stock prices as stock price cycles.
Figure 2.2 presents an alternative approach for capturing stock price cycles: it depicts
the empirical distribution of the quarterly price-dividend (PD) ratio of the S&P500.2
While the mode of the PD ratio is slightly below 125, the PD distribution displays a
long right tail with values of almost three times the mode being in the support of the
distribution. The observed positive skewness and the large support of the empirical PD
∗This chapter is based on and largely identical to the paper Adam and Merkel (2018).
1Figure 2.1 depicts the nominal value of the S&P500, but similar conclusions emerge if one deflates
the nominal value by the consumer price index.
2The quarterly PD ratio is defined as the end-of-quarter price over a deseasonalized measure of
quarterly dividend payouts, see Appendix B.1 for details.
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Figure 2.1. Cycles in the S&P 500: Q1:1985-Q4:2014, nominal index values
distribution are an alternative way to capture the presence of occasional stock price run-
ups and reversals.
Making economic sense of these large stock price movements remains, however, chal-
lenging. This is especially true when seeking a joint explanation for stock price behavior
and the behavior of the business cycle. While the latter is relatively smooth, stock prices
are rather volatile. Without addressing stock price cycles, the existing literature typically
relies on two approaches for reconciling the smoothness of the business cycles with the
volatility of stock prices.
The first explanation combines preferences featuring a low elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution (EIS) with adjustment frictions.3 A low EIS creates a strong desire for
intertemporal consumption smoothing, while adjustment frictions prevent such smooth-
ing from fully taking place. For agents to be willing to accept the observed moderate
consumption fluctuations, asset prices then need to adjust strongly in equilibrium. Since
one possible adjustment margin is agents’ labor supply, too strong adjustments in the
number of hours worked need to be prevented in such settings.4 Therefore, EIS-based
3Typical examples are habit preferences (e.g. Jermann, 1998; Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher, 2001;
Uhlig, 2007; Jaccard, 2014), though sometimes also recursive preferences with a low EIS are used (e.g.
Guvenen, 2009).
4Otherwise the high desire to smooth intertemporal fluctuations would lead to a strong adjustment in
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Figure 2.2. Postwar distribution of the quarterly PD ratio of the S&P 500 (kernel density
estimate, Q1:1955-Q4:2014)
explanations include labor market frictions of some form (adjustment frictions, inflexible
labor supply through preferences, real wage frictions), causing labor market frictions to
become key for explaining asset price behavior. The centrality of labor market frictions is
puzzling, in particular in light of the fact that labor market institutions differ considerably
across advanced economies, while stock prices are very volatile in all these economies.
A second explanation reconciling smooth business cycles with volatile stock prices
relies on specifying recursive preferences in conjunction with an additional source of
exogenous uncertainty, e.g. long-run growth risk or disaster risk.5 Such shocks have large
pricing implications under recursive preferences, provided the coefficient of risk aversion
is larger than the inverse EIS. These shocks then generate a large equity premium in the
presence of realistic consumption dynamics. Time variation in the equity premium leads
to substantial volatility in stock prices and returns, though typically less than what can be
observed in the data.6 As recently pointed out by Epstein, Farhi, and Strzalecki (2014),
hours worked and a very smooth consumption profile, which in turn would largely eliminate asset price
fluctuations.
5See Gourio (2012), Croce (2014)
6Labor market frictions or the elasticity of labor supply are usually not discussed in this strand
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standard calibrations of recursive preferences imply very large consumption premia for
the resolution of uncertainty and the verdict on the quantitative plausibility of these
premia is still outstanding.
The present paper proposes an alternative explanation for stock price and business
cycle behavior. In contrast to the existing approaches, it relies on a standard separable
preference specification and also features a frictionless labor market and perfectly elastic
labor supply from households.7 Despite these features, the model can jointly replicate the
quantitative behavior of business cycles and stock prices using (reasonably sized) shocks
to total factor productivity as its only source of exogenous random variation. The model
also generates a stable risk-free interest rate and gives rise to large and persistent stock
price boom-bust patterns of the kind observed in the data. The most notable dimension
along which the model falls short of fully matching the data is the equity premium: it
generates only about one third of the empirically observed premium. Since we consider
a setting with time-separable utility and a logarithmic utility function for consumption,
this still represents a respectable achievement.
Key to the empirical success of the model is a departure from the rational expectations
hypothesis (REH). Following Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) and Adam, Marcet, and
Beutel (2017), we consider subjectively Bayesian investors who seek to filter the long-term
trend component of capital gains from observed capital gains and as a result extrapolate
(to some extent) past capital gains into the future. Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017)
show that such extrapolative behavior is in fact consistent with the available survey ev-
idence on investors’ return expectations, whereas the REH is strongly rejected by the
data.8 Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) show how subjective beliefs of such kind sub-
stantially improve the asset pricing predictions of a standard Lucas (1978) endowment
economy. The present setting significantly extends their framework to one with endoge-
nous production, featuring endogenous labor and investment choices. In doing so, we
also present a conceptual approach for dealing with dynamic decision settings in which
agents’ expectations deviate from rational expectations along some dimension (future as-
set prices), but are consistent with the REH along other dimensions (all other variables
beyond agents’ control).
We estimate the subjective belief model using the simulated method of moments and
also estimate a version with fully rational expectations. We show that the empirical
improvements associated with a departure from the assumption of rational stock price
of literature. While they are certainly not as crucial as they are for the low-EIS-based explanations,
flexible labor supply in a frictionless labor market is still a powerful tool for households to insure against
consumption fluctuations. The fact that the asset pricing models in this second strand of literature tend
to generate too little volatility of hours worked is an indication that the chosen preference specification
make labor supply not flexible enough.
7We consider households with a linear disutility of work.
8Adam, Matveev, and Nagel (2018) tests to what extent survey expectations are consistent with
various expectations hypotheses entertained in the asset pricing literature.
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expectations is significant, both along the business cycle dimension and – even more im-
portantly – along the stock price dimension. Under fully rational expectations, the model
fails to fully replicate business cycle moments, because we do not consider investment-
specific productivity shocks. We show that in a setting with subjective price beliefs such
shocks are not required.
We also consider the welfare effects associated with stock price fluctuations that are
driven by fluctuations in investors’ subjective beliefs. Stock price movements induce
volatility of investment and hours worked, but these variations are not exclusively driven
by productivity developments. As a result, average consumption is higher and aver-
age hours worked lower when imposing rational stock price expectations, as investment
choices then fully reflect underlying productivity. The volatility of hours and investment
significantly falls under fully rational expectations and there is a dramatic drop in the
volatility of stock prices. The welfare gains – measured in terms of ex-post realized util-
ity – amount to a permanent increase in consumption of 0.29%, thus are in the order of
magnitude associated with eliminating the business cycle.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature. Sec-
tion 2.3 presents key facts about business cycles, stock prices and their interaction in the
United States. Section 2.4 describes our model with the exception of beliefs, which are
discussed in detail in Section 2.5. All equilibrium conditions of the model are summarized
in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 derives analytical insights and discusses the dynamics of stock
prices, price beliefs and macro aggregates. Section 2.8 outlines our estimation procedure
and assesses the empirical performance of our model. There, we also discuss how subjec-
tive price beliefs contribute to the empirical success of the model by contrasting our results
with those of a model version where agents hold fully rational expectations. Section 2.9
compares our quantitative results to two closely related papers, Boldrin, Christiano, and
Fisher (2001) and Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017). Section 2.10 discusses the welfare
implications of belief-driven stock price cycles. Section 2.11 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Early attempts of jointly modeling business cycles and stock prices have relied on a combi-
nation of habit preferences and adjustment frictions to generate high stock price volatility
and equity premia (Jermann, 1998; Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher, 2001; Uhlig, 2007).
Habit preferences create a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and thereby
a strong desire to smooth consumption, which leads to volatile stock prices in a set-
ting with empirically plausible consumption fluctuations. The intertemporal substitution
channel, however, causes all asset prices to be volatile and thus generates a counterfac-
tually high volatility of the risk-free interest rate.9 An exception is Uhlig (2007) who
9The risk-free rate volatility in Jermann (1998) is twice as high as in the data; in Boldrin, Christiano,
and Fisher (2001) it is almost five times as high.
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considers external habits, which create strong fluctuations in risk aversion10 and thereby
allow for relatively volatile stock prices and a stable risk-free interest rate.11 To prevent
consumption smoothing, low EIS models also crucially rely on labor market frictions or
inelastic labor supply: labor supply in Jermann (1998) is fully inelastic, while a timing
friction forces households to choose labor supply one period in advance in Boldrin, Chris-
tiano, and Fisher (2001); Uhlig (2007) introduces a real wage rigidity that leads to labor
supply rationing following negative productivity shocks. Jaccard (2014) augments the
model of Jermann (1998) and allows for adjustments in labor supply, but introduces a
habit specification over a composite of consumption and leisure which makes labor supply
adjustments unattractive for the purpose of smoothing consumption.12
Models with a low EIS also typically generate the equity premium via a counterfac-
tually high term premium. For example, the premium on long-term bonds in Jermann’s
(1998) model is 92% of that on stocks, compared to only 28% in the data.
Another line of literature jointly considers business cycle dynamics and stock price be-
havior using models with limited asset market participation.13 In these models, a limited
set of agents has access to the stock market and in addition insures the consumption of
non-participating agents via other contracts. An early example is Danthine and Donald-
son (2002), who consider shareholders and workers, where the latter do not participate
in financial markets at all. Shareholders then offer workers a labor contract that gives
rise to “operating leverage” in the sense that it causes the cash flows of shareholders to
become even more volatile and procyclical. As a result, the model gives rise to an equity
premium and volatile stock returns, albeit at the cost of creating too much volatility for
shareholder’s consumption.14
Guvenen (2009) considers a model with limited stock market participation in which
all agents participate in the bond market. When stock market investors have a higher EIS
than non-participating agents, they optimally insure the latter against income fluctuations
via bond market transactions, thereby channeling most labor income risk to a small set of
stock market participants. As a result, their consumption is strongly procyclical and gives
10See Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) for a discussion of the differing risk aversion implications
of internal and external habit specifications.
11It is unclear, however, whether Uhlig (2007) matches the volatility of stock returns as he only reports
the sharpe ratio.
12As a result, the standard deviation of the growth rate of hours worked in Jaccard (2014) is only
about one half of the value observed in the data.
13As mentioned in Guvenen (2009), stock market participation increased substantially during the
1990’s. From 1989 to 2002 the number of households who owned stocks increased by 74% so that half of
U.S. households had become stock owners by the year 2002.
14In Table 6 in Danthine and Donaldson (2002), which is the specification with the best overall empirical
fit, shareholder consumption volatility is about 10 times as large as aggregate consumption volatility.
Guvenen (2009) reviews the empirical evidence on stockholders’ relative consumption volatility and
concludes that stockholders’ consumption is about 1.5-2 times as volatile as non-stockholders’ and thus
even less high in relative terms when compared to aggregate consumption volatility
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rise to both a high equity premium and high volatility of returns. The model assumes the
EIS to be low – even for shareholders – thus generates additional stock price volatility
through the same channels as the habit models. The model performs quantitatively very
well on the financial dimension, except for a slightly too volatile risk-free interest rate.
Performance along the business cycle dimension is more mixed, as consumption is too
volatile and investment and hours worked too smooth.
Tallarini (2000), Gourio (2012), Croce (2014) and Hirshleifer, Li, and Yu (2015) discuss
the asset pricing predictions of the real business cycle models under Epstein-Zin prefer-
ences (Epstein and Zin, 1989), assuming that the coefficient of risk aversion is larger than
the inverse EIS. Tallarini (2000) shows that increasing risk aversion while keeping the
EIS fixed at one barely affects business cycle dynamics, but has substantial effects on the
price of risk. While the model can give rise to a high Sharpe ratio, in line with the value
observed in the data, it considerably undershoots the equity premium and the volatility
of returns. The model thus falls short of reconciling the volatility of stock prices with the
smoothness of business cycle dynamics. Gourio (2012) considers preferences with a larger
EIS and moderate risk aversion and enriches the model by time-varying disaster risk.15
Whereas constant disaster risk has little effect on the model dynamics, time-variation
in disaster risk combined with preferences for early resolution of uncertainty generate a
high equity premium and return volatility, while at the same time keeping the dynam-
ics of macro aggregates relatively smooth, provided the disaster does not realize. While
framed as a rational expectations model applied to a disaster-free data sample, one may
alternatively interpret the model as a subjective belief model and the exogenous shock
to the disaster probability as a shock to agents’ expectations. Under this interpretation,
subjective beliefs drive asset price dynamics, as is the case in the present paper. However,
subjectively expected returns in his model are negatively related to the PD ratio, unlike
in the data and unlike in the present model.
Another channel through which preferences for early resolution of uncertainty can
generate realistic asset pricing predictions is long-run consumption growth risk as in
Bansal and Yaron (2004). Croce (2014) considers a production economy with long-run
productivity growth risk and shows that this translates into long-run consumption risk,
thereby transferring the asset pricing predictions of the endowment economy of Bansal
and Yaron (2004) to a real business cycle setting. His model can match well the equity
premium and low and stable risk-free rate, but is only partially able to generate price
and return volatility.
Hirshleifer, Li, and Yu (2015) also consider an economy with preferences for early
resolution of uncertainty but assume inelastic labor supply. Agents know the produc-
tivity process only imperfectly and over-extrapolate recent productivity observations in
their filtering problem. This mechanism endogenously generates long-run variations in
15A disaster is a potentially persistent event in which the economy experiences for the duration of the
disaster in each period a negative productivity shock and a capital depreciation shock.
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perceived technology growth and thus perceived consumption growth, despite there being
only short-run technology shocks present in the data-generating process. If the extrapo-
lation bias is small but sufficiently persistent, then the model produces a sizeable equity
premium and about 50% of the observed volatility of stock returns. The model also
matches a range of business cycle quantities, except for the volatility of hours worked.
In independent and complementary work, Winkler (2018) considers the asset pricing
implications of a rich DSGE model featuring subjective price beliefs of the kind we also
consider. His model features financial frictions, price and wage rigidities, and limited
stock market participation, from which the present paper abstracts. In addition, Win-
kler (2018) considers a setup with “conditionally model-consistent expectations”, which
requires agents’ beliefs to be consistent with both the subjective law of motion for prices,
other agents’ decision functions and a maximum number of market clearing conditions.16
This setup allows for deviations from rational expectations also for other variables than
just stock prices and differs from our setting with “partially rational expectations”, which
endows agents with the correct statistical model about decision-relevant variables other
than prices.
Learning about stock prices in our model does not only improve stock market pre-
dictions, but helps quantitatively also along the business cycle dimension. The idea that
learning can improve the business cycle predictions of the standard real business cycle
model is also present in Eusepi and Preston (2011), who consider a setting where agents
are learning about wages and rental rates. They show that this generates significant
amplification and persistence in effects of neutral technology shocks, so that expectations
ultimately drive the business cycle. In our setting, beliefs about wages and rental rates
are assumed to be rational, but subjective stock price expectations do affect business cy-
cle outcomes. Specifically, fluctuations in expectations affect capital valuations and the
demand for investment goods, thereby generating fluctuations in investment and labor
demand.
The paper is also related to the literature on rational stock market bubbles, as for
instance derived in classic work by Froot and Obstfeld (1991). While rational bubbles
provide an alternative approach for generating stock market volatility, they seem incon-
sistent with empirical evidence along two important dimensions. First, the assumption
of rational return expectations is strongly at odds with survey measures of return ex-
pectations, which clearly favors the subjective belief specifications we consider in the
present paper (compare Adam, Marcet, and Beutel, 2017). Second, Giglio, Maggiori,
and Stroebel (2016) show that there is very little evidence supporting the notion that
violations of the transversality condition drive asset price fluctuations, unlike suggested
by the rational bubble hypothesis.
16Due to Walras’ Law one market clearing condition can be dropped. Winkler (2018) must drop a
second one, as not all markets can clear under the subjective plans.
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Table 2.1
U.S. business cycle moments (quarterly real values, Q1:1955-Q4:2014)
Symbol Data Std. dev.
moment data moment
Std. dev. of output σ(Y ) 1.72 0.25
Relative std. dev. of consumption σ(C)/σ(Y ) 0.61 0.03
Relative std. dev. of investment σ(I)/σ(Y ) 2.90 0.35
Relative std. dev. of hours worked σ(H)/σ(Y ) 1.08 0.13
Correlation output and consumption ρ(Y,C) 0.88 0.02
Correlation output and investment ρ(Y, I) 0.86 0.03
Correlation output and hours worked ρ(Y,H) 0.75 0.03
2.3 Stock Prices and Business Cycles: Key Facts
This section presents key data moments that characterize U.S. business cycles and stock
price behavior and that we focus on in our empirical analysis. We consider quarterly U.S.
data for the period Q1:1955-Q4:2014. The start date of the sample is determined by the
availability of the aggregate hours worked series. Details of the data sources are reported
in Appendix B.1.
Table 2.1 presents a standard set of business cycle moments for output (Y ), consump-
tion (C), investment (I) and hours worked (H).17 These quantities have been divided by
the working age population so as to take into account demographic changes in the U.S.
population over the sample period. The second to last column in Table 2.1 reports the
data moment and the last column the standard deviation of the estimated moment. We
will use the latter in our simulated methods of moments estimation and for computing
t-statistics.18
The picture that emerges from Table 2.1 is a familiar one: output fluctuations are
relatively small, consumption is considerably less volatile than output, while investment is
considerably more volatile; hours worked are roughly as volatile as output. Consumption,
investment and hours all correlate strongly with output. A major quantitative challenge
will be to simultaneously replicate the relative smoothness of the business cycle with the
much larger fluctuations in stock prices to which we turn next.
17As is standard in the business cycle literature, we compute business cycle moments using logged and
subsequently HP-filtered data with a smoothing parameter of 1600. All other data moments will rely on
unfiltered (level) data. We HP filter model variables when comparing to filtered moments in the data
and use unfiltered model moments otherwise.
18All standard deviations of moments reported in this section are computed by a procedure combining
Newey-West estimators with the delta method as in Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016). We refer to
Appendix F of that paper for details.
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Table 2.2
Key moments of stock prices, risk-free rates and dividends (U.S., quarterly
real values, Q1:1955-Q4:2014)
Symbol Data Std. dev.
moment data moment
Average PD ratio E[P/D] 152.3 25.3
Std. dev. PD ratio σ(P/D) 63.39 12.39
Auto-correlation PD ratio ρ(P/D) 0.98 0.003
Average equity return (%) E[re] 1.87 0.45
Std. dev. equity return (%) σ(re) 7.98 0.35
Average risk-free rate (%) E[rf ] 0.25 0.13
Std. dev. risk-free rate (%) σ(rf ) 0.82 0.12
Std. dev. dividend growth (%) σ(Dt+1/Dt) 1.75 0.38
Table 2.2 presents a standard set of moments characterizing U.S. stock price behavior.
The first three moments summarize the behavior of the PD ratio:19 the PD ratio is rather
large and implies a dividend yield of just 66 basis points per quarter. The PD ratio is
also very volatile: the standard deviation of the PD ratio is more than 40% of its mean
value and fluctuations in the PD ratio are very persistent, as documented by the high
quarterly auto-correlation of the PD ratio. Table 2.2 also reports the average real stock
return, which is high and close to 2% per quarter. Stock returns are also very volatile:
the standard deviation of stock returns is about four times its mean value. This contrasts
with the behavior of the short-term risk-free interest rate documented in Table 2.2. The
risk-free interest rate is very low and very stable. The standard deviation of the risk-free
interest rate in Table 2.2 is likely even overstated, as ex-post realized inflation rates have
been used to transform nominal safe rates into a real rate. Table 2.2 also reports the
standard deviation of dividend growth. Dividend growth is relatively smooth, especially
when compared to the much larger fluctuation in equity returns. This fact is hard to
reconcile with the observed large fluctuations in stock prices (Shiller, 1981).
Table 2.3 presents data moments that link the PD ratio to business cycle variables. It
shows that stock prices are pro-cyclical: (1) the PD ratio correlates positively with hours
worked; (2) stock prices also correlate positively with the investment to output ratio, but
the correlation is surprisingly weak and also estimated very imprecisely. Table 2.4 below
shows why this is the case: the investment to output ratio correlates positively with the
PD ratio over the second half of the sample period (1985-2014), i.e., in the period with
19The PD ratio is defined as the end-of-quarter stock price divided by dividend payments over the
quarter. Following standard practice, dividends are deseasonalized by averaging dividends over the last
four quarters.
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Table 2.3
Comovement of stock prices with real variables and survey return expecta-
tions (U.S., quarterly real values, Q1:1955-Q4:2014)
Correlations Symbol Data Std. dev.
moment data moment
Hours & PD ratio ρ(H,P/D) 0.51 0.17
Investment-output & PD ratio ρ(I/Y, P/D) 0.19 0.31
Survey expect. & PD ratio ρ(EP [re], P/D) 0.79 0.07
large stock price cycles, but negatively in the first half of the sample period (1955-1984).
Table 2.4 also shows that the overall investment to output ratio correlates much more
strongly with the PD ratio if one excludes non-residential investment and investment in
non-residential structure. The negative correlation in the first half of the sample period
is, however, a robust feature of the data.20
Table 2.3 also reports the correlation of the PD ratio with the one-year-ahead expected
real stock market return of private U.S. investors. It shows that investors are optimistic
about future holding period returns when the PD ratio is high already. As shown in
Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017), this feature of the data is inconsistent with the notion
that investors hold rational return expectations. Since we will consider an asset pricing
model with subjective return expectations, we include this data moment into our analysis.
Table 2.4
Stock prices and investment: alternative measures and sample periods
(U.S., quarterly real values)
corr(I/Y, P/D) 1955-2014 1955-1984 1985-2014
Fixed investment 0,19 -0,64 0,40
Fixed investment, less residential
inv. and nonresidential structures: 0,58 -0,66 0,77
2.4 Asset Pricing in a Production Economy
We build our analysis on a stripped-down version of the representative agent model
of Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001). This model features a consumption goods
producing sector and an investment goods producing sector. Both sectors produce output
20The correlation of the hours worked series with the PD ratio is positive in the first and second half
of the sample period.
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using a neoclassical production function with capital and labor as input factors. Output
from the investment goods sector can be invested to increase the capital stock.
We deviate from Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) by using a standard time-
separable specification for consumption preferences instead of postulating consumption
habits. In addition, we remove all labor market frictions on the firm side by making hours
worked perfectly flexible.
Given a linear specification for the disutility of labor, the labor market is then perfectly
flexible and competitive. While frictions are arguably present in U.S. labor markets, we
prefer the fully flexible specification to illustrate that our asset pricing implications do
not depend on assuming labor market frictions. This feature distinguishes the present
analysis from much of the earlier work.
We furthermore simplify our setup relative to the one studied in Boldrin, Christiano,
and Fisher (2001) by specifying an exogenous capital accumulation process in the in-
vestment goods sector, in line with a balanced growth path solution. This helps with
analytical tractability of the model, but also insures that the supply of new capital goods
is sufficiently inelastic, so that the model has a chance of replicating the large persistent
swings in stock prices that can be observed in the data.21
2.4.1 Production Technology
There are two sectors, one producing a perishable consumption good (consumption sec-
tor), the other producing an investment good that can be used to increase the capital
stock in the consumption sector (investment sector). The representative firm in each
sector hires labor and rents capital, so as to produce its respective output good according
to standard Cobb-Douglas production functions,
Yc,t = K
αc
c,t (ZtHc,t)
1−αc , Yi,t = K
αi
i,t (ZtHi,t)
1−αi , (2.1)
where Kc,t, Ki,t denote capital inputs and Hc,t, Hi,t labor inputs in the consumption and
the investment sector, respectively, and αc ∈ (0, 1) and αi ∈ (0, 1) the respective capital
shares in production. Zt is an exogenous labor-augmenting level of productivity and the
only source of exogenous variation in the model. Productivity follows
Zt = γZt−1εt, log εt ∼ iiN
(
−σ
2
2
, σ2
)
, (2.2)
with γ ≥ 1 denoting the mean growth rate of technology and σ > 0 the standard deviation
of log technology growth.
21In Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), capital prices do not display large and persistent fluctua-
tions.
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Labor is perfectly flexible across sectors, but capital is sector-specific. The output of
investment goods firms increases next period’s capital in the consumption goods sector,
so that
Kc,t+1 = (1− δc)Kc,t + Yi,t, (2.3)
where δc ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate. Capital in the investment goods sector
evolves according to
Ki,t+1 = (1− δi)Ki,t +Xt (2.4)
where Xt is an exogenous endowment of new capital in the investment goods sector
and δi ∈ (0, 1) the capital depreciation rate. We set Xt such that Ki,t+1 ∝ Zt, which
insures that the model remains consistent with balanced growth.22 The assumed capital
stock dynamics in the investment goods sector insures that capital good production that
deviates from the balanced growth path is subject to decreasing returns to scale. This
allows for persistent price fluctuations in the price of consumption capital around the
balanced growth path.
2.4.2 Households
The representative household each period chooses consumption Ct ≥ 0, hours worked
Ht ≥ 0, the end-of-period capital stocks Kc,t+1 ≥ 0 and Ki,t+1 ≥ 0 to maximize
EP0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt (logCt −Ht)
]
, (2.5)
where the operator EP0 denotes the agent’s expectations in some probability space (Ω,S,P).
Here, Ω is the space of realizations, S the corresponding σ-Algebra, and P a subjective
probability measure over (Ω,S). As usual, the probability measure P is a model prim-
itive and given to agents. The special case with rational expectations is nested in this
specification, as explained below.
Household choices are subject to the flow budget constraint
Ct +Kc,t+1Qc,t +Ki,t+1Qi,t = WtHt +XtQi,t +Kc,t ((1− δc)Qc,t +Rc,t) (2.6)
+Ki,t ((1− δi)Qi,t +Ri,t) ,
for all t ≥ 0, where Qc,t and Qi,t denote the prices of consumption-sector and investment-
sector capital, respectively, and Rc,t and Ri,t the rental rates earned by renting out capital
to firms in the consumption and investment sector, respectively; Wt denotes the wage rate
and Xt the endowment of new investment-sector capital.
22The model allocation is then identical to a setting in which investment is produced with labor only,
i.e., Yi,t ∝ Ztε−αit (Hi,t)1−αi . We prefer a specification that includes capital, capital depreciation and
an exogenous investment input, as this allows us to define capital values in both sectors in a symmetric
fashion.
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To allow for subjective price beliefs, we shall consider an extended probability space
relative to the case with rational expectations. In its most general form, households’
probability space is spanned by all external processes, i.e. by all variables that are
beyond their control. These are given by the process {Zt, Xt,Wt, Rc,t, Ri,t, Qc,t, Qi,t}∞t=0,
so that the space of realizations is
Ω := ΩZ × ΩX × ΩW × ΩR,c × ΩR,i × ΩQ,c × ΩQ,i,
where ΩX =
∏∞
t=0R with X ∈ {Z,X,W,Rc, Ri, Qc, Qi}. Letting S denote the sigma-
algebra of all Borel subsets of Ω, beliefs will be specified by a well-defined probability
measure P over (Ω,S). Letting Ωt denote the set of all partial histories up to period t,
households’ decision functions can then be written as
(Ct, Ht, Kc,t+1, Ki,t+1) : Ω
t −→ R4. (2.7)
We assume that households choose these functions, so as to maximize (2.5) subject to
the constraints (2.6).
In the special case with rational expectations, (X,W,Rc, Ri, Qc, Qi) are typically re-
dundant elements of the probability space Ω, because households are assumed to know
that these variables can at time t ≥ 0 be expressed as known deterministic equilibrium
functions of the history of fundamentals Zt only.23 Without loss of generality, one can
then exclude these elements from the probability space and write:24
(Ct, Ht, Kc,t+1, Ki,t+1) : Ω
t
Z −→ R4,
where ΩtZ =
∏t
s=0R is the space of all realizations of Zt = (Z0, Z1, ..., Zt). This rou-
tinely performed simplification implies that households perfectly know how the markets
determine the excluded variables as a function of the history of shocks. By introducing
subjective beliefs, we will step away from this assumption.
To insure that the household’s maximization problem remains well-defined in the
presence of the kind of subjective price beliefs introduced below, we impose additional
capital holding constraints of the form Kc,t+1 ≤ Kc,t+1 and Ki,t+1 ≤ Ki,t+1, for all t ≥ 0,
where the bounds
(
Kc,t+1, Ki,t+1
)
are assumed to increase in line with the balanced growth
path and are assumed sufficiently large, such that they never bind in equilibrium.25
23This assumes that there are no sunspot fluctuations in the rational expectations equilibrium.
24Sunspot fluctuation require either keeping some of the endogenous variables or including the sunspot
variables into the probability space.
25These capital holding constraints are required for subjective price beliefs to be consistent with internal
rationality in a setting with an effectively exogenous stochastic discount factor, see Adam and Marcet
(2011) for details. While they must be chosen sufficiently large so as to never bind in equilibrium, their
precise values do not matter for equilibrium determination.
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2.4.3 Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of an economy in which households hold subjective beliefs
is defined as follows:
Definition 1. For given initial conditions (Kc,−1, Ki,−1), a competitive equilibrium with
subjective household beliefs P consists of allocations {Ct, Ht, Hc,t, Hi,t, Kc,t+1, Ki,t+1}∞t=0
and prices {Qc,t, Qi,t, Rc,t, Ri,t,Wt}∞t=0, all of which are measurable functions of the process
{Zt}∞t=0, such that for all partial histories Zt = (Z0, Z1, ...Zt) and all t ≥ 0, prices and
allocations are consistent with
1. profit maximizing choices by firms,
2. the subjective utility maximizing choices for households decision functions (2.7),
and
3. market clearing for consumption goods (Ct = Yc,t), hours worked (Ht = Hc,t+Hi,t),
and the two capital goods (equations (2.3) and (2.4)).
The equilibrium requirements are weaker than what is required in a competitive rational
expectations equilibrium, because household beliefs are not restricted to be rational. For
the special case where P incorporates rational expectations, the previous definition defines
a standard competitive rational expectations equilibrium.
2.4.4 Connecting Model Variables to Data Moments
In order to compare our model to the data, we need to define the real variables (invest-
ment, output) and stock market variables (stock prices, dividends) in our production
economy. For the real variables, this is relatively straightforward. We follow Boldrin,
Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and define investment as being proportional to the quan-
tity of capital produced and use the steady state capital price Qssc as a base price, so that
fluctuations in the price of capital do not contribute to fluctuations in real investment.
Investment is thus given by
It = Q
ss
c Yi,t
and output correspondingly by
Yt = Ct + It.
To define stock prices and dividends, we consider a setup where (investment- and con-
sumption-sector) capital can be securitized via shares and where shares and capital can
be jointly created or jointly destroyed at no cost. The absence of arbitrage opportunities
then implies that the price of shares is determined by the price of the capital it securitizes.
We consider a representative consumption-sector share and a representative investment-
sector share. The only free parameter in this extended setup is then the dividend policy of
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stocks, which is indeterminate (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). To obtain a parsimonious
setting, we assume a time-invariant profit payout share p ∈ (0, 1): a share p of rental
income/profits per share is paid out as dividends each period and in both sectors, with
the remaining share 1− p being reinvested in the capital stock that the share securitizes.
We now describe the setting for the consumption sector in greater detail. The setup
for the investment sector is identical up to an exchange of subscripts. Let kc,t denote the
units of (beginning-of-period t) capital held per unit of shares issued in the consumption
sector. The capital is used for production and earns a rental income/profit of kc,tRc,t.
Given the payout ratio p ∈ (0, 1), dividends per share are given by
Dc,t = pkc,tRc,t.
Retained profits are reinvested to purchase (1− p) kc,tRct/Qc,t units of new capital per
share.26 The end-of-period capital per share then consists of the depreciated beginning-of-
period capital stock and purchases of new capital from retained profits. The end-of-period
share price Pc,t is thus equal to
27
Pc,t = (1− δ)kc,tQc,t + (1− p)kc,tRc,t,
and the end-of-period PD ratio is given by
Pc,t
Dc,t
=
1− δc
p
Qc,t
Rc,t
+
1− p
p
.
Since the last term is small for reasonable payout ratios p, the end-of-period PD ratio is
approximately proportional to the capital price over rental price ratio (Qc,t/Rc,t). More-
over, as is easily verified, the equity return per unit of stock Rec,t = (Pc,t +Dc,t) /Pc,t−1 is
equal to the return per unit of capital Rkc,t = ((1− δc)Qc,t +Rc,t)/Qc,t−1.
Given sectoral stock prices and PD ratios, we can define the aggregate PD ratio using
a value-weighted portfolio of the sectoral investments. Let
wc,t−1 =
Qc,t−1Kc,t
Qc,t−1Kc,t +Qi,t−1Ki,t
denote the end-of-period t − 1 value share of the consumption sector. The value share
of the investment sector is then 1 − wc,t−1. A portfolio with total value Pt−1 at the
end of period t − 1 and value shares wc,t−1 and 1 − wc,t−1 in the consumption and
investment-sector, respectively, must contain wc,t−1Pt−1/Pc,t−1 consumption shares and
26In case the aggregate capital supply differs from capital demand implied by the existing number of
shares, new shares are created or existing shares repurchased to equilibrate capital demand and supply.
27We compute end-of-period share prices, because this is the way prices have been computed in the
data.
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(1− wc,t−1)Pt−1/Pi,t−1 investment shares. The end-of-period t value of this portfolio is
then given by
Pt =
wc,t−1Pt−1
Pc,t−1
Pc,t +
(1− wc,t−1)Pt−1
Pi,t−1
Pi,t (2.8)
and period t dividend payments for this portfolio are
Dt =
wc,t−1Pt−1
Pc,t−1
Dc,t +
(1− wc,t−1)Pt−1
Pi,t−1
Di,t. (2.9)
Using the previous two equations, the aggregate PD ratio can be expressed as a weighted
mean of the sectoral PD ratios where the weights are given by the share of portfolio
dividends coming from each sector:
Pt
Dt
=
wc,t−1
Dc,t
Pc,t−1
wc,t−1
Dc,t
Pc,t−1
+ (1− wc,t−1) Di,tPi,t−1
Pc,t
Dct
+
(1− wc,t−1) Di,tPi,t−1
wc,t−1
Dc,t
Pc,t−1
+ (1− wc,t−1) Di,tPi,t−1
Pi,t
Di,t
.
Note that the PD ratio is independent of the initial portfolio value Pt−1. Aggregate
dividend growth can similarly be expressed using equations (2.9) and (2.8) as a weighted
average of the sectoral dividend growth rates. This completes our definition of model
variables.
2.5 Price Beliefs, Probability Space and State Space
In specifying household beliefs P , we shall consider two alternative belief specifications:
(1) a standard setting in which all expectations are rational and (2) a setting in which
households hold subjective beliefs about future capital prices (Qc,t+j, Qi,t+j), in line with
the belief setup considered in Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017), but rational expectations
about all remaining variables (Zt+j,Xt+j,Wt+j, Rc,t+j, Ri,t+j).
We consider the setting with fully rational expectations as a point of reference. It is
well known that under rational expectations the asset pricing implications of the model
are strongly at odds with the data. Considering this setup, however, allows highlighting
the empirical improvements achieved by introducing subjective price beliefs.
Two considerations motivate us to keep rational expectations about variables other
than prices: first, we do not want to deviate from the rational expectations assumption by
more than in Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017), so as to illustrate that the same deviation
that can be used to explain stock price behavior in an endowment setting can explain
stock price behavior and business cycle dynamics; second, investor expectations about
future stock prices can be observed relatively easily from investor survey data, which
allows disciplining the subjective belief choice. Observing beliefs about future values of
(Xt+j,Wt+j, Rc,t+j, Ri,t+j) is a much harder task, which prompts us to keep the standard
assumption of rational expectations.
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Under rational expectations, decision functions in period t depend only on the history
of fundamental shocks Zt, as discussed in Section 2.4.2. Given the Markov-structure for
shocks Zt, there is furthermore a recursive time-invariant form of the decision functions,
where decisions depend only on current shock Zt and the beginning-of-period capital
stocks (Zt, Kc,t, Ki,t). Using this fact, we can standardly solve for the nonlinear rational
expectations equilibrium using global approximation methods.28
We consider subjective capital price expectations of the form previously introduced
in Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017). Specifically, we assume that agents perceive the
end-of-period capital prices Qs,t (s = c, i) to evolve as
logQs,t = logQs,t−1 + log βs,t + log εs,t,
with εs,t denoting a transitory shock to price growth and βs,t a persistent component,
which is given by
log βs,t = log βs,t−1 + log νs,t.
The innovations (εs,t, νs,t) are independent of each other, with log εs,t ∼ iiN (−σ2ε/2, σ2ε)
and log νs,t ∼ iiN (−σ2ν/2, σ2ν), and also independent of all other variables.29
Each period t, agents only observe capital prices logQs up to period t and estimate the
persistent component driving capital gains. Let log βs,t−1 ∼ N (logms,t−1, σ2) denote the
period t−1 prior belief about the persistent component, where σ denotes the steady state
Kalman filter uncertainty.30 In period t, agents observe the new capital price Qs,t and
update their beliefs using Bayes’ law. Their period t beliefs are then given by log βs,t ∼
N (logms,t, σ2) with
logms,t = logms,t−1 − σ
2
v
2
+ g
(
logQs,t − logQs,t−1 + σ
2
ε + σ
2
v
2
− logms,t−1
)
, (2.10)
where the Kalman gain is given by
g =
σ2
σ2 + σ2ε
. (2.11)
Agents’ beliefs can thus be parsimoniously summarized by the variables (mc,t,mi,t), which
capture agents’ degree of optimism about future capital gains. Equation (2.10) shows
how agents’ capital gain expectations are driven by observed past capital gains, whenever
g > 0. Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) show that for values of g around 2% this delivers
28This requires a standard transformation of variables, so as to render them stationary.
29The random variables εs,t+1, νs,t+1 are not defined on the probabiltiy space Ω, but on a larger
auxiliary space Ω, as they contain random variation that is independent of variation in both prices and
other observables in equilibrium. Decision function can still be specified to be functions of Ω only.
30We have 2σ2 ≡ −σ2ν +
√
(σ2ν)
2
+ 4σ2νσ
2
ε .
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an empirically plausible specification describing the dynamics of investors’ subjective
capital gain beliefs over time.
To avoid simultaneous determination of price beliefs and prices, we follow Adam,
Marcet, and Beutel (2017) and use a slightly modified information setup in which agents
receive at time t information about the transitory component in t − 1, log εs,t−1. The
modification causes the updating equation (2.10) to contain only lagged price growth and
no variance correction terms. Capital gain beliefs then evolve according to
logms,t = logms,t−1 + g (logQs,t−1 − logQs,t−2 − logms,t−1) + g log ε1s,t (2.12)
where log ε1s,t ∼ iiN (−σ
2
ε
2
, σ2ε) is a time t innovation to agents’ information set (unpre-
dictable using information available to agents up to period t − 1), which captures in-
formation that agents receive in period t about the transitory price growth component
log εs,t−1.31 Agents’ expectations are then given by
EPt
[
Qs,t+1
Qs,t
]
= ms,t. (2.13)
Given the specific subjective price beliefs and the assumption of rational expectations
about (Zt+j,Xt+j,Wt+j, Rc,t+j, Ri,t+j), we can work with the probability space
Ω˜ ≡ ΩZ × ΩQ,c × ΩQ,i
and consider decision functions of the form
(Ct, Ht, Kc,t+1, Ki,t+1) : Ω˜
t −→ R4. (2.14)
Moreover, the subjective belief setup allows us to summarize the history of capital
prices in the two sectors using the two state variables (mc,t,mit) ∈ R2, so that house-
hold decision functions are time-invariant function of an extended set of state variables
(Zt, Kc,t, Ki,t,mc,t,mit). The state St describing the aggregate economy at time t can
be summarized by the vector St = (Zt, Kc,t, Ki,t,mc,t,mit, Qc,t−1, Qi,t−1), where the latter
two variables are required to be able to describe the equilibrium dynamics of beliefs over
time, as implied by equation (2.12). The economy’s equilibrium dynamics can then be
31However, we follow the baseline specification of Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) and assume that
along the equilibrium path no actual information is observed, instead set ln ε1s,t to 0 each period. It is
easy to see in our specific model, that – given the solution to the filtering problem – beliefs about future
m values do not matter for policy functions. For this reason we work with a reduced updating equation
logms,t = logms,t−1 + g (logQs,t−1 − logQs,t−2 − logms,t−1)
and the reduced outcome space Ω˜ below, which does not include observable innovations ε1c,t and ε
1
i,t .
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described by a nonlinear state transition function G(·) mapping current states and future
technology into future states
St+1 = G(St, Zt+1),
and by an outcome function F (·) mapping states into economic outcomes for the remain-
ing variables
(Wt, Rc,t, Ri,t, Yt, Ct, It, Ht) = F (St).
We endow households with beliefs about future values (Wt+j, Rc,t+j, Ri,t+j) consistent with
these equilibrium mappings.32 Since the mappings depend themselves on the solution
to the household problem and the solution to the household problem on the assumed
mappings, one needs to solve for a fixed point. Because the economy features seven state
variables, it is generally not feasible to solve for the fixed point of this problem at a speed
that would allow estimating the subjective belief model using the simulated methods of
moments. Yet, as we explain below, it becomes computationally feasible for our log-linear
specification for household preferences.
2.6 Equilibrium Conditions
This section derives the equations characterizing the competitive equilibrium. These
equations hold independently of the assumed belief structure. From the household’s
first-order conditions we have33
Ct = Wt, (2.15)
Qc,t = βE
P
t
[
Wt
Wt+1
((1− δc)Qc,t+1 +Rc,t+1)
]
, (2.16)
Qi,t = βE
P
t
[
Wt
Wt+1
((1− δi)Qi,t+1 +Ri,t+1)
]
, (2.17)
for all t ≥ 0. The first-order conditions of consumption-sector firms are
Wt =
(1− αc)Yc,t
Hc,t
, (2.18)
Rc,t =
αcYc,t
Kc,t
, (2.19)
32That is, households beliefs P over the full set of exogenous variables Ω are jointly described by
the equilibrium mappings F and G and a measure P˜ on Ω˜ that is consistent with the exogenous law
of motion for Z and the perceived laws of motion for Qi and Qc implied by the learning specification
above. Appendix B.3.1 provides details on how P can be recovered from P˜ and the mappings F and G.
Appendix B.3.2 proves that there is a unique measure P˜ consistent with the subjective belief description
given in this section.
33The household budget constraint will hold automatically, as we will keep all market clearing condi-
tions in the set of equations characterizing equilibrium.
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and the optimality conditions of investment-sector firms
Wt = (1− αi)Qc,tKαii,tZ1−αit H−αii,t , (2.20)
Ri,t = αiQc,tK
αi−1
i,t Z
1−αi
t H
1−αi
i,t . (2.21)
The market clearing conditions are
Ct = Yc,t, (2.22)
Ht = Hc,t +Hi,t, (2.23)
Kc,t+1 = (1− δc)Kc,t + Yi,t, (2.24)
Ki,t+1 = (1− δi)Ki,t +Xt. (2.25)
For the case with subjective beliefs, we have in addition (for s = c, i)
EPt [Qs,t+1] = ms,tQs,t, (2.26)
where ms,t evolves according to (2.12) and rational expectations about all other variables.
For the case with rational expectations, we have EPt [·] = Et [·] .
Equations (2.15), (2.18) and (2.22) show that labor in the consumption sector is
constant and given by
Hc,t = 1− αc. (2.27)
Consumption variations are thus driven entirely by productivity variations and by the
dynamics of capital accumulation in the consumption sector. This feature will allow
the model to replicate the smoothness of the aggregate consumption series. For the
investment sector, we obtain from equation (2.20) that
Hi,t = Ki,tZ
1−αi
αi
t
(
(1− αi) Qc,t
Wt
) 1
αi
, (2.28)
which shows that high prices for consumption capital (Qc,t) induce – ceteris paribus –
high labor demand by firms in the investment sector and thus drive up investment in the
consumption sector. This feature will allow the model to generate a positive comovement
between capital prices, hours worked and investment. In addition, it follows from equation
(2.20) that high prices for consumption capital (Qc,t) and high labor input (Hi,t) induce
high rental rates in the investment sector. From equation (2.17) it then follows that
high prices for consumption capital (Qc,t) transmit via this channel to higher prices for
investment capital (Qc,t), so that the asset prices in the two sectors comove with each
other.
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2.7 Equilibrium Dynamics under Subjective Beliefs
This section provides analytic insights into the equilibrium dynamics of the model under
subjective beliefs. These analytic results show how the model can give rise to persistent
swings in capital prices and thus generate volatile and persistent stock price dynamics,
while simultaneously producing smooth dynamics for the remaining variables.
We start by studying the prices dynamics of consumption-sector capital. Given the
assumption of rational dividend and wage expectations and given the assumed subjective
price beliefs (2.26), we obtain from equation (2.16)
Qc,t = βEt
[
Wt
Wt+1
]
(1− δc)mc,tQc,t + βEt
[
Wt
Wt+1
Rc,t+1
]
. (2.29)
Using the equilibrium relationships (2.19), (2.22) and (2.15) allows expressing the dis-
counted expected rental rate (the last term in equation (2.29)) using period t variables:
Et
[
Wt
Wt+1
Rc,t+1
]
= αc
Wt
Kc,t+1
(2.30)
Substituting into equation (2.29) and solving for Qc,t delivers
Qc,t =
βαc
1
Wt
− β (1− δc)Et
[
1
Wt+1
]
mc,t
1
Kc,t+1
. (2.31)
To illustrate the asset price dynamics implied by this equation, suppose for a moment that
the capital stock (Kc,t+1) and expected future wages (Et[1/Wt+1]) are constant over time.
We shall consider the additional effects associated with movements in these variables
below. The asset pricing equation (2.31) then takes the particularly simple form
Qc,t =
A
1
Wt
−Bmc,t , (2.32)
where A and B are positive constants. From
Wt = Ct = Yc,t = ZtK
αc
c,t (1− αc)1−αc , (2.33)
we get that wages are determined by productivity (Zt) and the consumption-sector capital
stock (Kc,t). This shows that that capital prices in equation (2.32) increase with pro-
ductivity (Zt), the capital stock (Kc,t) and with subjective optimism (mc,t). Optimism is
itself driven by past observed capital gains according to equation (2.12). Independent of
the source of an initial increase in the capital price Qc,t,, it follows from equation (2.32)
that it will propagate over time through two self-reinforcing effects: (1) any observed cap-
ital gain today increases – via the belief updating equation (2.12) – optimism tomorrow
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(mc,t+1) and thus tomorrow’s capital prices; (2) an increase in the current capital price
Qc,t, increases hours worked in the investment sector (equation (2.28)), thereby tomor-
row’s consumption-sector capital and thus tomorrow’s wages (Wt+1) (equation (2.33)).
34
An increased wage tomorrow raises tomorrow’s capital price (equation (2.32)).
The previous arguments shows how – for given end-of-period capital stock levels
(Kc,t+1) and given expectations about future wages (Et[1/Wt+1]) – asset price increases
are followed by further increases.35 Yet, along a path where Qc,t rises, investment in
consumption-sector capital also rises and thus the capital stock Kc,t+1 and future wages
Wt+1. This sets in motion dampening forces that work against the capital price increase.
The last term on the r.h.s of equation (2.31) shows that an increased capital stock starts
to directly dampen the capital price increase. This effect emerges because an expanded
capital stock leads – ceteris paribus – to falling rental rates (equation (2.30)). Simi-
larly, since wages will increase as the capital stock expands (equation (2.33)) inverse
wage expectations Et [1/Wt+1] in equation (2.31) start to fall. This exerts an additional
dampening effect on asset prices (equation (2.31)).
It turns out that the dampening forces associated with rising capital stocks and rising
expected wages are not always strong enough to terminate capital price booms. To
insure that capital prices remain finite, we follow Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016)
and impose a projection facility that eventually bounds upward belief revisions.36 The
projection facility can be interpreted as an approximate implementation of a Bayesian
updating scheme where agents have a truncated prior about the support of βs,t. The
details of the projection facility are spelled out in Appendix B.2.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the quantitative model dynamics by displaying the impulse re-
sponses to an exogenous one-time increase in the quarterly expected growth rate of the
price of consumption sector capital (mc,t) by 10 basis points in period zero.
37 The figure
uses the estimated parameters from Section 2.8 and normalizes all variables relative to
the deterministic balanced growth path values that would emerge in the absence of the
shock. Figure 2.3 shows that the period zero increase in optimism and the associated
34This investment increase is obvious, if it is triggered by an increase in mc,t, as the wage Wt does
then not react. If instead the initial price increase is due to an increase in productivity, we can substitute
(2.32) into (2.28) to obtain Hi,t = Ki,tZ
1−αi
αi
t
(
(1− αi) A1−WtBmc,t
) 1
αi
. This shows that the joint wage
and capital price increase still implies an increase in hours worked in the investment sector.
35Similarly, asset price decreases are followed by further decreases.
36The issue of bounding beliefs so as to ensure that expected utility remains finite is present in many
applications of both Bayesian and adaptive learning to asset prices. The literature has typically dealt
with this issue by using a projection facility, assuming that agents simply ignore observations that would
imply updating beliefs beyond the required bound. See Timmermann (1993, 1996), Marcet and Sargent
(1989), or Evans and Honkapohja (2001). This approach has two problems. First, it does not arise
from Bayesian updating. Second, it introduces a discontinuity in the simulated moments and creates
difficulties for our MSM estimation. To avoid this, we follow the differentiable approach to bounding
beliefs used in Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016).
37We report the impulse response to a technology shock in Section 2.8.
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Figure 2.3. Impulse response to a +10bps shock to expected capital gains in consumption-
sector capital (mc,t)
small increase in the capital price is followed by eight quarters of further increases in
optimism and capital prices. The increased capital price leads to additional investment
in consumption-sector capital and also to a wage increase, as discussed before. These re-
actions eventually dampen the price increase and capital prices start to revert direction.
Prices significantly undershoot their balanced growth path value before slowly recover-
ing. As capital prices become depressed, investment falls and consumption-sector capital
persistently undershoots its balanced growth path value. Associated with the reduction
in capital is a reduction in wages.
Figure 2.4 illustrates how the dynamics in the consumption sector spill over into the
investment sector. To understand the channels through which this spillover happens,
note that we obtain from equation (2.17) and the assumed subjective price beliefs (2.26)
the following relationship:
Qi,t =
βEt
[
Wt
Wt+1
Ri,t+1
]
1− β (1− δi)Et
[
Wt
Wt+1
]
mi,t
. (2.34)
Since wages increase during the price boom in consumption sector capital, see Figure 2.3,
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Figure 2.4. Impulse response to a +10bps shock to expected capital gains in consumption-
sector capital (mc,t)
the drop of E [Wt/Wt+1] exerts downward pressure on the price of investment-sector
capital in both the numerator and the denominator of equation (2.34). Yet, equation
(2.20) shows that expected rental rates Ri,t+1 increase strongly following the increase
in the price of consumption-sector capital (and also as a result of the increase in hours
worked in the investment sector). Due to the strong response of Ri,t+1, the overall price
effect at time zero is positive and the price boom in the consumption-sector capital spills
over into an increase in the price of investment-sector capital. The initial price increase
then propagates via the belief updating mechanism (2.12) and the positive dependence of
capital prices on mi,t (equation (2.34)) into a persistent boom for the price of investment-
sector capital. This shows that capital prices in the two sectors have a tendency to comove
over time.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that capital prices in the investment sector move consider-
ably more than in the consumption sector. Figure 2.5 shows that this difference is far
less pronounced for a standard stock market valuation measure such as the PD ratio.
Since dividends in the investment sector increase strongly during the price boom (equa-
tion (2.21)) the difference in the response of the PD ratio across sectors is much more
muted. Overall, the model is consistent with empirical observation that stock prices in
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Figure 2.5. Impulse response to a +10bps shock to expected capital gains in consumption-
sector capital (mc,t)
the investment sector are more volatile than stock prices in the consumption sector.
While the PD ratios approximately double in response to the considered optimism
shock, the response of real quantities is one or two orders of magnitude smaller. Con-
sumption, for instance, increases in line with the increase in the stock of consumption
sector capital and moves by less than +/- 1% over the boom-bust cycle, see Figure 2.3.
Hours worked are more variable and increase by around 13% while investment increases
by up to 25%. This relatively muted response of real variables allows the model to rec-
oncile the relative smoothness of the business cycle with the observed high volatility of
stock prices.
2.8 Quantitative Performance: Subjective versus Ra-
tional Price Beliefs
This section estimates the model using the simulated methods of moments (SMM). In
the setting with subjective price beliefs, the model has nine parameters that need to
be estimated, (β, αc, αi, δc, δi, γ, σ, p, g). There is one parameter less under fully rational
expectations, as the Kalman gain g then drops out.
In our baseline approach, we estimate the model using 13 target moments and a
diagonal weighting matrix with the data-implied variance of the estimated data moment
as diagonal entries. For the subjective belief model, these target moments include the
CHAPTER 2. STOCK PRICE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 65
seven business cycle moments listed in Table 2.1 and all asset pricing moments listed in
Table 2.2, except for the mean and standard deviation of the risk-free interest rate. We
exclude the risk-free rate moments from the set of targeted moments because the model
has a hard time fully matching the equity premium. We shall nevertheless report the risk-
free rate moments implied by the estimated model. For the rational expectations model,
we furthermore exclude the equity return moments (E[re], σ(re)) and the autocorrelation
of the PD ratio (ρ(P/D)), as including these variables significantly deteriorates the model
fit along the business cycle dimension without improving it substantially for the excluded
moments.38,39
With fully rational expectations, equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities are
unique.40 For the case with subjective price beliefs, this is far from obvious, but the
following result shows that we have indeed uniqueness of equilibrium allocations and
prices in our setting with subjective price beliefs:
Proposition 1. There are unique functions G and F and a unique measure P˜ on Ω˜,
such that
1. P˜ describes the joint beliefs of households about technology and capital prices as
defined in Section 2.5
2. G is a state transition function, St+1 = G(St, Zt+1), and F an outcome function,
(Wt, Rc,t, Ri,t, Yt, Ct, It, Ht) = F (St), such that St, St+1 and (Wt, Rc,t, Ri,t, Yt, Ct, It, Ht)
are consistent with
(a) All equilibrium conditions (see Section 2.6)
(b) Households’ belief updating equations (equation (2.12) for s ∈ {c, i})41
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix B.3.3. There, we also provide an
explicit characterization of the mappings G and F based on the equations collected in
Section 2.6. Essentially, this characterization determines those functions up to a static
equation system (stated in Lemma 4 in the appendix). In our numerical solution proce-
dure, we solve this equation system and construct the mapping G mirroring the construc-
38Excluding these moments does not conceal the true potential of the rational expectations model to
match the equity return moments. Even if we give the model the best chance to match E[re] and σ(re)
by making them the only estimation targets, the resulting model moments are just 0.74% and 0.50%,
respectively, as opposed to the values 0.77% and 0.16% reported in Table 2.6. Relative to their empirical
counterparts (1.87% and 7.98%), these numbers are small and similar in magnitude.
39We keep the level and standard deviation of the PD ratio as estimation targets for the RE model,
because otherwise the payout ratio p would be unidentified. Excluding them has almost no impact on
the remaining estimated parameters.
40As is well-known, the market allocation is equivalent to the solution of a social planning problem,
with the latter featuring a concave objective function and a convex set of constraints.
41With projection adjustments as described in Appendix B.2, where necessary.
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Table 2.5
Estimated parameters
Parameter Subjective Belief RE Model RE Model
Model w/o inv. shocks w inv. shocks
β 0.996 0.997 0.997
αc 0.36 0.36 0.36
αi 0.73 0.35 0.35
δc 0.010 0.020 0.010
δi 0.014 0.030 0.030
γ 1.004 1.005 1.003
σ 0.015 0.018 0.015
p 0.350 0.195 0.337
g 0.019 – –
σi – – 0.015
tion in the proof of Proposition 1. Having recovered G and F , this essentially determines
equilibrium.42
When estimating the learning model we impose the additional restriction that the
impulse responses of capital prices to fundamental shocks display an exponential decay
rate of 1.16% per quarter.43 We do so to avoid that the estimation selects parameter values
that would imply deterministic equilibrium cycles. Clearly, imposing this additional
restriction can only deteriorate the fit of the targeted moments. The model moments
that we present thus represent a lower bound on the fit that could be achieved in the
absence of this restriction.
Table 2.5 reports the estimated parameter values and Table 2.6 target moments. We
first discuss business cycle moments, which are reported in the upper half of Table 2.6.
Along this dimension, our estimated subjective belief model matches the targets very
well. Instead, the rational expectations model displays somewhat too much consumption
volatility and considerably too little investment and hours volatility. In addition, the
degree of comovement of the macro aggregates is higher in the rational expectations
model than both in the data and in the subjective belief model.
The poorer performance of the rational expectations model can be fixed by introduc-
42Moments are computed based on a Monte Carlo simulation of model dynamics using the state
transition function G. Simulated paths for all parameter combinations start in the balanced growth path
and are based on the same random draw of 10,000 productivity shocks. The first 500 observations of the
simulation are dropped before computing moments.
43Details of this restriction are provided in Appendix B.4.
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Table 2.6
Model fit for targeted moments (13 / 10 targets, 9/8 model parameters for the
subjective belief/RE model)
Data Subj. Belief RE Model RE Model
(std.dev.) Model w/o inv. shocks w inv. shocks
Business Cycle Moments
σ(Y ) 1.72 (0.25) 1.83 1.90 1.85
σ(C)/σ(Y ) 0.61 (0.03) 0.67 0.75 0.66
σ(I)/σ(Y ) 2.90 (0.35) 2.90 1.88 2.79
σ(H)/σ(Y ) 1.08 (0.13) 1.06 0.31 0.56
ρ(Y,C) 0.88 (0.02) 0.84 0.98 0.86
ρ(Y, I) 0.86 (0.03) 0.89 0.97 0.90
ρ(Y,H) 0.75 (0.03) 0.70 0.89 0.80
Financial Moments
E[P/D] 152.3 (25.3) 150.0 174.6 166.0
σ(P/D) 63.39 (12.39) 44.96 7.00 8.28
ρ(P/D) 0.98 (0.003) 0.97 0.96 0.95
E[re] 1.87 (0.45) 1.25 0.77 0.57
σ(re) 7.98 (0.35) 7.07 0.16 0.16
σ(Dt+1/Dt) 1.75 (0.38) 2.46 1.19 1.69
ing additional investment-specific shocks.44 While the literature has mostly focused on
persistent investment-specific technology processes, we add here just a parsimonious iid
component to the investment-sector production function, so as to keep the changes to the
model described above minimal and to have only one additional parameter. Specifically,
we replace Yi,t from equation (2.1) by
Yi,t = ε
I
tK
αi
i,t (ZtHi,t)
1−αi
with log εIt ∼ N (−σ
2
i
2
, σ2i ). We solve and re-estimate this augmented model under rational
expectations using the same procedure and targets as for the model without investment-
specific shocks. The resulting parameter estimates and model moments are reported in the
third columns of Tables 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. With investment shocks, the business
cycle predictions of the model are much closer to the data and overall comparable with
our subjective belief model. While this approach is in principle capable of generating
44Investment-specific technology shocks are found to be important drivers of business cycles in es-
timated models (compare Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010, 2011) and thus are a natural
candidate to improve business cycle predictions of the real business cycle model.
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Table 2.7
Model fit for untargeted moments
Moment Data Subjective Belief RE Model RE Model
Model w/o inv. shocks w inv. shocks
E[rf ] 0.25 (0.13) 0.78 0.77 0.57
σ(rf ) 0.82 (0.12) 0.06 0.09 0.16
ρ(H,P/D) 0.51 (0.17) 0.79 -0.97 -0.95
ρ(I/Y, P/D) 0.19 (0.31) 0.69 -0.97 -0.94
ρ(EP [re], P/D) 0.79 (0.07) 0.52 -0.99 -0.98
good business cycle predictions, the required volatility σi of the investment-specific shock
is as high as the volatility σ of the neutral shock (see Table 2.5). Interestingly, this
additional source of exogenous randomness is not required in our subjective belief model
to generate the same amount of investment volatility (and even more hours volatility),
despite σ being the same in both specifications.
We next turn to the financial target moments reported in the lower part of Table 2.6.
The model with subjective beliefs is able to match the level and persistence of the PD
ratio and the PD ratio in the model also displays substantial variability, although its
volatility is somewhat lower than in the data. Equity returns in the model are also very
volatile, generating almost 90% of the volatility observed in the data, despite a moderate
– though somewhat overstated – dividend growth volatility. The model can match the
level of equity returns only partially with the mean equity return in the model being only
two thirds of the 1.87% per quarter earned on average on stock market investments in
our sample period.
The two versions of the rational expectations model, reported in the last two columns,
perform significantly worse along the financial dimension. While the level of the PD ratio
(by choice of p), its persistence and the volatility of dividend growth are roughly in line
with the data, the rational expectations model generates almost no price and return
volatility and equity returns are considerably lower than in the subjective belief model,
regardless of whether investment shocks are present or not.45
Table 2.7 reports all moments from Section 2.3 which where not targeted by the
estimation. The first two rows show the mean and volatility of the risk-free rate. The
model is consistent with a stable risk-free rate, both under subjective beliefs and rational
expectations, but tends to overstate its level.46 Yet, despite the too low mean stock return
45The poor ability to match E[re] and σ(re) is not because these are untargeted moments in the
rational expectations estimation, compare footnote 38.
46The somewhat lower value for the model with investment shocks is due to the lower growth rate (γ)
in that model.
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and the too high mean risk-free rate, the subjective belief model generates an equity
premium of 0.47%. While only around 30% of the historical equity premium, this result
is still remarkable, given the low risk aversion implicit in our preference specification.47
In comparison, there is literally no equity premium in both rational expectations versions
of the model.
The subjective belief model also generates positive comovement between the business
cycle and stock prices as measured by the correlations of H and I/Y with the PD ratio.
In contrast, these correlations are strongly negative under rational expectations. Fur-
thermore, the model matches the positive correlation between expected returns and the
PD ratio. While quantitatively this correlation is almost four standard errors lower than
in the data, it is still in the range of values that Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) report
for other surveys than the UBS Gallup survey, which our data moment is based on, see
their Appendix A.2. We interpret this as evidence that our model generates overall real-
istic comovement of stock prices and expected returns. Again, rational expectations are
strongly at odds with the data: because the PD ratio tends to mean-revert and expected
returns must on average forecast realized returns, the correlation is strongly negative in
both rational expectation specifications.
The central mechanism underlying the dynamics in the subjective belief model has al-
ready been discussed in Section 2.7. To illustrate this mechanism further, Figures 2.6 and
2.7 depict impulse response functions of the model with subjective beliefs to a technology
shock (solid lines) for macro aggregates and capital prices/expectations, respectively.48
For comparison purposes, the figures also plot impulse responses of the rational expec-
tations model with an identical parameterization as the subjective belief model (dashed
lines). We first discuss the latter as the dynamics under rational expectations are also
informative for the response under subjective beliefs and the difference between the two
explains well, why our subjective belief model can account better for the joint dynamics
of business cycles and stock prices than the rational expectations model.
The dashed lines in Figure 2.6 show familiar adjustment dynamics present in a real
business cycle model with capital adjustment frictions. On impact, the higher technology
level leads to an increase in output, consumption and investment and, with one period
lag,49 also in hours worked. The increased technology increases the marginal product of
47Due to linear disutility of labor the effective risk aversion is even lower than what is implied by
logarithmic utility in consumption: agents are risk-neutral with respect to all risk that is uncorrelated
with wages. Thus only assets that yield low payoffs in states where wages are low carry a positive
risk-premium.
48We start the model in a deterministic balanced growth path and plot deterministic impulse responses
to a one-time one-standard-deviation positive innovation to technology, shutting down all randomness in
the dynamics thereafter. For trending quantities (Y , C, I, K), the plotted dynamics are normalized by
dividing by γt to eliminate the deterministic time trend.
49This lag is because of our particular timing assumption about the exogenous capital stock in the
investment sector according to which the end-of-period capital stock Ki,t+1 is held proportional to Zt.
As it is not possible to reallocate capital from the consumption to the investment sector, the marginal
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Figure 2.6. Impulse response functions of macro aggregates to a technology shock for
subjective belief model (solid lines) and RE model (dashed lines)
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Figure 2.7. Impulse response functions of prices and beliefs to a technology shock for
subjective belief model (solid lines) and RE model (dashed lines)
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(consumption-sector) capital. This in turn increases capital prices in both sectors above
their steady state level (see Figure 2.7),50 which sets in motion a capital accumulation
process that lasts beyond the impact period (lower panel in Figure 2.6). As capital
increases over time, investment declines and consumption and output increase to their
new balanced growth path, on which all three variables are permanently higher (relative
to their deterministic trend) than on the pre-shock balanced growth path. As the capital
stock expands, marginal products of capital and capital prices return back to steady
state. The two lower plots in Figure 2.7, which show the expected capital price growth,
Et [Qs,t+1/Qs,t] for s ∈ {c, i}, mirror the response of decreasing capital prices along the
adjustment path.
Next, we turn to the impulse responses of the subjective belief model. Here, two
channels determine the adjustment dynamics after a technology shock. First, the econ-
omy reacts on impact almost identical to the rational expectations economy51 and, again,
the shock creates a situation in which the capital stock is below its desired level, so low
frequency movements of the economy display an adjustment process very close to the one
observed under rational expectations. But second, as capital supply is not fully elastic,
the higher capital demand on impact increases capital prices and this has substantially
different implications under subjective beliefs than under rational expectations. Under
rational expectations, the capital price just indicates the relative scarcity of capital and
reverts back to steady state as capital is accumulated. Instead, under subjective beliefs,
the initial surprise increase in prices Qc,t, Qi,t triggers an upward revision in beliefs mc,t+1,
mi,t+1 through the belief updating equation (2.12). The exogenous technology shock thus
endogenously triggers a “belief shock” of the kind we have studied in Section 2.7 to illus-
trate the equilibrium dynamics.52 As a result, all impulse responses cyclically fluctuate
around the long-run adjustment path under rational expectations. Quantitatively, these
cyclical deviations from their long-run paths are small for consumption and capital, some-
what larger for hours and output, even larger for investment and substantially larger for
product of labor in the investment sector (measured in capital units) grows on impact only due to the
technology increase itself. With αc < αi, this increases is smaller than the increase in the wage, which
even leads to a small decline of hours on impact, unless it is offset by a sufficiently strong increase in
Qc (recall, that hours in the consumption sector are constant, so all the dynamics in hours are due to
adjustments in labor supply of the investment sector).
50While capital in the investment sector exogenously appears as a response to the technology shock,
Qi,t still increases due to the increased output price Qc,t of the investment sector. The response is,
however, quantitatively small and thus hardly visible in the figure.
51The only difference is that under rational expectations agents expect a subsequent decline in capital
prices, which dampens the initial increase. Under subjective beliefs, no such decline is expected, which
leads to a larger impact response in Qc, translating into an additional positive effect on hours worked
and investment.
52While we have shown there a “large” increase in optimism to illustrate the emergence of a boom-bust
cycle, the effect is quantitatively much smaller here. This explains the differences between the Figures
2.6 and 2.7 here and the Figures 2.3 and 2.4 there.
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capital prices and price-growth expectations. This explains why the model with subjective
beliefs can generate considerably more volatility in investment, hours and, particularly,
stock prices, without overstating the overall volatility of consumption and output. The
additional belief-driven cyclical fluctuations in the adjustment dynamics after the shock
also break the almost perfect comovement of output, consumption, investment and hours
under rational expectations, instead bring the correlations ρ(Y,C), ρ(Y, I) and ρ(Y,H)
closer to the data.
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Figure 2.8. Simulated equilibrium paths of (detrended) output and the price-dividend
ratio
While these impulse responses display cyclical price variations, the fluctuations in the
PD ratio (not shown) implied by a single one-standard-deviation technology shock are
quantitatively small. To generate sizeable fluctuations in the PD ratio as in Figure 2.5,
larger amounts of capital gains optimism are required than generated by a single shock.53
However, a sequence of positive technology shock can occasionally create a sufficient
amount of optimism for dynamics to display large stock price cycles. Figure 2.8, which
53Note that the peak level in mc in Figure 2.7 is just 5 basis points, whereas we have studied a one-time
increase in optimism of 10 basis points in Section 2.7
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plots simulated sample paths for output and the PD ratio over 200 quarters54, shows
two such price cycles in the first half of the sample (lower panel). The first, larger,
price cycle is accompanied by an output boom that ends in a deep recession as prices
drop sharply, mainly due to a strong decline in investment activity (not shown). The
subsequent recovery is followed by a second, smaller cycle in output and prices. In the
second half of the sample, prices fluctuate only little and output fluctuations are mainly
driven by technology shocks and capital adjustment dynamics. From this discussion, we
conclude that our model gives rise to quantitatively realistic stock price cycles, not unlike
the ones depicted in Figure 2.1, and that these cycles are linked to economic activity.
The existence of stock price cycles in our model also implies that the model economy
spends a considerably amount of time in states of capital gains optimism, in which PD
ratios are substantially above their long-run mean. There is thus a large amount of
mass in the right tail of the ergodic P/D distribution, which is illustrated in Figure 2.9.
The figure plots once again the empirical kernel density of the P/D distribution in the
data as in Figure 2.2, but now in addition the distribution in the model. As is visible
there, the model generates a right tail that is remarkably close to the one observed in
the data. However, in the model more mass is concentrated around the mode, while very
small PD ratios are rare compared to the data. The reason for this asymmetry is that
belief revisions have much larger effects on prices in states of optimism than in states of
pessimism as is easily observable in the equations (2.31) and (2.34), such that additional
negative shocks in a bust do not drive down prices as much as additional positive shocks
in a boom drive them further up. The lack of mass in the left tail of the distribution also
explains why we cannot match the full scale of the volatility of the PD ratio in Table 2.5
without overstating the mean.
To further illustrate by how much the shape of the P/D distribution is affected by
subjective beliefs, Figure 2.10 plots the distribution of the PD ratio in the data together
with the distributions implied by the two versions of the rational expectations model. In
both cases, the distribution is unimodal and symmetric, with a substantial amount of
mass closely centered around the mean.
54The figure plots output relative to its stochastic trend.
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Figure 2.9. Unconditional density of PD ratio: subjective belief model versus data (not
targeted in estimation, kernel estimates)
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2.9 Comparison with Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
(2001) and Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017)
In this section we compare the quantitative implications of our model with Boldrin,
Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017). We choose to
compare our model to Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), because it is one of the
leading joint explanations of stock prices and business cycles under rational expectations
in the literature and the one closest to ours. We compare our model to Adam, Marcet,
and Beutel (2017), because they study the same belief specification as we do, but in an
endowment economy.
Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) calibrate their model to a different data sam-
ple than we consider. In order to make the comparison as fair as possible, we use their
reported data moments as a benchmark,55 not the ones reported in Section 2.3, but re-
estimate our model to fit those moments using the procedure outlined in Section 2.8. As
estimation targets we use all moments reported in Table 2.9 with the exception of the
standard deviation of the risk-free rate.56 Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) report
annual instead of quarterly return moments despite their model being quarterly, which
necessitates another change to make the two models comparable. As return autocorrela-
tions are not fully in line with the data in either model,57 we transform the annual return
moments reported in Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) both for the data and the
model to quarterly frequency under the assumption of no return autocorrelation at that
frequency.58
Table 2.8 shows the estimated parameters in comparison with the parameters used by
Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001). Due to the similar structure of the two models,
the parameters in their model have an identical interpretation as in ours. They are also
quantitatively not too different. Table 2.9 reports a standard set of business cycle and
financial return moments in the data and in both models. The second column reports
55For financial moments, they consider U.S. data covering the period 1892–1987, for business cycle
moments U.S. data covering 1964:Q1–1988:Q2.
56The standard deviation of the risk-free rate is clearly lower in our model than in the data, particularly
relative to the sample starting in 1892 used by Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001). We do not consider
this as a serious shortcoming, since the data moment is likely overstated as argued in Section 2.3. For
this reason, we do not attempt to match this number perfectly.
57In our model, returns at the quarterly frequency are positively autocorrelated. This is a known
weakness of subjective price belief models of the kind studied here in the absence of transitory shocks.
See Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) Section VIII.A for a discussion and solution of this issue. Instead,
in Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) quarterly returns are strongly negatively correlated.
58This assumption is (approximately) correct for the data and it transforms – counterfactually – the
good fit of the Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) model to quarterly returns, so as to not bias the
model comparison towards our model. It implies that means are divided by 4 and standard deviations
are divided by 2. Similarly, we divide standard errors of means by 2 and standard errors of standard
deviations by
√
2.
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Table 2.8
Parameters for subjective belief model and
model of Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001)
Parameter Subjective Belief Model BCF
β 0.997 0.999999
αc 0.36 0.36
αi 0.6 0.36
δc 0.15 0.021
δi 0.01 0.021
γ 1.004 1.004
σ 0.015 0.018
g 0.025 –
p 0.4 (0.248)
Note: BCF refers to Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
(2001).
moments for our model, the third column moments for Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
(2001). Overall, both models match the set of business cycle moments well. Where
there are differences between the two, our model tends to do slightly better. Along the
financial dimension, the model by Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) is able to match
the average levels of the risk-free rate and stock returns perfectly and generates stock
return volatility close to the one observed in the data. Our model is less successful with
the former two moments, but its prediction lie within a one-standard-error interval around
the point estimates in the data. As Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), we are able
to generate high stock return volatility, but unlike in their paper, this is not achieved by
generating counterfactually high volatility in the risk-free rate.
Table 2.10 reports additional evidence for the two models. The first four moments
are statistics reported in Tables 1 and 2 of Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) which
have not been discussed in Section 2.3 of the present paper. ρ(∆Yt), ρ(∆Ct) denote the
autocorrelation of log output growth and log consumption growth, respectively, σ(Php) is
the standard deviation of logged and HP-filtered quarterly stock prices and ρ(Y, Php) is
the correlation of output and stock prices, both logged and HP-filtered. The two models
perform similarly for the first three moments, both matching the persistence of output
growth, but underpredicting the persistence of consumption growth and overstating the
volatility of HP-filtered stock prices. Our model generates somewhat more comovement
of stock prices with output than Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), in line with the
data.
Table 2.10 also shows statistics that relate to the behavior of dividends and the PD
ratio. These statistics are not reported by Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001). We
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therefore report our own estimates discussed in Section 2.3 in the data column and com-
pute the respective moments in the Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) model our-
selves.59 For the definition of dividends and prices we use the same convention as for our
own model. Namely, firms pay out a fixed fraction p of capital rental income each period
as dividends and reinvest the remaining fraction 1− p into new capital. Then, dividend
growth equals the growth rate of the (sector-weighted) capital rental rates and the PD ra-
tio is an affine linear function of the capital-price-to-rental-rate ratio, as in our model. For
this reason, only the moments E[P/D] and σ(P/D) depend on the value of the parameter
p, which is not present in Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001). We choose this param-
eter so as to minimize the sum of squared t statistics for two moments.60 The resulting
value is p = 0.248. In our model, dividends and the PD ratio behave qualitatively as
discussed in Section 2.8, although the overall quantitative fit is somewhat worse, because
the PD ratio was not targeted by the estimation. Yet, for any of the reported moments,
our model clearly outperforms Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001). Dividend growth
is far too volatile in their model and the PD ratio is neither as volatile nor as persistent as
in the data and in our model. In addition, the PD ratio in Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
(2001) displays negative comovement with hours worked and the investment-to-output
ratio. We have encountered such negative correlations also in the rational expectations
version of our model above. The reason for this negative correlation is, that capital prices
are much less persistent than H and I/Y in Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and
thus only mildly procyclical, but rental rates are similarly persistent as macro aggregates.
This leads to a negative correlation of H (I/Y ) and the PD ratio, despite the fact that
they both move in the same direction on impact in response to a technology shock.
Next, we compare the financial moments of our model to the baseline specification
of the endowment-economy model of Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) reported in their
Table 3 (last column, labeled “diagonal Σ matrix”). As their data sample is almost
identical to ours, we consider again the estimated model from Section 2.8. Table 2.11
reports the results. Not unexpected, our production economy matches the moments less
well than the endowment economy studied in Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017). Yet,
overall the performance of our model is relatively close to that of the Adam, Marcet, and
Beutel (2017) model. Given that our model has at the same time realistic business cycle
implications, we consider this a substantial achievement.
59We solve the Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) model by solving the associated planner problem
using standard Bellman-equation-based iteration methods. We evaluate the accuracy of our solution by
computing Euler errors and replicating the model moments reported in Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
(2001). Additional moments reported by us are computed using the same method as described in footnote
a in all of their tables (based on 500 simulations of sample size 200).
60This mirrors our estimation procedure for the subjective belief model.
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Table 2.11
Model comparison with Adam, Marcet, and Beu-
tel (2017)
Moment Data Model AMB
E[P/D] 152.3 (25.3) 149.95 115.2
σ(P/D) 63.39 (12.39) 44.96 88.20
ρ(P/D) 0.98 (0.003) 0.97 0.98
E[re] 1.87 (0.45) 1.25 1.82
σ(re) 7.98 (0.35) 7.07 7.74
E[rf ] 0.25 (0.13) 0.78 0.99
σ(rf ) 0.82 (0.12) 0.06 0.83
σ(Dt+1/Dt) 1.75 (0.38) 2.46 1.92
ρ(EP [re], P/D) 0.79 (0.07) 0.52 0.79
Note: Column “Model” refers to our model, column
“AMB” refers to Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017).
2.10 Welfare Implications of Belief-Driven Stock Price
Booms
This section studies to what extent the presence of belief-driven boom and bust cycles af-
fects allocations and household welfare. To this end, it considers the estimated subjective
belief model from Section 2.8 and the allocative and welfare implications associated with
imposing fully rational expectations on households. In the absence of subjective belief
distortions, the competitive allocation is efficient and thus represents a natural welfare
benchmark against which one can judge the costs of belief-driven boom and bust cycles.
When evaluating welfare in the subjective belief model, we consider ex-post realized wel-
fare rather than ex-ante expected welfare, as the latter would depend also on the degree
of subjective optimism.
Table 2.12 reports business cycle and financial moments for a setting with and without
subjective beliefs.61 It shows that the elimination of subjective price beliefs decreases
output volatility by about 13%. This is mainly driven by a substantial fall in the volatility
of investment and a dramatic fall in the volatility of hours worked. These effects are partly
compensated by an increase in consumption volatility, in both absolute and relative terms.
The elimination of subjective beliefs has, however, its strongest effect on the volatility
of financial variables. The standard deviation of the PD ratio decreases by more than
three quarters and the standard deviation of stock returns falls even more dramatically.
Dividend growth volatility also falls considerably.
61The results for both models are based on the estimated parameters for the subjective belief model
in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.12
The effects of shutting down subjective price beliefs
Data Subjective Belief REE Implied by
Model Subj. Belief Model
Business Cycle Moments
σ(Y ) 1.72 (0.25) 1.83 1.60
σ(C)/σ(Y ) 0.61 (0.03) 0.67 0.89
σ(I)/σ(Y ) 2.90 (0.35) 2.90 1.59
σ(H)/σ(Y ) 1.08 (0.13) 1.06 0.12
ρ(Y,C) 0.88 (0.02) 0.84 0.96
ρ(Y, I) 0.86 (0.03) 0.89 0.91
ρ(Y,H) 0.75 (0.03) 0.70 0.70
Financial Moments
E[P/D] 152.3 (25.3) 150.0 199.7
σ(P/D) 63.39 (12.39) 44.96 8.99
ρ(P/D) 0.98 (0.003) 0.97 0.99
E[re] 1.87 (0.45) 1.25 0.68
σ(re) 7.98 (0.35) 7.07 0.19
E[rf ] 0.25 (0.13) 0.78 0.68
σ(rf ) 0.82 (0.12) 0.06 0.06
σ(Dt+1/Dt) 1.75 (0.38) 2.46 0.92
The increase in consumption volatility and the fact that the volatility of hours is
welfare neutral – given our linear specification for the disutility of work – suggests that
the welfare implications of eliminating subjective beliefs are likely to be small. Indeed,
we find that the utility gain associated with the elimination of subjective beliefs amounts
to 0.29% of consumption. This is of the same order of magnitude as the welfare gains
associated with the elimination of the business cycle.
The welfare gains associated with the elimination of subjective beliefs arise mainly
through changes in the mean levels of consumption and work. Table 2.13 depicts the
mean value of (detrended) consumption and labor under the two belief specifications.62
It shows that average consumption is higher and average labor is lower in a setting with
fully rational expectations. This is the case because with rational expectations asset
prices correctly signal the value of investment opportunities. Instead, under subjective
beliefs, investment can be triggered by a belief-driven price boom, so that high levels
62The utility from the common consumption trend, which is a function of the productivity process
{Zt} only, enters utility separately.
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Table 2.13
Mean values of (detrended) consumption and labor
Subjective Belief REE Implied by
Model Subj. Belief Model
E[Cdetr] 2.7719 2.7768
E[L] 0.7152 0.7141
of hours worked and high levels of investment might occur during times in which new
capital is not particularly productive. As a result, agents can work on average more but
achieve lower average consumption levels.
We conclude this section with two remarks. First, one reason for the low welfare effects
of fluctuations induced by price cycles is the low curvature in assumed preferences. As
curvature increases, agents would be willing to give up more consumption to eliminate
fluctuations. However, the welfare gains associated with the elimination of fluctuations
induced by stock price cycles are bounded above by the welfare gains associated with
the elimination of all fluctuations and thus the cost of business cycles. Unless higher
curvature in preferences also increases the mean effects reported in Table 2.13, we expect
our result to generalize that costs of belief-driven price cycles are small and of the same
order of magnitude as the costs of business cycles.
Second, the representative agent assumption is critical for the result that welfare
effects of stock price cycles are small. Adam, Beutel, Marcet, and Merkel (2016) show
that a belief-driven boom-bust cycle can have substantial redistributive effects in the
presence of belief heterogeneity. In their model agents trade with each other at prices
that are – relative to a setting without belief distortions – too high or low. In the
present model, prices only affect allocations through aggregate investment. Likely, our
welfare assessment would change in the presence of heterogeneity that leads to trading
among agents over the course of stock price cycles, if the welfare objective was to include
distributional concerns.
2.11 Conclusions
We have presented a simple theory of the joint behavior of stock prices and business
cycles. This theory is quantitatively consistent with key facts about the business cycle,
stock price behavior and the interaction between the two. In particular, it can reconcile
smooth business cycles and volatile stock prices. Relative to the previous literature, no
labor market frictions or inseparable preferences are required to achieve this. Instead, in
our model stock prices are volatile because agents hold subjective stock price expectations
and extrapolate observed past capital gains into the future as in Adam, Marcet, and
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Beutel (2017). Extrapolation creates price-belief feedback loops that can occasionally
disconnect prices from fundamentals and lead to large and persistence stock price cycles.
In the model, such price cycles have allocative implications, because they lead to cyclical
variation in investment demand. Our theory suggests that this variation is an important
source of the business cycle fluctuations of investment and hours worked, but has only
minor effects on consumption variability.
We also assess the welfare implications of belief distortions in stock markets. In the
presence of such distortions, prices are only imperfect signals of the relative scarcity of
capital goods. Consequently, in times of optimism there can be over-investment, in times
of pessimism under-investment. Inefficient timing of investment leads to a lower average
level of consumption despite a higher average amount of hours worked. However, we
find the welfare costs of belief-driven stock price cycles to be relatively moderate. Several
considerations absent in our model might overturn this result. First, effects of price cycles
could be much larger in the presence of heterogeneity and trading in a setting where the
wealth distribution matters. Second, in a richer model with a large cross-section of
sectors in which sectoral price cycles only partially comove fluctuations in relative firm
valuations may lead to additional misallocation, absent in our model. Third, if asset
prices play an important role for the balance sheet dynamics of a financially constrained
sector,63 fluctuations in asset prices may have larger effects on allocations than in the
model presented in this paper. Exploring these channels appears to be an interesting
avenue for future research.
Conceptually, we show how to specify expectations that combine subjective beliefs
for some model variables with rational expectations along other dimensions. The pro-
posed expectation concept that is “partially rational” with respect to a subset of model-
endogenous variables can be generalized beyond our specific setting. In particular, it
may prove fruitful in other macroeconomic applications where beliefs can be disciplined
empirically along some dimensions, but one wishes to maintain the rational expectations
hypothesis along others.
63Arguably, this is less relevant for stocks than for other asset classes such as real estate. House prices
also display large and persistent cycles in many advanced economies. To the extent that such cycles are
also driven by the same belief dynamics analyzed here, one could easily extend the analysis to include
housing.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data sources
Stock price data: Our stock price data is for the United States and has been downloaded
from ‘The Global Financial Database’.1 The period covered is Q1:1949-Q1:2012. The
nominal stock price series is the “SP 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension)”
(Global Fin code “ SPXD”). The daily series has been transformed into quarterly data
by taking the index value of the last day of the considered quarter. To obtain real values,
nominal variables have been deflated using the “USA BLS Consumer Price Index” (Global
Fin code “CPUSAM”). The monthly price series has been transformed into a quarterly
series by taking the index value of the last month of the considered quarter. Nominal
dividends have been computed as follows
Dt =
(
ID(t)/ID(t− 1)
IND(t)/IND(t− 1) − 1
)
IND(t)
where IND denotes the “SP 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension)” described
above and ID is the “SP 500 Total Return Index (w/GFD extension)” (Global Fin code
“ SPXTRD”), which contains returns from price changes and dividend payouts. In the no-
tation of our model, ID(t) is equal to Pt and I
ND(t)/IND(t−1) equal to (Pt+Dt)/Pt−1.We
first computed monthly dividends and then quarterly dividends by adding up the monthly
series. Following Campbell (2003), dividends have been deseasonalized by taking averages
of the actual dividend payments over the current and preceding three quarters.
Stock market survey data: The UBS survey is the UBS Index of Investor Opti-
mism.2 For all our calculations we use own portfolio return expectations from 1999:Q1
to 2007:Q2. We do not use data from 1998 due to missing values. The micro dataset of
the UBS survey consists of 92823 record. Data-cleaning results in the removal of 18379
1It is available at http://www.globalfinancialdata.com.
2See http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data access/data/datasets/ubs investor.html.
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this records: Following Vissing-Jorgensen (2003), we ignore survey responses with stated
expected returns larger than 95% in absolute value, which results in the elimination of
16380 observations. Furthermore, we ignore records, where the difference between the
respondent’s age and his stated stock market experience is less than 16 years, which
eliminates 2378.3
The Shiller survey covers individual investors and has been kindly made available to us
by Robert Shiller at Yale University. The survey spans the period 1999:Q1-2012:Q4. The
CFO survey is collected by Duke University and CFO magazine and collects responses
from about 450 CFOs. The data span the period 2000:Q3-2012:Q4.
Inflation expectations data: The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is avail-
able from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Trading volume: We have daily data from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream
from 2nd January 1973 until 31st March 2014. We look at the series “US-DS Market”
(TOTMKUS), an index of 1000 U.S. stocks traded on NYSE and Nasdaq.
We compute quarterly trading volume as follows: Starting from daily trading volume
(DS: VA) and daily market value (DS: MV) we compute daily trading volume (VA/MV),
i.e. the share of the market that is traded on each day. We then aggregate this up,
following Lo and Wang (2009), by summing the shares over all trading days in the quarter,
thus arriving at the share of the market that is traded in a particular quarter up to the
last trading day of the quarter (end of March, June, September, December). Thus volume
is measured over the same time period where expectations are measured. Moreover, end
of quarter PDs are associated with the trading volume accumulated in the preceding 3
months.
A.2 Numerical solution approach
We now describe the solution strategy for determining the functions Si(·) and τ i(·) and the
associated lump sum rebate T i(·). To simplify notation we drop all i superscripts. Also,
instead of solving for the optimal stockholding function S(·), we solve in our numerical
approach for the optimal consumption dividend ratio Ct/Dt = CD(St−1, PtDt ,
Wt
Dt
,mt).
There is a one-to-one mapping between the S (·) policy and the CD (·) policy due to the
flow budget constraint, which implies
Ct
Dt
= St−1
(
Pt
Dt
+ 1
)
+
Wt + Tt
Dt
− τt(St − St−1) Pt
Dt
− St Pt
Dt
,
and due to the assumption that τt = τ(St−1, PtDt ,
Wt
Dt
,mit) and Tt/Dt = τ |(St − St−1)Pt/Dt|.
We solve the first order condition by combining time iteration with an endogenous
grid point method, thereby avoiding any root finding steps in the solution procedure.
3The two numbers do not add up to 18379, since some records satisfy both criteria for elimination.
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This considerably speeds up the numerical solution. We now describe this procedure in
detail.
We start with a guess for the future consumption policy CD(j)(·), the transactions tax
function τ (j)(·) and the lump sum rebate relative to dividends TD(j)(·) = T j(·)/Dt, where
the superscript (j) denotes the j-th guess in the time iteration procedure and where all
functions depend on the arguments (St−1, PtDt ,
Wt
Dt
,mt).
Given the guesses CD(j)(·), τ (j)(·) and TD(j) (·) and given an alternative grid of cur-
rent values (St,
Pt
Dt
, Wt
Dt
,mt) - note this alternative grid contains St not St−1 - we can com-
pute the updated consumption policy C˜D
(j+1)
(St,
Pt
Dt
, Wt
Dt
,mt) and the updated marginal
tax function τ˜ (j+1), which are both defined over the alternative grid, by iterating on the
FOC (1.16). In particular, equation (1.16) implies
(
C˜D
(j+1)
)−γ
(1 + τ˜
(j+1)
t ) =
δEPt
(
CD(j)
)−γ (Dt+1
Dt
)1−γ (
Pt+1
Dt+1
(1 + τ
(j)
t+1) + 1
)
Pt/Dt
(A.1)
Given any point (St,
Pt
Dt
, Wt
Dt
,mt) on the alternative grid, we can compute the distribu-
tion over future (standard) grid points (St,
Pt+1
Dt+1
, Wt+1
Dt+1
,mt+1), using the perceived evolution
over prices, dividends, wages and beliefs. Together with the guesses CD(j)(·) and τ (j),
this allows evaluating the r.h.s. of (A.1) using a standard numerical integration method
(we use deterministic integration based on quadrature points). For future reference, let
M(St,
Pt
Dt
, Wt
Dt
,mt) denote the value of the r.h.s. of (A.1). The l.h.s. of equation (A.1)
then implies that we have also determined the value of the product (Ct/Dt)
1−γ(1 − τt),
at every alternative grid point.
It now remains to compute the updated functions CD(j+1), τ
(j+1)
t and TD
(j+1) which
are defined over the standard grid (St−1, PtDt ,
Wt
Dt
,mt). We do so by fixing an arbitrary alter-
native grid point (S∗t ,
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
,
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
,m∗t ) and by checking the range of possible situations
St−1 ≶ S∗t .
We begin by conjecturing St−1 = S∗t . The flow budget constraint then determines the
implied consumption dividend ratio, i.e.,
Ct
Dt
= S∗t +
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
. (A.2)
We can then check whether the tax rate τ
(j+1)
t associated with (A.2), defined as(
Ct
Dt
)−γ
(1 + τ
(j+1)
t ) = M(S
∗
t ,
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
,
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
,m∗t ), (A.3)
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satisfies τ
(j+1)
t ∈ [−τ,+τ ]. If so, then we have found the optimal consumption divi-
dend ratio CD(j+1) and associated shadow tax rate τ
(j+1)
t at the standard grid point(
St−1 = S∗t ,
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
,
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
,m∗t
)
. The updated lump sum tax rebate over dividends at
this gridpoint is simply TD(j+1) = 0.
If the value of τ
(j+1)
t solving (A.3) satisfies τ
(j+1)
t > τ , then it must be that S
∗
t > St−1.
4
We therefore set τ
(j+1)
t = τ and determine the equilibrium consumption dividend ratio
CD(j+1) from equation (A.1), which delivers
(CD(j+1))−γ(1 + τ) = M(S∗t ,
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
,
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
,m∗t ).
Finally, we use the budget constraint to compute the associated initial grid point St−1,
which must solve
CD(j+1) = St−1
((
Pt
Dt
)∗
+ 1
)
+
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
− S∗t
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
, (A.4)
where we used the updated lump sum rebate function TD(j+1) = τ ·(S∗t −St−1)
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
. We
have thus determined CD(j+1), τ (j+1) and TD(j+1) at the grid point
(
St−1,
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
,
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
,m∗t
)
.
If the value of τ
(j+1)
t solving (A.3) satisfies τ
(j+1)
t < −τ , then we must assume S∗t <
St−1 and thus set τ
(j+1)
t = −τ . Using (A.1) we can determine the equilibrium consumption
dividend ratio CD(j+1)
u′(CD(j+1))(1− τ) = M(S∗t ,
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
,
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
,m∗t ).
Again, we use the budget constraint to compute the associated grid point St−1, which
must solve
CD(j+1) = St−1
((
Pt
Dt
)∗
+ 1
)
+
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
− S∗t
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
, (A.5)
where we use the updated lump sum rebate function TD(j+1) = −τ · (S∗t − St−1)
(
Pt
Dt
)∗
We perform the iterations described above until convergence of the functions CD(j) (·),
τ (j) (·) and TD(j).
4Reducing τt so that it satisfies τt ≤ τ requires that (Ct/Dt)−γ increases, see the l.h.s. of equation
(A.1). From the flow budget constraint follows that this can only happen if St−1 decreases below S∗t ,
given the values for (Pt/Dt)
∗
and (Wt/Dt)
∗
.
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A.3 Inaction Regions and Adaptive Grid Point Choice
A transaction tax leads to partially flat stock demand curves (inaction regions) and
thereby introduces a high degree of nonlinearity - non-differentiabilities in the Pt
Dt
-dimension
- into the consumption policy function CD(j) (·) and the associated shadow tax τ (j) (·).
While linear interpolation between two grid points yields very accurate approximations
of these functions for most Pt
Dt
values, this is generally not true close to the boundaries of
the inaction regions, if these boundaries are not elements of our discretized state space.
Including the Pt
Dt
boundaries of the inaction region into the discretized state space
poses two challenges: First, the exact locations of these boundaries are not known a
priori, but depend on the optimal solution. Therefore, the Pt
Dt
grid is required to change
in every iteration. We describe in the sequel how we use an adaptive grid point choice
to ensure that our best guess for the inaction region boundaries is always part of the
Pt
Dt
grid. Second, these boundaries are not independent of other states, but vary with
(St−1, WtDt ,mt). Hence, the
Pt
Dt
grid is not only required to change in every iteration of the
algorithm, but also to be dependent on other state variables.5 We clarify below how we
interpolate our policy to states not contained in the discretized state space.
Adaptive grid points: Since the non-differentiability problem only occurs in the Pt
Dt
-
dimension, we fix a vector (St−1, WtDt ,mt) in the sequel. First, we observe, that the interior
of the inaction region in the Pt
Dt
-dimension can be identified by the shadow tax function
τ (·): The optimal consumption (or, equivalently, stock holding) policy does not change
in a neighborhood of the current value of Pt
Dt
, if and only if τ
(
St−1, PtDt ,
Wt
Dt
,mt
)
∈ (−τ, τ).
Since in such cases St−1 = St, the same relationship must hold for the function τ˜ defined
on the alternative “state space” (St,
Pt
Dt
, Wt
Dt
,mt). In our solution algorithm, we solve
for this function τ˜ by solving equation (A.3) under the assumption that consumption
satisfies the no trade relationship (A.2) and set it to τ , whenever its value exceeds τ and
to −τ , whenever its value is less than −τ . The boundaries of the inaction region are
therefore given for those values of Pt
Dt
, for which no trade consumption defined by (A.2)
and τ
(j+1)
t ∈ {−τ, τ} solve equation (A.3). This yields two equations(
S∗t +
(
Wt
Dt
)∗)−γ
(1± τ) = M(S∗t ,
(
P
D
)
±
,
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
,m∗t )
which we solve for the adapted grid points
(
P
D
)
± in each iteration of the above algorithm.
6
We make sure, that in our algorithm not only the functions CD(j) (·), τ (j) (·) and TD(j),
5Including all inaction boundaries for any combination of (St−1, WtDt ,mt) into a common
Pt
Dt
grid
creates a computationally prohibitively large number of discretization points.
6Note, that
(
P
D
)
+
and
(
P
D
)
− are functions of ((S
∗
t ,
(
Wt
Dt
)∗
,m∗t ), although this is suppressed in our
notation.
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but also these adapted grid points converge. The present approach is similar to the
approach proposed in Brumm and Grill (2014). The latter cover the discretized state
space with simplices and look for ‘just binding’ constraints on each edge of these simplices.
We only look at edges that are orthogonal to the (St−1, WtDt ,mt)-hyperplane, which is
computationally more efficient within the present setup.
Interpolation: We fix the set of initial grid points GS, GWD, GPD, Gm for the state
space. Our discretized state space is, however, not given by the product GS × GWD ×
GPD ×Gm, but instead by
GS ×GWD ×GPD ×Gm
∪ {(S,WD,PD+(S,WD,m),m) | (S,WD,m) ∈ GS ×GWD ×Gm}
∪ {(S,WD,PD−(S,WD,m),m) | (S,WD,m) ∈ GS ×GWD ×Gm}
The standard linear interpolation method on a Cartesian product of one-dimensional
grids is therefore augmented as follows: for a given query point (Sq,WDq, PDq,mq),
we first search for indices i, j, k, such that Sq ∈ [Si, Si+1], WDq ∈ [WDj,WDj+1] and
mq ∈ [mk,mk+1] and then linearly interpolate the policy in the PD-dimension for each
combination (S,WD,m) ∈ {Si, Si+1} × {WDj,WDj+1} × {mk,mk+1} using as a PD
grid the intersection of the discretized state space with the line parallel to the PD-
axis that crosses (S,WD,m). This yields eight interpolated policy values CDu,v,w with
(u, v, w) ∈ {i, i+ 1} × {j, j + 1} × {k, k + 1} of the function
(S,WD,m) 7→ CD(S,WD,PDq,m)
at the chosen closest (S,WD,m)-grid points. We then use ordinary three-dimensional
linear interpolation to obtain the interpolated policy value for CD(Sq,WDq, PDq,mq),
i.e.
CDinterp(Sq,WDq, PDq,mq)
=
∑
u=i,i+1
∑
v=j,j+1
∑
w=k,k+1
|Sq − Su||WDq −WDv||mq −mw|
(Si+1 − Si)(WDj+1 −WDj)(mk+1 −mk)CDu,v,w
We proceed analogously for linear extrapolation.
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Table A.1
p-values for equality of gain estimates
Experience groups 6-11 12-17 18-23 > 23
0-5 0.33 0.11 0.01 0.00
6-11 - 0.30 0.00 0.00
12-17 - - 0.11 0.00
18-23 - - - 0.00
A.4 Testing for Equality of Gain Estimates in Ta-
ble 1.4
Table A.1 reports the p-values for the null hypothesis H0 : g
i = gj for i 6= j.
A.5 No Tax Rebates
Table A.2 reports the outcomes shown in Table 1.8 in the main text for the case where
tax revenue is not rebated to investors (T it = 0 for all t,i). It shows that findings are
robust to making this alternative assumption on tax rebates.
Table A.2
Effects of introducing financial transaction taxes (no tax rebate)
No tax 1% tax 2% tax 4% tax 10% tax
E[PD] 135.77 137.11 140.18 143.99 152.01
std(PD) 122.13 122.89 125.54 128.29 131.48
corr(PDt, PDt−1) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
std(rs) (%) 11.63 11.72 11.97 12.26 13.78
E[rs] (%) 2.11 2.12 2.15 2.19 2.41
corr(PDt, EtRt+1) 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.89
corr(TVt, TVt−1) 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94
corr(TVt, PDt) 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.16
corr(TVt, |Pt/Pt−1 − 1|) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.04
corr(TVt, std(E˜
i
tRt+1)) 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.87
# of booms per 100 yrs 1.82 1.92 2.08 2.32 2.88
average boom length (quarters) 32.42 31.97 31.44 30.72 28.24
average boom peak (PD) 491.01 487.57 484.54 478.82 468.96
E[TV ] relative to no tax (%) 100.00 97.33 97.96 96.69 105.66
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data Sources
Data on Macro Aggregates Data series on macro aggregates and related variables
have all been downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database
maintained by the federal reserve bank of St. Louis (https://fred.stlouisfed.org). All time
series refer to the United States, are at quarterly frequency and cover the sample period
Q1:1955 to Q4:2014. Data on output, consumption and investment is from the National
Income and Product Accounts of the BEA. We measure nominal output by gross domestic
product (FRED Code “GDP”), nominal consumption by personal consumption expendi-
tures in nondurable goods (“PCND”) and services (“PCESV”) and nominal investment
by fixed private investment (“FPI”). Nominal values of investment subcomponents for Ta-
ble 2.4 are private residential fixed investment (“PRFI”) and private nonresidential fixed
investment in structures (“B009RC1Q027SBEA”), equipment (“Y033RC1Q027SBEA”)
and intellectual property products (“Y001RC1Q027SBEA”). These nominal series have
been deflated by the consumer price index for all urban consumers (“CPIAUCSL”) from
the BLS, which is consistent with the deflating procedure used for stock prices and in-
terest rates by Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) and us. Hours worked are based on
an index of nonfarm business sector hours (“HOANBS”) published by the BLS. Working
age population is based on data published by the OECD (“LFWA64TTUSQ647N”).
Stock Prices, Interest Rates and Investor Expectations We use identical data
sources as in Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017) and refer to their data appendix for
details. They use ‘The Global Financial Database’ to obtain data on stock prices and
interest rates until Q1:2012. We extend their stock price and interest rate data to Q4:2014
using identical data sources as they do.
We compute dividends based on price and total return index data of the SP 500 index
by the procedure outlines there, resulting in a dividend series {Dt}, where t runs through
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all quarters from Q1:1955 to Q4:2014. Given the price series from the price index {Pt},
where Pt is the closing price of the last trading day in quarter t, we define the price-
dividend ratio as the ratio Pt/Dt of the end-of-quarter closing price Pt and the within
quarter dividend Dt .
B.2 Details of the Projection Facility
Following Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016), we modify the belief updating equation
(2.12) to
lnms,t = ws,t
(
lnms,t−1 + g (lnQs,t−1 − lnQs,t − lnms,t−1) + g ln ε1s,t
)
where ws,t(·) is a differentiable function satisfying ws,t(x) = x for x ≤ ms,t and ws,t(x) ≤
ms,t for all x, with ms,t > ms,t. Beliefs are thus bounded below ms,t, but evolve as
described in the main text as long as they remain below ms,t. Following Adam, Marcet,
and Nicolini (2016) we consider the function
ws,t(x) =
{
x if x ≤ ms,t
ms,t +
x−ms,t
x+ms,t−2ms,t (ms,t −ms,t) if ms,t < x.
(B.1)
and calibrate the critical values
(
ms,t,ms,t
)
in both sectors s = c, i such that ms,t is the
degree of optimism that implies a quarterly PD ratio of 250 and ms,t is the degree of
optimism implying a PD ratio of 500. The critical PD values of 250 and 500 are taken
from Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016).
We now explain how these critical values can be computed. The Euler equation for
capital in sector s is
Qs,t = β (1− δs)EPt
[
Wt
Wt+1
Qs,t+1
]
+ βEPt
[
Wt
Wt+1
Rs,t+1
]
= β (1− δs)EPt
[
Wt
Wt+1
]
ms,tQs,t + βE
P
t
[
Wt
Wt+1
Rs,t+1
]
implying
Qs,t =
βEPt
[
Wt
Wt+1
Rs,t+1
]
1− β (1− δs)EPt
[
Wt
Wt+1
]
ms,t
and thus the price-dividend ratio is
Ps,t
Ds,t
=
1− δ
p
Qs,t
Rs,t
+
1− p
p
=
1
p
(1− δ) βEPt
[
Wt
Wt+1
Rs,t+1
Rs,t
]
1− β (1− δ)EPt
[
Wt
Wt+1
]
ms,t
+
1− p
p
. (B.2)
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The value ms,t is the value for ms,t in the preceding equation that causes the PD to
be equal to 250; likewise, ms,t is the value that causes the PD ratio to be equal to
500.1 Since the expectations of Wt+1 and Rs,t+1 both depend on Kc,t+1 (this follows
from equations (2.18) and (2.19) and the fact that Yc,t+1 = K
αc
c,t+1 (Zt+1(1− α))1−αc),
solving for the values
(
mc,t,mc,t
)
thus requires simultaneously solving for the optimal
investment Yi,t in period t. Since the capital stock dynamics in the investment sector
are exogenous, mi,t,mi,t can be computed once the new belief mc,t that incorporates the
projection facility has been determined.
B.3 Details on the Representation of Beliefs and Equi-
librium Existence
B.3.1 Belief Representations on Ω and Ω˜
We provide here details on the remarks made in footnote 32. To ease the discussion, we
first introduce some notation that will also be used in Sections B.3.2 and B.3.3.
Notation For each random (upper case) symbol A, denote elements of ΩA by a (these
are real sequences) and their t-th component by at (these are real numbers).
2 For each
random sequence {At}∞t=0, write shorter just A. On the domain Ω˜ = ΩZ ×ΩQ,c×ΩQ,i we
define the random variables (sequences) Z˜, Q˜c and Q˜i as projections on the first, second
and third component, respectively,
Z˜(z, qc, qi) = z, Q˜c(z, qc, qi) = qc, Q˜i(z, qc, qi) = qi.
Similarly, we define the random variables Z, X, W , Rc, Ri, Qc, Qi as projections from
the domain Ω = ΩZ ×ΩX ×ΩW ×ΩR,c×ΩR,i×ΩQ,c×ΩQ,i to the respective factor.3 We
make the difference between Z˜ (defined on Ω˜ consisting of typical elements ω˜ = (z, qc, qi))
and Z (defined on Ω consisting of typical elements ω = (z, x, w, rc, ri, qc, qi)) explicit to
avoid any ambiguity and confusion arising in the arguments below. In the main text, we
regularly do not make these distinctions and use the same symbols, whenever a variable
has the same interpretation, no matter on which space it is defined and whether it is a
random variable or a realization.
1In addition, we do not allow mc,t to exceed the theoretical upper bound on beliefs for which unique-
ness has been proven in Appendix B.3.3 (see Lemma 4), irrespective of the implied PD ratio. This is
done to insure equilibrium uniqueness, but is a purely theoretical concern. In practice, we encountered
not a single case in which this upper bound was binding in our numerical simulations.
2Because the variables mc and mi are lower case in the model, those symbols can denote both random
variables and realizations. This ambiguity should not lead to any confusion below.
3E.g. Z(z, x, w, rc, ri, qc, qi) = z.
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We regularly have to work with the big vector (Z,X,W,Rc, Ri, Qc, Qi) of random se-
quences on Ω.4 For space reasons, we denote this vector just by O (“observables vector”).
Furthermore, we use the following two conventions for the outcome mapping F : st 7→
(wt, rc,t, ri,t, yt, ct, it, ht) (where st = (zt, kc,t, ki,t,mc,t,mi,t, qc,t−1, qi,t−1)) introduced at the
end of Section 2.5
• We denote by FW , FR,c, FR,i etc. the components of that function
• By a slight abuse of notation, we denote by F also the mapping from the full
state sequence s = {st}∞t=0 into the full outcome sequence (w, rc, ri, y, c, i, h) =
{(wt, rc,t, ri,t, yt, ct, it, ht)}∞t=0, similarly we use the component functions FW , FR,c,
RR,i etc.
Mapping a Recursive Evolution into a Sequence Representation Consider a
fixed initial state s0 = (z0, kc,0, ki,0,mc,0,mi,0, qc,−1, qi,−1) and a measurable function G
describing a recursive state evolution as in the main text.5 For any sequence z ∈ ΩZ such
that z0 is consistent with s0, the recursion
st+1 = G(st, zt+1) t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
defines then a unique sequence s = {st}∞t=0 in Σ :=
∏∞
t=0R7 (Σ is the space of all state
sequences). The procedure just outlined defines therefore a function H : ΩZ → Σ which
maps technology sequences z into state sequences s.6 Obviously, if G is measurable and
Σ is endowed with the usual product σ-field, then H is also a measurable function. Call
H the sequence representation associated with G (and the initial state s0
7).
Consistency of Beliefs with an Evolution The following definition clarifies the
notion in the main text that beliefs about wages and rental rates be consistent with the
equilibrium mappings G and F . The definition is formulated for arbitrary mappings G
and F that do not necessarily need to correspond to the equilibrium mappings of the
model.
Definition 2. For a given measurable state evolution G and a given measurable outcome
function F , we say that a measure P on Ω implies beliefs about (W,Rc, Ri) consistent
4As a mapping, this vector just agrees with the identity idΩ, but this notation conceals the economic
interpretation of the random variables.
5The function G is allowed to be arbitrary here, but should have the same domain and codomain as
in Section 2.5. There is no need for it to conform with any notion of equilibrium or model consistency.
6Strictly speaking, the mapping is only partially defined due to the requirement that z0 has to equal
the first component of s0. This is not important for anything to follow and we will ignore it from now on
(alternatively, one could just keep the last 6 components of s0 fixed and specify that H always assigns
the value z0 to the first component of s0 ).
7From now on we consider a fixed initial state throughout without explicitly mentioning this anymore.
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with mappings G and F , if
W = FW ◦H ◦ Z, Rc = FR,i ◦H ◦ Z, Ri = FR,i ◦H ◦ Z
P-a.s. Here, H is the sequence representation associated with G.
Constructing Consistent Beliefs from G, F and P˜ The following lemma is the
main result of this section and provides the justification why it is sufficient to work with
the smaller probability space Ω˜ instead of Ω.
Lemma 1. For any given measure P˜ on Ω˜ and measurable G and F , there is a unique
measure P on Ω with the following properties:
1. The distribution of (Z,Qc, Qi) under P equals P˜;
2. The joint distribution of (Z,X) under P is consistent with the exogenous relation-
ship between Z and X;
3. P implies beliefs about (W,Rc, Ri) that are consistent with the mappings G and F .
Proof. We give an explicit construction of the measure P as the distribution of a set of
suitable random variables on Ω˜ under P˜ . First, the capital accumulation equation (2.25)
for investment-sector capital and the assumption Ki,t+1 ∝ Zt imply
k¯iZt = (1− δ) k¯iZt−1 +Xt ⇒ Xt = k¯i (Zt − (1− δi)Zt−1) , (B.3)
where k¯i is the (fixed) proportionality constant.
8 The second requirement that the joint
distribution of (Z,X) under P be consistent with the exogenous relationship between
those variables means that equation (B.3) has to hold P-a.s. for all t. We thus define a
random variable X˜ : Ω˜→ ΩX in a way that is consistent with the analog equation (B.3)
on the Ω˜ domain:9
X˜t := k¯i
(
Z˜t − (1− δi) Z˜t−1
)
.
Next, let the function H : ΩZ → Σ be the sequence representation associated with G.
As for X, we simply define random variables for wages, W˜ : Ω˜ → ΩW , and rental rates,
R˜c : Ω˜→ ΩR,c, R˜i : Ω˜→ ΩR,i, on the domain Ω˜ in a way that they satisfy the analog of
the consistency condition for the probability space (Ω˜, S˜, P˜), namely
W˜ = FW ◦H ◦ Z˜, R˜c = FR,i ◦H ◦ Z˜, R˜i = FR,i ◦H ◦ Z˜.
8Strictly speaking, k¯i is a model parameter. However, the choice of this parameter is not discussed
in Section 2.8, because its value does not matter for any results reported in the main text. Intuitively,
changing k¯i just scales up or down the production of consumption-sector capital and thereby changes
the units in which this capital is measured, which has no economic relevance.
9For t = 0 one must back out Z˜t−1 = z−1 from the entry ki,0 of the initial state: z−1 =
ki,0
k¯i
.
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With these definitions the random (observables) vector
O˜ := (Z˜, X˜, W˜ , R˜c, R˜i, Q˜c, Q˜i)
is a measurable mapping from Ω˜ to Ω and thus its distribution defines a measure P on
Ω. We claim that this measure satisfies the three conditions in the assertion and is the
only measure to do so:
1. Z is the projection defined by Z(z, x, w, rc, ri, qc, qi) = z, so Z(O˜) = Z˜ and a similar
argument shows Qc(O˜) = Q˜c and Qi(O˜) = Q˜i. So we get
(Z,Qc, Qi)(O˜) =
(
Z˜, Q˜c, Q˜i
)
= idΩ˜.
Because P is the distribution of O˜ under P˜ , this equation implies that the distribu-
tion of (Z,Qc, Qi) under P and the distribution of idΩ˜ under P˜ must be identical.
As the latter distribution is P˜ itself, this proves the first property.
2. The following equation holds by definition of the random variables X, Z and X˜ (for
all ω˜ ∈ Ω˜)
Xt(O˜) = X˜t = k¯i
(
Z˜t − (1− δi) Z˜t−1
)
= k¯i
(
Zt(O˜)− (1− δi)Zt−1(O˜)
)
.
=
[
k¯i (Zt − (1− δi)Zt−1)
]
(O˜)
As this equation holds on Ω˜, it must in particular hold P˜-a.s., soXt and k¯i (Zt − (1− δi)Zt−1)
must coincide a.s. with respect to the distribution of O˜ under P˜ , which is exactly
P . Hence, equation (B.3) holds P-a.s.
3. The consistency proof works along the same lines as the proof that (B.3) has to
hold P-a.s. by reducing it to the analogous consistency condition in the tilde space
for the tilde variables. The argument is omitted for this reason.
For uniqueness, suppose that P ′ is another (arbitrary) measure on Ω such that properties
1-3 are satisfied. Then in particular equation (B.3) holds P ′-a.s. for all t and by the
definition of X˜ and Z˜ we obtain for all t
X˜t (Z,Qc, Qi) = k¯i
(
Z˜t − (1− δi) Z˜t−1
)
(Z,Qc, Qi)
= k¯i (Zt − (1− δi)Zt−1)
= Xt P ′-a.s.
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(here, all equalities except for the last hold even ω-by-ω and the last is just equation
(B.3)). Similarly, from W = FW ◦ H ◦ Z P ′-a.s. (the consistency condition for wage
beliefs under P ′) and the definition of W˜ and Z˜ we can conclude
W˜ (Z,Qc, Qi) = FW ◦H ◦ Z˜ (Z,Qc, Qi) = FW ◦H ◦ Z = W P ′-a.s.
Identical arguments also yield
R˜c (Z,Qc, Qi) = Rc P ′-a.s.
R˜i (Z,Qc, Qi) = Ri P ′-a.s.
Combining those results with the obvious equations Z˜(Z,Qc, Qi) = Z, Q˜c(Z,Qc, Qi) =
Qc, Q˜i(Z,Qc, Qi) = Qi implies
idΩ = O = O˜ (Z,Qc, Qi) P ′-a.s.
But by property 1, the distribution of (Z,Qc, Qi) under P ′ must be P˜ and thus the
equation shows that the distribution of idΩ under P ′ must be equal to the distribution of
O˜ under P˜ , which is by definition P . Hence, P ′ = P .
B.3.2 Construction and Uniqueness of P˜
We first construct a measure and show that it has all the properties that any candidate
for P˜ has to have. We then argue why it is the only such measure. First, the following
two auxiliary constructions are required. As always, we assume implicitly, that an initial
state s0 = (z0, kc,0, ki,0,mc,0,mi,0, qc,−1, qi,−1) is fixed.
1. Let PZ be a measure on ΩZ that describes the exogenous evolution of Z, i.e. under
PZ for all t ≥ 1
log εt := log
(
Zt
γZt−1
)
is iid normal with mean −σ2
2
and variance σ2 and Z0 = z0 PZ-a.s. Clearly, a unique
measure with this property exists.
2. For s ∈ {c, i} let PQ,s be a measure on ΩQ,s that describes the subjective evolution
of Qs under learning, i.e. under PQ,s for all t ≥ 1
log εQ,st := log
(
Qs,t
ms,t−1Qs,t−1
)
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is iid normal with mean −σ
2
Q
2
and variance σ2Q and σ
2
Q = σ
2
ε . Here ms,t is recursively
defined by equation (2.12), for t ≥ 110
ms,t = ms,t−1
(
Qs,t−1
ms,t−1Qs,t−2
)g
.
In addition, Qs,−1 = qs,−1 PQ,s-a.s. Also, the measure PQ,c is uniquely defined by
these properties.
It is obvious, that PZ indeed describes the exogenous evolution of Z as defined in equation
(2.2) and that PQ,c and PQ,i represent the marginal distribution of Qc and Qi, respectively,
under agents’ beliefs, if they are to be consistent with the Bayesian learning formulation
in Section 2.5. So any measure P˜ on Ω˜ that correctly represents subjective beliefs as
defined in Section 2.5 must imply the marginal measures PZ , PQ,c and PQ,i on ΩZ , ΩQ,c
and ΩQ,i, respectively. The only issue left to discuss is thus which assumptions about the
dependence structure of the processes Z, Qc and Qi lead to a valid belief measure P˜ in
line with the assumptions made in Section 2.5. We claim that only independence does
and thus P˜ must be given by P˜ = PZ ⊗ PQ,c ⊗ PQ,i.
To see this, note that on the extended probability space that includes latent variables
in households’ filtering problem, agents must think that the four equations
logQc,t = logQc,t−1 + log βc,t + log εc,t
log βc,t = log βc,t−1 + log νc,t
logQi,t = logQi,t−1 + log βi,t + log εi,t
log βi,t = log βi,t−1 + log νi,t
hold with probability 1 for all t ≥ 1. In addition, as stated in Section 2.5, {εc,t}∞t=1,
{νc,t}∞t=1, {εi,t}∞t=1, {νi,t}∞t=1 are independent stochastic processes and independent of all
other model variables, including the process Z. But those two facts can only be simulta-
neously true, if the three processes Z, Qc and Qi are independent.
11
B.3.3 Existence and Uniqueness of G and F
The goal of this section is to prove Proposition 1. We start with a result that collects
important equations and gives an explicit characterization of the function F – up to the
presence of the argument Qc,t which is not part of the state St.
10Note that we here ignore the additional observable innovation present in that equation in line with
footnote 31.
11Formally, this would require a simple induction proof over time, which is not explicitly spelled out
here.
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 100
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, irrespective of beliefs, the following equations have to hold
Wt = K
αc
c,tZ
1−αc
t (1− αc)1−αc
Rc,t = αcK
αc−1
c,t Z
1−αc
t (1− αc)1−αc
Ri,t = αi
(
1− αi
Wt
) 1−αi
αi
Z
1−αi
αi
t Q
1
αi
c,t
Yt = K
αc
c,tZ
1−αc
t (1− αc)1−αc +Qssc Ki,tZ
1
αi
t
(
(1− αi)Qc,t
Wt
) 1−αi
αi
Ct = K
αc
c,tZ
1−αc
t (1− αc)1−αc
It = Q
ss
c Ki,tZ
1
αi
t
(
(1− αi)Qc,t
Wt
) 1−αi
αi
Ht = 1− αc +Ki,tZ
1−αi
αi
t
(
(1− αi) Qc,t
Wt
) 1
αi
for all t ≥ 0. In particular, (Wt, Rc,t, Ri,t, Yt, Ct, It, Ht) is a deterministic function of
(Zt, Kc,t, Ki,t, Qc,t).
Conversely, if these equations hold, and Hc,t, Hi,t are given by equations (2.27) and
(2.28), then allocations (C,H,Hc, Hi, Kc, Ki) and prices (Qc, Qi, Rc, Ri,W ) are consistent
with all equilibrium conditions (equations (2.15)-(2.25)), except for the two Euler equa-
tions (equations (2.16) and (2.17)) and the two capital accumulation equations (equations
(2.24) and (2.25)).
Proof. In any competitive equilibrium with subjective beliefs, the equilibrium equations
(2.15)-(2.25) stated in Section 2.6 have to hold. Based on these equations and definitions
in the model description, the expressions in the assertion can be computed. The wage is
given by
Wt
(2.15)
= Ct
(2.22)
= Yc,t
(2.1)
= Kαcc,tZ
1−αc
t H
1−αc
c,t
(2.27)
= (1− αc)1−αc Kαcc,tZ1−αct .
Similarly, the rental rate in the consumption sector is
Rc,t
(2.19)
=
αcYc,t
Kc,t
(2.1),(2.27)
= αc (1− αc)1−αc Kαc−1c,t Z1−αct .
Substituting Hi,t as given by equation (2.28) into the capital first-order condition of
investment firms (2.21) yields for the rental rate in the investment sector
Ri,t = αiQc,tK
αi−1
i,t Z
1−αi
t
(
Ki,tZ
1−αi
αi
t
(
(1− αi) Qc,t
Wt
) 1
αi
)1−αi
= αi
(
1− αi
Wt
) 1−αi
αi
Z
1−αi
αi
t Q
1
αi
c,t .
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Output is defined as Yt = Ct + It, so the asserted output equation follows from the
equations for Ct and It. The equation for Ct follows from Ct = Wt (2.15) and the
equation for Wt already proven. The equation for It = Q
ss
c Yi,t is obtained by substituting
Hi,t stated in (2.28) into the investment-sector production function (2.1). Finally, the
expression for Ht just combines hours in the two sectors (given by (2.27) and (2.28)) with
labor market clearing (2.23).
For the second part of the lemma, we just remark that all the equations (2.15), (2.18),
(2.19), (2.20), (2.21), (2.22) and (2.23) have been used in deriving the equations in the
first part of the lemma and inverting the arguments used there shows that these equations
also necessarily need to hold, if the equations in the lemma and (2.27) and (2.28) hold.
The functional relationships in Lemma 2 contain Qc,t as the sole argument that is not
contained in the state of time t. Qc,t and Kc,t+1 are simultaneously determined by the
consumption-sector Euler equation (2.16) and the accumulation equation of consumption-
sector capital (2.24). It has been shown in the main text how the former equation can
be solved for Qc,t under the assumption of subjective price beliefs, compare equation
(2.31). In this equation, still a conditional expectation Et
[
1
Wt+1
]
appears. However,
given the representation of W in Lemma 2, this conditional expectations can be easily
solved explicitly
Et
[
1
Wt+1
]
= Et
[
1
Kαcc,t+1Z
1−αc
t+1 (1− αc)1−αc
]
=
1
(1− αc)1−αcKαcc,t+1
Et
[
(γZtεt+1)
αc−1]
=
1
(1− αc)1−αcKαcc,t+1
E
[
εαc−1t+1
]
γ1−αcZ1−αct
,
where it has been used thatKc,t+1 is known at the end of period t and Zt+1 = γZtεt+1. The
expectation E
[
εαc−1t+1
]
of the log-normal variable εαc−1t+1 is simply given by e
(αc−1)(αc−2)σ22 .
Combining this result with equation (2.31), the price of consumption capital must be
given by equation (B.4) in the next lemma, which is key for the argument to follow. We
first formulate a version under the assumption of predetermined beliefs mc,t (no projection
facility applied).12 As in Appendix B.3.1, we use in the following lower case letters to
denote realizations of random variables.
12Note also, that the second equation (B.5) is just a combination of the capital accumulation equation
(2.24) with Yc,t =
It
Qc
and the expression for It from Lemma 2, so this equation has to hold along any
equilibrium path as well.
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Lemma 3. For any given (zt, kc,t, ki,t,mc,t) with zt, kc,t, ki,t,mc,t > 0, the equations
qc,t =
αcβ
1− β (1− δc) wtkαcc,t+1(1−αc)1−αc
e(αc−1)(αc−2)
σ2
2
γ1−αcz1−αct
mc,t
wt
kc,t+1
(B.4)
kc,t+1 = (1− δc) kc,t + z
1
αi
t ki,t
(
(1− αi) qc,t
wt
) 1−αi
αi
(B.5)
have a unique solution (qc,t, kc,t+1) with qc,t, kc,t+1 > 0. Here, wt = k
α
c,t (1− α)1−α z1−αt is
a function of kc,t and zt.
Proof. Equation (B.4) expresses qc,t as a function of kc,t+1, qc,t = f(kc,t+1), equation (B.5)
expresses kc,t+1 as a function of qc,t, kc,t+1 = g(qc,t). Clearly, due to wt, zt > 0 and αi < 1
the function g is strictly increasing on the domain (0,∞). Furthermore, as long as the
denominator on the left of equation (B.4) is positive, i.e. for kc,t+1 ∈ (K,∞) with
K :=
(
β (1− δc) wt
(1− αc)1−αc
e(αc−1)(αc−2)
σ2
2
γ1−αcz1−αct
mc,t
) 1
αc
,
f(kc,t+1) is strictly decreasing in kc,t+1.
13 Hence, also the function
h : (K,∞)→ ((1− δc) kc,t,∞) , kc,t+1 7→ g(f(kc,t+1))
must be strictly decreasing and thus there is at most one fixed point k∗c,t+1 (satisfying
k∗c,t+1 = h(k
∗
c,t+1)). As any solution (qc,t, kc,t+1) to (B.4) and (B.5) must satisfy qc,t =
f(kc,t+1) and kc,t+1 = g(qc,t), any such kc,t+1 must necessarily be a fixed point of h. Thus,
there can be at most one (positive) solution to (B.4) and (B.5).
Conversely, for any fixed point k∗c,t+1 of h, the pair (q
∗
c,t, k
∗
c,t+1) = (f(k
∗
c,t+1), k
∗
c,t+1) is
obviously a (positive) solution to (B.4) and (B.5). It is thus left to show that a fixed
point always exists. The function h is continuous and the following limit considerations
show the existence of a fixed point by the intermediate value theorem:
• f(k) → 0 as k → ∞, so h(k) → g(0) = (1− δc) kc,t as k → ∞, hence for large k
h(k)− k is negative
• f(k)→∞ as k ↘ K and g(q)→∞ as q →∞, so h(k)→∞ as k ↘ K, hence for
small k close to K, h(k)− k is positive
13When looking for a positive solution (qc,t, kc,t+1) to (B.4) and (B.5), we can restrict attention to
kc,t+1 > K, because otherwise qc,t = f(kc,t+1) becomes negative.
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Unfortunately, the above result treats mc,t as fixed, but due to the projection facility
described in Appendix B.2, mc,t is not fully predetermined in period t, instead might be
projected downward, if it implies a too high PD ratio. Hence, the simple result above
cannot always be applied. The following technical lemma deals with the more general
case.14
Lemma 4. For any given positive values of zt, kc,t, ki,t, mc,t consider the three equations
(again, wt = (1− αc)1−αckαcc,tz1−αct )
qc,t =
αcβ
1− β (1− δc) wtkαcc,t+1(1−αc)1−αc
e(αc−1)(αc−2)
σ2
2
γ1−αcz1−αct
mpc,t
wt
kc,t+1
(B.6)
kc,t+1 = (1− δc) kc,t + z
1
αi
t ki,t
(
(1− αi) qc,t
wt
) 1−αi
αi
(B.7)
mpc,t =
{
mc,t, mc,t ≤ m (kc,t+1)
m (kc,t+1) +
(m−m)(kc,t+1)
mc,t+(m−2m)(kc,t+1) (mc,t −m (kc,t+1)) , mc,t ≥ m (kc,t+1)
(B.8)
where the functions m, m are the projection thresholds for mc as defined in Appendix B.2.
15
If
mc,t <
1
β (1− αc)
(
γ
(1− δc) e (2−αc)σ
2
2
)1−αc
, (B.9)
then the equation system has a unique solution (qc,t, kc,t+1,m
p
c,t).
Proof. Ignore the capital accumulation equation (B.7) and first consider equations (B.6)
and (B.8). To transfer the proof from Lemma 3, we need to show that after substituting
mpc,t into the first equation, this still defines a decreasing relationship between kc,t+1 and
qc,t. As m(kc,t+1) is strictly increasing in kc,t+1 (and approaching −∞ as kc,t+1 → 0),
there is some threshold kˆ, such that m(kc,t+1) ≤ mc,t for kc,t+1 ≤ kˆ and m(kc,t+1) ≥ mc,t
for kc,t+1 ≥ kˆ. We consider the two cases separately:
1. If kc,t+1 ≤ kˆ, then the projection is actually used, so we have
mpc,t = m+
m−m
mc,t +m− 2m (mc,t −m)
14The additional upper bound on beliefs stated in equation (B.9) is of little practical relevance. In
all calibrations we consider, the upper bound is approximately equal to 11−αc ≈ 1.5, which implies an
expected appreciation in the capital price of 50% within the next quarter and is much larger than any
value mc ever attained in our numerical simulations. We nevertheless tighten the projection upper bound
mc,t to be always consistent with equation (B.9), see footnote 1. This additional modification does not
invalidate the proof of the lemma.
15m, m also depend on zt, wt and kc,t, which is suppressed in the notation.
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from the third equation. For notational convenience define the constants
A =
1
β(1− δc)
wt exp
(
(1−αc)(2−αc)σ22
)
γ1−αc (1−αc)1−αcz1−αct
B =
β (1− δc) kc,t
(p (1 + PD)− 1) β (1− δc)
wt exp
(
(1−αc)(2−αc)σ22
)
γ1−αc (1−αc)1−αcz1−αct
=
β (1− δc) kc,t
p (1 + PD)− 1A
B =
β (1− δc) kc,t(
p
(
1 + PD
)− 1) β (1− δc) wt exp((1−αc)(2−αc)σ22 )γ1−αc (1−αc)1−αcz1−αct
=
β (1− δc) kc,t
p
(
1 + PD
)− 1A
C = β(1− δc)
wt exp
(
(1− αc)(2− αc)σ22
)
γ1−αc(1− αc)1−αcz1−αct
= A−1
and drop all subscripts for the following argument (k refers to kc,t+1, q to qc,t and
m to mc,t).
Then we have (this follows from equations (B.1) and (B.2) for s = c)
m = Akαc −Bkαc−1, m = Akαc −Bkαc−1
and (from equation (B.6))
q =
const
1− Ckαcmp
1
k
.
Using mp = m+ m−m
m+m−2m (m−m), we obtain
const
q
= k − Ck1−αcmp
= k − Ck1−αc
(
m+
m−m
m+m− 2m (m−m)
)
= k − Ck1−αc
(
Akαc −Bkαc−1
+
Akαc −Bkαc−1 − Akαc +Bkαc−1
m+ Akαc −Bkαc−1 − 2Akαc + 2Bkαc−1
(
m− Akαc +Bkαc−1))
= CB − C (B −B) m− Akαc +Bkαc−1
m− Akαc + (2B −B) kαc−1
CB and C
(
B −B) are positive constants, so q is decreasing in k, if and only if
the expression m−Ak
αc+Bkαc−1
m−Akαc+(2B−B)kαc−1 is. Using that the derivative of x 7→
u(x)
u(x)+v(x)
is
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given by u
′(x)v(x)−v′(x)u(x)
(u(x)+v(x))2
, we find that m−Ak
αc+Bkαc−1
m−Akαc+(2B−B)kαc−1 is (strictly) decreasing
in k, if and only if16(−Aαckαc−1 + (αc − 1)Bkαc−2) (B −B) kαc−1
< (αc − 1)
(
B −B) kαc−2 (m− Akαc +Bkαc−1)
After expanding the products on both sides and canceling common terms, this
inequality simplifies to
0 < (αc − 1)
(
B −B)mkαc−2 + A (B −B) k2αc−2
⇔ m < Ak
αc
1− αc .
Finally, using the definition of A, we obtain the condition (from now on subscripts
are added back again for clarity about the timing of variables)
mc,t <
γ1−αc(1− αc)1−αcz1−αct
β(1− δc)wt exp
(
(1− αc)(2− αc)σ22
) kαcc,t+1
1− αc
(2.33)
=
γ1−αc(1− αc)1−αcz1−αct
β(1− δc)(1− αc)1−αckαcc,tz1−αct exp
(
(1− αc)(2− αc)σ22
) kαcc,t+1
1− αc
=
γ1−αc
β (1− δc) (1− αc) exp
(
(1− αc)(2− αc)σ22
) (kc,t+1
kc,t
)αc
This condition is tighter, the smaller is kc,t+1. The smallest possible value of kc,t+1
given kc,t is kc,t+1 = (1 − δc)kc,t (otherwise equation (B.7) is inconsistent with a
positive qc,t), so the above condition on mc,t is certainly satisfied, if
mc,t <
1
β (1− αc)
(
γ
(1− δc) e (2−αc)σ
2
2
)1−αc
,
which is exactly the condition required in the assertion. So as long as kc,t+1 ≤ kˆ,
the third and first equation define a strictly decreasing relationship between kc,t+1
and qc,t.
2. If kc,t+1 ≥ kˆ, then mpc,t = mc,t does not depend on the level on kc,t+1 anymore and
thus the third and first equation define a strictly decreasing relationship between
kc,t+1 and qc,t by arguments made in the proof of Lemma 3.
16Here,u(x) = m − Axαc + Bxαc−1 ⇒ u′(x) = −Aαcxαc−1 + (αc − 1)Bxαc−2 and v(x) =(
B −B)xαc−1 ⇒ v′(x) = (αc − 1) (B −B)xαc−2
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After substituting the third equation into the first, we have as before two functional
relationships qc,t = f(kc,t+1) and kc,t+1 = g(qc,t) with f strictly decreasing and g strictly
increasing. The same arguments made in the proof of Lemma 3 guarantee a unique
solution. The associated level of mpc,t can then be computed from the third equation.
We have now all the tools available to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Existence and uniqueness of the measure P˜ has already been
discussed in Section B.3.2 of this appendix. Here, it is left to construct the mappings G
and F . Throughout the construction only necessary equilibrium conditions are used and
no construction step admits several choices. For this reason, the construction will also
yield uniqueness of the mappings G and F .
Suppose St = st for an arbitrary (fixed) state st = (zt, kc,t, ki,t,mc,t,mi,t, qc,t−1, qi,t−1)
such that mc,t respects the upper bound of Lemma 4. For the following argument it is also
useful to define the “reduced state” sˆt = (zt, kc,t, ki,t,mc,t, qc,t−1) that does not include
mi,t and qi,t−1. We first show the existence of a unique state transition function Gˆ for this
reduced state. In any equilibrium, the wage is a function of Kc,t and Zt only, compare
Lemma 2. Hence, conditional on Sˆt = sˆt, Wt = F˜W (sˆt) with some deterministic function
F˜W (whose explicit form is given in Lemma 2). Furthermore, in any equilibrium (with
beliefs as specified in Section 2.5) the equations (B.6), (B.7), (B.8) have to hold along any
equilibrium path. Lemma 4 thus implies the existence of a unique vector (qc,t, kc,t+1,m
p
c,t),
given zt, kc,t, ki,t, mc,t and wt = F˜W (sˆt), which are all uniquely determined by the reduced
state sˆt, such that all three equations hold. The equations thus implicitly define three
functions
G˜Q,c(sˆt) = qc,t, G˜K,c(sˆt) = kc,t+1, G˜mp,c(sˆt) = m
p
c,t
and the argument given so far implies that along any equilibrium path qc,t, kc,t+1 and m
p
c,t
(the value of mc,t after projection) must necessarily be related to sˆt as described by these
three equations.
Next, mc,t+1 must satisfy the belief updating equation (compare (2.12) for the con-
sumption sector17)
lnmc,t+1 = lnm
p
c,t + g
(
ln qc,t − ln qc,t−1 − lnmpc,t
)
=: ln G˜m,c(sˆt),
where the right-hand side is a function of sˆt, because qc,t = G˜Q,c(sˆt) and m
p
c,t = G˜mp,c(sˆt)
are and qc,t−1 is a component of sˆt.
In addition, Ki,t+1 ∝ Zt by definition. Let k¯i be the proportionality constant, i.e.
Ki,t+1 = k¯iZt. This implies for realizations conditional on Sˆt = sˆt that ki,t+1 = k¯izt =:
G˜K,i(sˆt).
17As remarked in footnote 31, we set the additional shock to agents’ information set to 0 in all periods.
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In total, we obtain from the discussion so far that sˆt+1 = (zt+1, kc,t+1, ki,t+1,mc,t+1, qc,t)
must necessarily satisfy
sˆt+1 = (zt+1, G˜K,c(sˆt), G˜K,i(sˆt), G˜m,c(sˆt), G˜Q,c(sˆt)) =: Gˆ (sˆt, zt+1) .
Thus, in any equilibrium, the evolution of the reduced state sˆt+1 must be governed by
the transition function Gˆ. From our derivation it is also clear that the evolution of Gˆ is
consistent with the equations (B.6), (B.7), (B.8), the belief updating equation (2.12) in the
consumption sector and the exogenous evolution of Ki. In particular, Gˆ is then consistent
with the consumption-sector Euler equation (2.16) and with the capital accumulation
equations (2.24), (2.25) in both sectors.
Next, we let Fˆ be the mapping from reduced states sˆt to outcomes (wt, rc,t, ri,t, yt, ct, it, ht)
defined by the formulas given in Lemma 2, if qc,t is everywhere replaced by G˜Q,c(sˆt).
18
Combining this with the obvious state reduction mapping st 7→ sˆt, we can define F (st) :=
Fˆ (sˆt).
19 Lemma 2 tells us then that this choice of F is the only possible choice consistent
with equilibrium and in turn this F is consistent with all equilibrium equations other
than the two Euler equations and the two capital accumulation equations. Consequently,
F and Gˆ together are consistent with all the equilibrium conditions (2.15)-(2.25) except
for the investment-sector Euler equation (2.17). In addition, Gˆ is also consistent with the
belief updating equation for consumption-sector capital prices.
To complete the existence proof, it is left to show that Gˆ can be extended to a full
state transition mapping G that is in addition consistent with the investment-sector Euler
equation and the belief updating equation for investment-sector capital prices. First,
consider the conditional expectations in equation (2.34), which is a partially solved version
of the investment-sector Euler equation (2.17) from the main text. These conditional
18This means,
FˆW (sˆt) = k
αc
c,tz
1−αc
t (1− αc)1−αc
FˆR,c(sˆt) = αck
αc−1
c,t z
1−αc
t (1− αc)1−αc
FˆR,i(sˆt) = αi
(
1− αi
FˆW (sˆt)
) 1−αi
αi
z
1−αi
αi
t
(
G˜Q,c(sˆt)
) 1
αi
...
19We keep the separate mapping Fˆ as an auxiliary device for the extension of Gˆ to G below.
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expectations can be written as
Et
[
Wt
Wt+1
Ri,t+1
]
= E
[
FˆW (Sˆt)
FˆW (Sˆt+1)
FˆR,i(Sˆt+1)
∣∣∣St, St−1, . . .]
= E
 FˆW (Sˆt)
FˆW
(
Gˆ
(
Sˆt, Zt+1
)) FˆR,i (Gˆ(Sˆt, Zt+1)) ∣∣∣Sˆt
 ,
Et
[
Wt
Wt+1
]
= E
[
F˜W (Sˆt)
F˜W (Sˆt+1)
| St, St−1, . . .
]
= E
 F˜W (Sˆt)
F˜W
(
Gˆ
(
Sˆt, Zt+1
)) | Sˆt
 ,
where in each case the second equality follows from the fact that all information in
the history St not already contained in Sˆt is redundant for predicting Zt+1 and Sˆt.
Hence, both conditional expectations are deterministic functions of the current reduced
state Sˆt. As these two conditional expectations and Ri,t = FˆR,i(Sˆt) are the only rele-
vant variables to compute the projection bounds in the investment sector, compare Ap-
pendix B.2, conditional on Sˆt = sˆt, the projected belief in the investment sector is given
by mpi,t = G˜mp,i(sˆt,mi,t) with some deterministic function G˜mp,i. By equation (2.34), Qi,t
must then assume in equilibrium the value (conditional on Sˆt = sˆt and mi,t)
qi,t =
βE
[
Wt
Wt+1
Ri,t+1 | Sˆt = sˆt
]
1− βEt
[
Wt
Wt+1
| Sˆt = sˆt
]
(1− δ) G˜mp,i(sˆt,mi,t)
.
The right-hand side is a function of sˆt and mi,t and therefore of the full state st. Denote it
by G˜Q,i(st). Finally, the belief updating equation for the investment sector defines mi,t+1
as a function of the current state,
mi,t+1 = G˜m,i(st) := G˜mp,i(sˆt,mi,t)
(
G˜Q,i(st)
G˜mp,i(sˆt,mi,t)qi,t−1
)g
.
Define thus
G(st, zt+1) : =
(
GˆZ(sˆt, zt+1), GˆK,c(sˆt, zt+1), GˆK,i(sˆt, zt+1), Gˆm,c(sˆt, zt+1),
G˜m,i(st), GˆQ,c(sˆt, zt+1), G˜Q,i(st)
)
.
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By construction, G is then (together with F ) consistent with all equations that Gˆ is and
in addition with the investment-sector Euler equation (2.17) and with the belief updating
equation for mi. This finishes the proof of the proposition.
B.4 Details on the IRF Decay Restrictions in Esti-
mation
Capital prices in the subjective belief model show a cyclical pattern in response to a
technology shock: as prices fall from a boom to steady state, agents may be already
slightly pessimistic and prices undershoot, as prices recover from a bust back to steady
state, agents may already be slightly optimistic, triggering another boom. If these dy-
namics are too strong, deterministic cycles can exist or the cyclical dynamics can even be
self-amplifying (small shocks lead to a sequence of cycles of increasing magnitude). We
impose a decay restriction in the estimation to rule out such dynamics. The IRF decay
restriction does not impose a certain speed of decay within one cycle, but rather requires
the decay of subsequent cycle peaks over time to be sufficiently fast.
Specifically, for each sector s ∈ {c, i} we consider a long deterministic impulse response
path (400 quarters) for the capital price Qs to a one-standard-deviation technology shock
starting in the steady state. We identify all peaks (local maxima) of the resulting path
{Qs,t}400t=0, where at t there is a “peak”, if Qs,t > Qs,t−1, Qs,t+1. Let Tp be the set of
all peak times of the impulse response path. If |Tp| ≤ 1, we set the peak decay rate
to ∞, thereby always admitting such a parameter combination. If |Tp| ≥ 2, we fit an
exponential function through the points {Qs,t}t∈Tp , specifically we estimate the least-
squares regression
log
(
Qs,t
Qsss
− 1
)
= a+ bt+ εt, t ∈ Tp,
where Qsss is the steady-state value of Qs. We call −b the peak decay rate of the impulse
response. Figure B.1 illustrates the procedure graphically: the blue solid line is the
impulse response path, the red circles mark the peaks, i.e. the points (t, Qs,t/Q
ss
s ) for
t ∈ Tp, and the yellow dashed line represents the fitted exponential.
On the b parameter we impose the restriction −b ≥ 1.16%. This implies a half-life of
at most 60 quarters or – given a typical distance of approximately 40 quarters between
two peaks – a size reduction of at least one third from one peak to the next.
Parameter combinations are admitted in the estimation, if they satisfy this condition
for both Qc and Qi.
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Figure B.1. Illustration of the decay rate definition
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